The paper draws upon new conceptions of place, space, interaction and community in Geography and Media Studies to explore the possibilities of extending existing conceptions of care and caring from the context with which they are traditionally associated—face-to-face encounters within a shared physical locale. It proposes three structures of 'caring at a distance', all of which have a core element of mediated or distanciated interaction, and concludes that mass media and electronic networks play a significant role in extending the scope (...) of beneficence beyond our 'nearest and dearest' to embrace distant others. (shrink)

The paper draws upon new conceptions of place, space, interaction and community in Geography and Media Studies to explore the possibilities of extending existing conceptions of care and caring from the context with which they are traditionally associated—face-to-face encounters within a shared physical locale. It proposes three structures of ‘caring at a distance’, all of which have a core element of mediated or distanciated interaction, and concludes that mass media and electronic networks play a significant role in extending the scope (...) of beneficence beyond our ‘nearest and dearest’ to embrace distant others. (shrink)

This essay counteracts that trend [regarding the debate about whether partiality can be justified, those supporting impartiality have generally been on the offensive arguing that morality calls for impartiality] by taking a closer look at the moral complexity of our social practices of partiality. My adoption of this approach does not represent an endorsement of current notions of impartiality. The ideal of impartiality, in my view, should be substantially reformulated. However, that the concept of partiality is transparently defensible. In this (...) discussion, I focus on the aspects of partiality that complicate the philosophical defense of it. In the first part of the discussion, I argue that the moral value of partiality depends partly on the moral value of the relationships it helps to sustain. It matters to the philosophical issues at stake that personal relationships can be abusive and oppressive. In Section II, I refer to the vastly unequal social distribution of the means for favoring loved ones. Because many people have inadequate resources for caring for their loved ones, our conventional relationship practices of partiality-practices by which we care only for our ``own''-can be disasterous for many people. This seriously complicates the defense of partiality. The paper ends with a discussion, in Section III, of ``global moral concern'' and the resistance which most partialists show to it. (shrink)

This paper defends some aspects of the intentionalist and internationalist worldviews of (an expanded) mainstream development studies against certain moral claims emanating from the New Right and a diverse post-Left. I contend that citizens and states in the advanced industrial world have a responsibility to attend to the claims of distant strangers. Although it is difficult to specify in determinate ways how this responsibility should be discharged—save for attending to basic human needs and rights—the responsibility itself derives from the interlinking (...) and asymmetrical exchanges that bind distant strangers together in an interdependent world economy. I draw on Rawls and Roemer to specify the nature of this responsibility. I also draw on Benhabib to make a modified Rawlsian theory of justice less abstract while continuing to insist on the possibility and necessity of conversations between radically different social actors. The final part of the paper attends to questions of plausibility. I suggest that New Right and (more so) post-Left critiques of an expanded mainstream in development studies and policy are ethically deficient to the extent that they commend alternative development strategies without giving proper consideration to their costs and disbenefits. Development ethics, I conclude, is not just about questions of transnational justice and positionality; it is also about the construction of plausible alternative worlds and practical development policies. (shrink)

This paper defends some aspects of the intentionalist and internationalist worldviews of mainstream development studies against certain moral claims emanating from the New Right and a diverse post-Left. I contend that citizens and states in the advanced industrial world have a responsibility to attend to the claims of distant strangers. Although it is difficult to specify in determinate ways how this responsibility should be discharged—save for attending to basic human needs and rights—the responsibility itself derives from the interlinking and asymmetrical (...) exchanges that bind distant strangers together in an interdependent world economy. I draw on Rawls and Roemer to specify the nature of this responsibility. I also draw on Benhabib to make a modified Rawlsian theory of justice less abstract while continuing to insist on the possibility and necessity of conversations between radically different social actors. The final part of the paper attends to questions of plausibility. I suggest that New Right and post-Left critiques of an expanded mainstream in development studies and policy are ethically deficient to the extent that they commend alternative development strategies without giving proper consideration to their costs and disbenefits. Development ethics, I conclude, is not just about questions of transnational justice and positionality; it is also about the construction of plausible alternative worlds and practical development policies. (shrink)

First Published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Introduction This book aims at continuing a conversation. It takes for interlocutor a writer who is himself today indefatigable in engaging with the ideas ...

This book explores the interface between geography, ethics and morality. It considers questions that have haunted the past, are subjects of controversy in the present, and which affect the future. Does distance diminish responsibility? Should we interfere with the lives of those we do not know? Is there a distinction between private and public space? Which values and morals, if any, are absolute, and which cultural, communal or personal? And are universal rights consistent with respect for difference? David Smith shows (...) how these questions play themselves out in politics, planning, development, social and personal relations, the exploitation of resources, and competition for territory. After introducing the essential elements of moral philosophy from Plato to postmodernism, he examines the moral significance of concepts of landscape, location and place, proximity, distance and community, space and territory, justice, and nature. He is concerned above all with the morality people practice, to see how this varies according to geographical context, and to assess the inevitability of its outcomes. His argument is seamlessly interwoven with everyday observation and vividly described case studies: the latter include genocide and rescue during the Holocaust, the conflicts over space between Israeland Palestine and within Israel itself, and the social tensions and aspirations in post-apartheid South Africa. The meaning, possibility and limits of social justice lie at the heart of the book. That geographical context is vital to the understanding of moral practice and ethical theory is its central proposition. The book is clearly and engagingly written. The author has a student readership in mind, but his book will appeal widely to geographers and others involved in planning, development, politics, social theory, and the analysis of the contemporary world. (shrink)

The essays in Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge deal with philosophical issues that arise from the existence of a diversity of cultural traditions. The discussions range from broad examinations of the relevance of cultural pluralism to morality, to studies of specific cultural practices. Some essays explore the relationship between pluralism and political theory; some contrast pluralism with relativism or distinguish it from reasonable disagreement. Others propose and defend a set of principles that apply to all societies, forming the foundation of (...) a common moral system. Still others delve into questions of moral psychology, attempting to explain why people hold the values they do. (shrink)

In this 1989 book Rorty argues that thinkers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein have enabled societies to see themselves as historical contingencies, rather than as expressions of underlying, ahistorical human nature or as realizations of suprahistorical goals. This ironic perspective on the human condition is valuable on a private level, although it cannot advance the social or political goals of liberalism. In fact Rorty believes that it is literature not philosophy that can do this, by promoting a genuine sense (...) of human solidarity. A truly liberal culture, acutely aware of its own historical contingency, would fuse the private, individual freedom of the ironic, philosophical perspective with the public project of human solidarity as it is engendered through the insights and sensibilities of great writers. The book has a characteristically wide range of reference from philosophy through social theory to literary criticism. It confirms Rorty's status as a uniquely subtle theorist, whose writing will prove absorbing to academic and nonacademic readers alike. (shrink)