Critical-Set Views, Biographical Identity, and the Long Term

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Critical-set views avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by subtracting some constant from the welfare score of each life in a population. These views are thus sensitive to facts about biographical identity: identity between lives. In this paper, I argue that questions of biographical identity give us reason to reject critical-set views and embrace the total view. I end with a practical implication. If we shift our credences towards the total view, we should also shift our efforts towards ensuring that humanity survives for the long term.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Baxter and Cotnoir on Composition as Identity.Joongol Kim - 2019 - 철학사상 [CHUL HAK SA SANG: Journal of Philosophical Ideas] 73:105-125.
Biography in literary criticism.Stein Haugom Olsen - 2007 - In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 436–452.
Why you don't owe it to yourself to seek health.S. Gorovitz - 1984 - Journal of Medical Ethics 10 (3):143-146.
Life Extension versus Replacement in Enhancing Human Capacities.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2011 - In Julian Savulescu, Ruud ter Meulen & Guy Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capabilites. Oxford, Storbritannien: pp. 368-385.
Arguing for classical critical theory.David Rasmussen - 2021 - Filozofija I Društvo 32 (1):5-10.
Habermas’ turn?Martin Beck Matuštík - 2006 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 (1):21-36.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-22

Downloads
249 (#79,828)

6 months
249 (#9,499)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elliott Thornley
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
In Defense of Fanaticism.Hayden Wilkinson - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):445-477.
Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.

View all 33 references / Add more references