ABSTRACTThis paper compares Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic critical realism and Michel Foucault’s implicit discursive realism. It argues that there is a surprisingly high degree of correspondence between the two social ontologies. Specifically, both ontologies suggest that there are three largely autonomous domains in operation: cultural, structural, and agentive. Yet, while each of these domains have a level of independence, yet they are also partially constituted by the content and form of the others. This paper discusses the potential to integrate the two (...) approaches in such a way as to overcome their respective short-comings, namely the underdevelopment of culture in Archer’s ontology, and the underdevelopment of social agency in Foucault’s ontology. (shrink)

It is somewhat of a mystery why one of Foucault's most important concepts—that of ‘dispositif’—is still quite vague in social and political theory; and while a small number of analyses have moved understanding forward, it remains stubbornly opaque. This paper argues that a strengthening of Foucault's concept can be achieved by integrating elements of Althusser’s formulation of a dispositif events), and a detailed examination of the shared conceptual history between dispositifs and discursive formations. Regarding, the paper contends that dispositifs restrict (...) three types of aleatory event: first, a ‘continuous present’ exerted upon objects and subjects; second, overdetermining repetitious occurrences; and third, negating the effects of unexpected aleatory events. The paper also argues that dispositifs are capable of producing certain forms of aleatory change. Regarding, four developmental thresholds of dispositifs are identified: strategic emergence, political elaboration, overdetermined a priori, and aleatory dominance. These two developments are argued to move Foucault's concept from being descriptive and largely passive to becoming a more theoretically active resource—what Deleuze terms changing the analytical to the diagnostic. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper takes Lee McIntyre’s argument for post-truth and uses it to explain the contemporary rise of bad faith and bullshitting social actors. The paper then posits the critical realist metatheoretical framework of ontological realism, epistemic relativity, and judgemental rationality as a means of understanding the societal placement and the operation of bullshit and bad faith. Utilizing the CR concept of alethic truth enables epistemologies to be judged on a standard of truth separate from the epistemology itself. Using this (...) separation of truth from truth seeking techniques, the social processes inherent in epistemic communities and their translation into social epistemology are then examined in order put bullshit in its social place. The conclusion then discusses some suggested actions to begin to bolster epistemic communities and their associated institutional forms, as well as supporting the production and use of individuals’ judgmental rationality. (shrink)