Does economic globalization create a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top” in labor rights practices? Despite significant research on the possible impact of economic globalization on labor conditions, little consensus exists as to whether and what forms of economic openness might help or undermine labor rights. In this study, we illustrate the significance of considering the two distinct processes of de facto and de jure globalization. We argue that whereas de facto globalization in the form of (...) trade and financial transactions is likely to result in worse labor rights practices, de jure globalization that entails regulations to facilitate these transactions is likely to have a positive effect on labor conditions. Combining time-series, cross-national data on labor rights with data on economic globalization, we find significant evidence of the divergent effects of de facto and de jure globalization on labor rights practices. Results also indicate that the labor rights effects of de facto and de jure globalization are stronger for trade than financial globalization. We further show that the effects of economic globalization apply to both collective and substantive labor rights practices. (shrink)

As part of the roundtable “Economic Sanctions and Their Consequences,” this essay discusses whether economic sanctions are morally acceptable policy tools. It notes that both conventional and targeted sanctions not only often fail to achieve their stated objectives but also bring about significant negative externalities in target countries. Economic dislocation and increases in political instability instigated by sanctions disproportionately affect the well-being of opposition groups and marginalized segments of society, while target elites and their support base remain insulated from the (...) intended costs of foreign pressure. Sanctions might also incentivize target governments to use repressive means to consolidate their rule and weaken the opposition. Given these serious shortcomings, I argue that sanctions are ethically problematic tools of foreign policy. Nonetheless, this does not mean that sanctions should be rejected outright, as there might be cases where sanctions are the only viable option, and they might work effectively under certain circumstances. Rather, the essay suggests that policymakers should apply more caution in considering the use of sanctions given their low probability of success, and should be more concerned with the delicate balance between political gain and civilian pain before levying sanctions, whether comprehensive or targeted. (shrink)

This article offers a thorough analysis of the unintended impact economic sanctions have on political repression—referred to in this study as the level of the government respect for democratic freedoms and human rights. We argue that economic coercion is a counterproductive policy tool that reduces the level of political freedoms in sanctioned countries. Instead of coercing the sanctioned regime into reforming itself, sanctions inadvertently enhance the regime’s coercive capacity and create incentives for the regime’s leadership to commit political repression. Cross-national (...) time series data support our argument, confirming that the continued use of economic sanctions (even when aimed at promoting political liberalization and respect for human rights) will increase the level of political repression. These findings suggest that both scholars and policy makers should pay more attention to the externalities caused by economic coercion. (shrink)