Introduction -- The perceptual part of the soul -- Human perception -- The duality of the human soul -- Phronesis -- Conclusion.

This article addresses the question of how, by Aristotle’s lights, we apprehend concrete individuals, the objects of incidental perception. The author argues (a) that the incidental perceptible is indeed perceived and not interpreted, and (b) that what is perceived incidentally is an object as it bears significance to the projects and aims of the perceiver, rather than what the object is in itself (as it is commonly taken to be). Finally, the author argues (c) that this new way of understanding (...) what the incidental object of perception is provides a unified account of incidental perception that accommodates both animal and human incidental perception, while at the same time allowing that human perception is significantly different from that of nonrational animals. The article maintains that human perception is conditioned, but not interpreted, by intellect, and offers an account of the relationship between the two faculties that supports this interpretation of incidental perception. (shrink)

The bulk of the account of perception that Aristotle offers in De Anima focuses on analyzing the operation of the five senses and the reception of their respective objects. On Aristotle’s own terms, this analysis is an incomplete account of perception, for it does not explain how perception operates in the life of an animal, with the aim of supporting a certain kind of life. This paper aims to supplement the account of the five senses by considering perception in the (...) context of human life. I argue that human perception, i.e., rational perception, differs from non-rational perception insofar as the latter is perspectival—that is, the non-rational animal perceives objects only in light of its needs and desires—whereas the former is non-perspectival—that is, a person perceives objects as independent of and exceeding her desires. (shrink)