David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (1):17-27 (2003)
Nowadays, science is treated an instrument of policy, serving the material interests of government and commerce. Traditionally, however, it also has important non-instrumental social functions, such as the creation of critical scenarios and world pictures, the stimulation of rational attitudes, and the production of enlightened practitioners and independent experts. The transition from academic to ‘post-academic’ science threatens the performance of these functions, which are inconsistent with strictly instrumental modes of knowledge production. In particular, expert objectivity is negated by entanglement with political and commercial interests. We cannot go back to the old academic model for science, but need to consider how to maintain its vital non-instrumental roles.
|Keywords||instrumental academic post-academic commercial interests expertise impartiality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Berel Dov Lerner (1995). Winch and Instrumental Pluralism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (2):180-191.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Nancy Cartwright (1980). The Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:38 - 48.
Rowan Cruft (2010). On the Non-Instrumental Value of Basic Rights. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):441-461.
Harvey Siegel (1996). Instrumental Rationality and Naturalized Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):124.
Danny Frederick (2013). Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science. THEORIA 28 (1):61-75.
John Ziman (2002). The Continuing Need for Disinterested Research. Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (3):397-399.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #88,744 of 1,004,683 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,743 of 1,004,683 )
How can I increase my downloads?