Whistleblowing is an effective tool against fraud and corruption in organizations. However, as researchers have struggled to acquire data on actual whistleblowers, research relies on hypothetical intention data and student samples, which is seen as a major limitation. Using a field study of 1,416 employees from China, Germany, and Russia, the purpose of this article is to identify differences and similarities between intention and actual whistleblowing decisions, thus aiding research and interpretation of prior and future studies. I also contribute by (...) analyzing whether findings can be generalized across different cultures and whether status and power influence the whistleblowing process. My results reveal that the key difference between hypothetical and real decisions is not in variables that affect the process, but in effect sizes: Employees underestimate the effect of situational (retaliation) and organizational (compliance measures) variables in hypothetical compared to actual whistleblowing. Thus, reliance on intention research is not inherently problematic, when effect sizes are interpreted with caution. I also find that results are similar across countries and that status and power may not be decisive factors in whistleblowing. My findings should also be of interest to practitioners and policymakers, as they assist in designing effective whistleblowing systems and environments in organizations. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

I comment on some mistakes made my Dhamija and Rai in their paper “Role of retaliation and value orientation in whistleblowing intentions.” They fail to correctly interpret the overall model statistics, the F-test, which shows that some of their models have no explanatory power. I explain and give examples to readers on how to avoid this in the future. In addition, I give some suggestions on improving on this, additional issues, as well as an alternative means to interpret the results.

Whistleblowing is regularly identified as corporate control mechanism to prevent and uncover fraud. We review and compare the legal situation for whistleblowers in the People’s Republic of China and India. In a survey of 942 employees from private companies in both countries, we take a look at the status quo of whistleblowing system implementation, explore preference of channels to disclose fraud or corruption, and analyze under which conditions and what kind of employees prefer external over internal whistleblowing. We find that (...) provisions for mandatory whistleblowing systems can be found in the law of both countries. In China in particular, protection is scattered across many different laws in the private sector. Indian companies seem to have systems in place more often, although this difference becomes smaller the larger the company. The general preference of internal over external channels is similar across countries. Our regression models suggest that external channels are preferred over internal ones when fear of retaliatory measures is higher, the company is smaller, and the whistleblower is female. In line with prior literature, the effect of fear of retaliation is moderated by gender: women are less influenced by retaliation. All in all, implementation of whistleblowing systems seems ubiquitous in both countries; legal protection and comprehensive measures to decrease retaliation are lacking. Additional implications of findings are discussed. (shrink)