Descartes’ version of the Cosmological Argument in the Third Meditation is usually considered a failure, not because its conclusion doesn't follow from its premises, but because the truth of two of its premises is doubtful. One of these premises is that the objective reality of an idea is derived from a cause in which there is at least as much formal reality; the other, that only a being that possesses the qualities normally attributed to God could be responsible for the (...) idea of God. Typically there are two objections made in response to the first of these premises. First, we don't understand the concepts of formal and objective reality well enough to know whether or not the premise commands our assent. (shrink)

The topic of my dissertation is the treatment of the fallacies of composition and division during the scholastic period , the compounded/divided sense distinction which grew out of that treatment, and the philosophical use to which the distinction was put. For instance, a recognition of these fallacies during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries helped theologians deal with certain problems having to do with foreknowledge and human freedom. In addition, a recognition of the distinction between the compounded and divided senses of (...) propositions allowed medieval logicians after the first quarter of the fourteenth century to get clearer about what might broadly be described as the logic of propositional attitudes. ;In Chapter 1, I briefly summarize and compare theories of composition and division from Peter Abelard to Paul of Pergula . And in Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the treatments of composition and division presented by Lambert of Auxerra , Roger Bacon , and William Ockham . In these treatments, composition and division are viewed in terms of ambiguity. ;By the second quarter of the fourteenth century, one sees the discussion of composition and division move from a concern with ambiguous expressions to a concern with arguments comprised of unambiguous sentences having either the compounded sense or the divided sense in virtue of the sentence's word-order. "Infinitely fast does Socrates run; therefore, Socrates runs infinitely fast" is, according to William Heytesbury , invalid: the premise has the divided sense, and is possibly true; the conclusion has the compounded sense, and is impossible. With Heytesbury there is an increasing emphasis on the compounded/divided sense distinction in connection with verbs signifying mental acts or acts of will: 'know,' 'believe,' 'desire,' 'understand,' etc. In Chapter 4 I explain why these shifts may have occurred in the medieval treatment of composition and division. And in Chapter 5, I consider the effect of Heytesbury's treatment of composition and division on logicians and commentators who come after him. I focus in particular on the work of four fifteenth- through sixteenth-century Italian logicians and their views on epistemic logic. (shrink)

An obligation, in the sense in which it was of interest to medieval logicians from about the early thirteenth century to the end of the scholastic period, is, according to Paul of Venice, a relation limiting one to take some statement affirmatively or negatively. This relation is based on the actions of two individuals: one obligates the other by first putting forward a sentence which the respondent agrees to affirm or deny for a limited time. The sentence the respondent agrees (...) to affirm is called the positum; that which he agrees to deny, the depositum; and his act of agreeing, the admissio. After this relation is established between the opponent and respondent, the opponent proceeds by putting forward a series of sentences to which the respondent replies by granting, denying, or doubting — all in accordance with certain rules the two individuals have previously accepted as governing their exchange. If the respondent at any time grants what is inconsistent with the sentence he agreed to uphold, or responds in a way that violates the accepted rules, the exchange comes to an end. The respondent has failed in his obligation. (shrink)

In Interpreting the Religious Experience, John Carmody and Denise Lardner Carmody attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the nature of the major religions of the world. According to the Carmodys, religion is that aspect of a person’s life which concerns the ultimate structures and values of human life. If we accept this definition for the sake of argument, it follows that a people’s religion lies at the heart of that people’s concept of themselves, their world, and their relationship with (...) other peoples; and it follows that if one understands the nature of the world religions, one will be in a position to understand the nature of international conflict; presumably the problems of the USSR in Afghanistan as well as the problems of the Middle East and Ireland. The aim of the book’s authors might seem, therefore, to be providing the reader with materials to enable him to understand world politics better, and so to understand why the world is on the brink of ecological and nuclear disaster. Tracts of that sort are familiar. But it turns out, the authors’ aim is not so commonplace. They are out to analyze the religions of the world, sift the good from the bad, and propose a new religion which would enable the peoples of the world to have a proper respect for the world and for each other. (shrink)