Social and regional inequality remained of secondary importance in the 2017 House of Representatives election, especially in comparison to national security and constitutional reform. Still, the election victory of the coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kōmeitō was also due to its ability to shape the debate concerning Japan’s political-economic model of growth and inequality. Abenomics and regional revitalization were the dominating policies, which opposition parties criticized without having a real counter-model. A more detailed analysis shows, however, that (...) Abenomics has not yet fulfilled its promise of shared growth, and that the governing coalition’s discursive control over the political-economic agenda has significantly weakened. This creates opportunities for opposition parties in the future. (shrink)

In the 1980s, a wave of newstudies revolutionized the Japanese politics field. The empirical findings of this literature remain the conventional wisdom on Japanese policy-making patterns under the . In this paper, we offer a critical reinterpretation of the new paradigm literature. We do not offer new empirical analysis, but, rather, reconsider this conventional wisdom by putting a new spin on the evidence previous authors utilized to analyze the policy-making process in Japan under the 1955 System. Contrary to the conventional (...) view of strong central bureaucratic power, we argue that in the 1960s policy making was quite fragmented. In contrast to literature suggesting substantial politician influence in the 1980s, we argue that there was a decline in the influence of politicians in general in policy making. (shrink)

In the 1980s, a wave of newstudies revolutionized the Japanese politics field. The empirical findings of this literature remain the conventional wisdom on Japanese policy-making patterns under the . In this paper, we offer a critical reinterpretation of the new paradigm literature. We do not offer new empirical analysis, but, rather, reconsider this conventional wisdom by putting a new spin on the evidence previous authors utilized to analyze the policy-making process in Japan under the 1955 System. Contrary to the conventional (...) view of strong central bureaucratic power, we argue that in the 1960s policy making was quite fragmented. In contrast to literature suggesting substantial politician influence in the 1980s, we argue that there was a decline in the influence of politicians in general in policy making. (shrink)

What determines whether interest groups choose to contact politicians or bureaucrats? Despite the importance of this question for policymaking, democracy, and some prominent principal-agent understandings of politics, it is relatively unexplored in the literature. We argue that government stability plays a major part in interest groups decisions is their assessment of the likelihood that politicians currently in power will continue to be in the future. We deduce logical, but totally contrasting hypotheses, about how interest groups lobby under such conditions of (...) uncertainty and then test these using a heteroskedastic probit model that we apply to a unique longitudinal survey of interest groups in Japan. We find that when it is unclear if the party controlling the government will maintain power in the future, interest groups are more likely to contact the bureaucracy. When it is believed that the party in power will retain control for a considerable period, interest groups are more inclined to contact politicians. In addition, during times of government uncertainty, interest groups that are supportive of the governing party (or parties) are more likely to contact politicians and those that are less supportive will be more likely to contact bureaucrats. (shrink)