In recent years, there has been an increase in the adoption of Shari’a in Europe and North America as an arbitration protocol for the resolution of potential contractual disputes. In a largely secular Western business environment, this reality raises corporate policy implications for business organizations. In particular, questions are raised about whether Shari’a is by nature too unpredictable—and too dismissive of women’s rights—to be properly and ethically permitted by Western companies as a possible dispute resolution alternative. This article examines the (...) dynamics and factors that are involved as corporate managers decide whether Shari’a arbitration ought to be banned entirely from contractual negotiations. Arguments for and against the inclusion of a Shari’a arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and contract negotiations are presented. The article concludes that while managers should exercise great prudence and consider the moral implications of negotiating arbitration clauses, an organizational ban of the use of faith-informed arbitration generally, or Shari’a in particular, would be neither morally required nor optimally serve the interests of the organization or its stakeholders. (shrink)

This paper addresses the central moral issues regarding the burka ban in a liberal society: the freedoms of religion and expression, women's liberty, gender equality, state neutrality and public safety. The paper argues that the ban is unjustifiable in a liberal society for the following reasons: (1) liberal institutions increase the likelihood of voluntary decisions, (2) a legal measure that promotes a controversial conception of liberty is an undue interference with liberty, (3) the ban overrides women’s judgment regarding their own (...) interest rather than gives effect to it, (4) the principle of moral equality fails to support forced unveiling, and (5) the ban is discriminatory because it imposes a harsh burden on women by preventing religious observance. (shrink)

Peremptory norms of general international law are universally binding prohibitions that override any consideration for non-compliance. The question is how nonconsensual norms emerge from a consensual international legal order. It appears that either the peremptoriness of jus cogens renders consent superfluous to the norm’s binding force or consent divests jus cogens of its peremptory status. The goal of this paper is to resolve the dilemma by explaining why jus cogens is exempt from the general requirement of consent that binds states (...) to the rules of international law. The paper provides an impartiality-based account of enforcement that explains why a state’s refusal to give consent to jus cogens may be overridden in a consensual legal order. (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination of a widely accepted method of human rights justification. The method defends the universality of human rights by appeal to diverse worldviews that converge on human rights norms. By showing that the norms can be justified from the perspective of diverse worldviews, human rights theorists suggest that there is reason to believe that human rights are universal norms that should govern the institutions of all societies. This paper argues that the evidence of plural foundations (...) of human rights fails to increase our confidence in the universality of human rights. The paper defends the following claims: (1) the convergence on human rights is better explained as an accidental outcome than as an indicator of the universality of human rights, (2) the plurality of human rights justification is superfluous to the explanation of why human rights apply to all societies, (3) the aggregation of justifications decreases rather than increases the reliability of the universality belief, and (4) the reasonable disagreement among conflicting justifications generates an epistemic dilemma. (shrink)