The London‐based Oily Cart theatre company aims to produce shows that are suitable forallyoung people. This paper closely examines one of their productions,Splish Splash, which was developed for children with profound and multiple learning difficulties. The paper's central purpose is to understand the value of this type of theatrical experience for these children. It argues that Winnicott's conception of play, and his account of the conditions that enable the capacity for play to unfold, provide a persuasive theoretical framework that makes (...) sense of Oily Cart's achievement. Winnicott's framework can integrate the views expressed (in interviews) by adults who were involved with or observed the show; arguably it is also corroborated by more recent infant research. (shrink)

It is a familiar idea that showing respect for someone requires an effort to take account of how she sees the world. There is more than one way we might do this. Williams suggests that each person is owed an effort at identification, whereas Rawls remarks that “mutual respect is shown … in our willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view.” The author explores these ideas as they apply to people with profound and multiple learning (...) difficulties and disabilities (PMLD), whose condition raises special difficulties in the way of complying with the conduct described here. The author examines the ideas of having a point of view and identifying with the person whose point of view it is, and shows how much—and also how little—these views can contribute to a principle of respect that includes people with PMLD. (shrink)

There is a view that what we owe to other people is explained by the fact that they are human beings who share in a common human life. There are many ways of construing this explanatory idea, and I explore a few of these here; the aim is to look for constructions that contribute to an understanding of what we owe to people with profound and multiple learning difficulties and disabilities. In exploring the idea of sharing in a common life (...) I construe ‘sharing’ as ‘participating in’, and ‘common life’ as the social life characteristic of the environment that someone lives in. My principal purpose is to render the idea of sharing in a common life in terms that help explain its eligibility as a ground for establishing the moral status of people with PMLD. The participatory options I examine each make some call on agency, if only as something hoped for in the future, including when hope flies in the face of expectation. Accordingly I look at conceptions of actual and potential participation in social life, and at the idea of treating people as if they have the potential to participate, even when the existence of any such potential is unlikely. I conclude with some thoughts on the relation between participation and the moral status of profoundly disabled people, and about how much, and how little, the argument has achieved. (shrink)