Neurolaw is the emerging research field and practice of applying neuroscientific knowledge to legal standards and proceedings. This intersection of neuroscience and law has put up some serious claims, the most significant of which is the overall transformation of the legal system as we know it. The claim has met with strong opposition from scholars of law, such as Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson (2011), who argue that neurolaw (and neuroscience more generally) is conceptually wrong and thus perceive most of (...) it as “nonsense” (Patterson, 2003). I expose a flaw in Pardo and Patterson’s arguments by means of confirmation theory. My main point is that Pardo and Patterson use implicit hypothetico-deductivism in their attack on neurolaw, and that we have good reasons to doubt the employment of such a model, because it faces serious theoretical problems. I then demonstrate how the alleged problems associated with neurolaw disappear if we use a quantitative probabilistic account of confirmation. I also explain why it provides a better account for the way the legal system actually works. (shrink)

The article focuses on some issues of a practical nature related to the implementation of activities for general and additional support for personal development of children and students in kindergartens and schools in Bulgaria. The authors hereby express their personal position based on discussion comments by deputy principals, teachers and other pedagogical specialists, during trainings on inclusive education in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria. Emphasis is placed on the modern dimensions of inclusive education, as well as on specific (...) features of the activities of pedagogical specialists in their work with children and adolescents. The philosophical concept of inclusive education at present in the context of normative documents and practice is presented. The article does not claim to be exhaustive. (shrink)