In Book VI of the Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius presents Cynicism as a philosophical school with origins in Socrates and prefiguring Stoicism, through the sequence: Socrates–Antisthenes–Diogenes–Crates–Zeno. However, the part of the sequence linking Diogenes to Crates is not unanimously accepted. Diogenes Laertius himself mentions that Crates had two other teachers: Bryson of Achaea and Stilpo. The first is unknown, but the sources tell us enough about the second to discern certain similarities between his philosophy and (...) that of Crates. When he wrote Book VI, Diogenes Laertius dismissed this parallel tradition connecting Crates to the Megarian school, preferring to link Stoicism to Socrates via Cynicism exclusively. Although Crates is unquestionably the philosophical heir of Diogenes, it is quite possible that he may have been influenced by both the Cynics and the Megarians. (shrink)

The testimonies of Stilpo of Megara show an anti-Platonic position within the megaric program against fundationists attempts. This paper studies a particular point of this deployment. We will review the origin of the views that locate thruth on the onomastic or on the predicative level. This initial survey will provide the basis for the study of the paradoxes of the nomination, an element Stilpo used as a tool to challenge the theory of Forms, and the analysis of the (...) aporias of predication, through which he rejects the combination of parts of the sentence in order to represent reality. The figure of Stilpo reveals the dialogical context in which ancient philosophies developed and, at the same time, displays ways of thinking the relationship between language and reality often forgotten. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the existence of a Dialectical school proper against criticisms brought forward by Klaus Döring and by Jonathan Barnes. Whereas Döring claims that there was no Dialectical school separate from the Megarians, Barnes takes issue with my claim (argued for in “Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus”) that most of the reports in Sextus on the dialecticians refer to members of the Dialectical school. Barnes contends that these dialecticians are in fact Stoic logicians. As against (...) Döring, I argue that the passage in Diogenes Laertius II 113 (first drawn attention to by David Sedley) which talks of a the Megarian Stilpo winning over disciples from the Dialecticians is not refuted by Döring’s arguments. It clearly shows that the Dialecticians and the Megarians at the time were taken to be different philosophical sects. As against Barnes I insist on the differences between the report in Ps.-Galen’s Historia 9 and the Sextan report on the theory of sign in AM VIII. These reports offer incompatible definitions of the indicative sign. Moreover, the classification of simple propositions reported by Sextus at AM VIII 96f. cannot be a truncated version of the (Stoic) list to be found in Diogenes Laertius VII 69f. since in Sextus’ report one of the three classes of simple propositions is labelled middle (meson). This is a certain sign that we are dealing with a triad, and hence that this list is meant to be complete. Therefore the classification found in Sextus and attributed to the dialecticians and the one in Diogenes Laertius reporting Stoic material do come from different sources. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar la ontología de distintas corrientes socráticas con un enfoque por Zonas de tensión dialógica. Antístenes y los megáricos Euclides y Estilpón despliegan modelos de negatividad que rechazan la afirmación de principios ontológicos capaces de sustentar lo real y su expresión en el lenguaje. Estas propuestas teóricas no solo ofrecen una perspectiva alternativa a la platónico-aristotélica, sino que influyen de manera decisiva, por medio de la interacción e influencia recíproca, en la construcción de las (...) variantes afirmativas de la época clásica. De este modo, la inclusión de las líneas socráticas permite poner en cuestión el diagnóstico heideggeriano que ve en la filosofía griega la sede del paradigma de la "metafísica de la presencia". La recuperación de las filosofías socráticas, habitualmente invisibilizadas bajo las figuras de Platón y Jenofonte, ofrece una oportunidad para redimensionar la Antigüedad clásica en función de propuestas ontológicas divergentes. ABSTRACT In this article we intend to analyze the ontology of different Socratic lines of thought, through an approach of Zones of dialogic tension. Antisthenes and the megarics Euclid and Stilpo develop ontologically negative conceptions that reject the affirmation of ontological principles capable of sustaining reality and its linguistic expression. This theoretical stance not only offers an alternative to the platonic-aristotelic approach towards ontology, but affects, by means of interaction and reciprocal influence, the constitution of those affirmative variants in classical Greek thought. Thereby, the inclusion of Socratic lines of thought allows us to question the heideggerian diagnosis of ancient Greek philosophy, inscribed solely in the paradigm of "metaphysics of presence". The recovery of the Socratic philosophers, usually obscured by the figures of Plato and Xenophon, offers an opportunity to redimension the period of classical antiquity through the study of its diverse ontological conceptions. (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende elucidar los rasgos generales de la metafísica de los megáricos en contra de las interpretaciones tradicionales que les atribuyen la defensa de un monismo numérico o una teoría de las Formas. Con base en los testimonios sobre Euclides y Estilpón de Mégara, intentaré mostrar que la metafísica megárica se caracteriza principalmente por el desarrollo de los conceptos de unidad e identidad de cada cosa consigo misma, lo que conlleva el rechazo de la diferencia y, en consecuencia, de (...) cualquier tipo de cambio. Esta perspectiva no excluye la existencia de múltiples entidades que, sin embargo, no son Formas. Por esta razón, los megáricos no desarrollan un monismo de tipo numérico, sino que su visión es coherente con un monismo de tipo predicativo que impugna la posibilidad de adjudicar atributos múltiples a una misma entidad. This paper purports to clarify the general features of Megarian metaphysics against two traditional interpretations which ascribe to this philosophical group either the defense of a numerical monism or a theory of Forms. Based on the testimonies of Euclid and Stilpo of Megara, I will aim to show that a main characteristic of Megarian metaphysics is the development of the concepts of unity and identity of each thing to itself, which involves a disavowal of difference as a possible property and, consequently, of any kind of change. I also intend to show that, although this standpoint does not exclude the existence of multiple entities, it implies that these entities are not Forms. Consequently, the Megarians do not develop a numerical monism but a predicational one, according to which the adscription of many predicates to the same entity is rejected. (shrink)

In a 1793 essay, J. Ch. Schwab claimed that Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments was already known to the Megarian philosopher Stilpo. Schwab's essay was criticised as early as 1794 by J. F. Ch. Gräffe. In a 1789 essay, J. A. Eberhard had also denied the originality of Kant's division of judgments and made certain indications suggesting that Aristotle was aware of the distinction. In this paper, I propose a fresh examination of why Schwab is wrong to (...) attribute knowledge of Kant's division of judgments to Stilpo – a second look which, however, does not disregard Gräffe's contributions to the discussion. Second, I argue that, in a precise sense, Kant's division of judgments is indeed original, but that the analytic – synthetic distinction was nevertheless in a sense known to Aristotle. The assessment of these alleged precedents sheds light no only on the novelty of Kant's philosophical project but also on what may be called the "the paradox of the discovery of an evident philosophical distinction". (shrink)

Dotted throughout the records of the turbulent last decades of fourth-century Athens are reports—often frustratingly vague—of prosecutions, many of intellectuals on the charge of . Most belong to the period of Macedonian domination: Theophrastus was one targeted at this time, and we hear also of actions against Demetrius of Phalerum, Theodorus the atheist, and Stilpo of Megara. Even before the Athenian capitulation to Macedon, in the immediate aftermath of the death of Alexander, prosecutions were launched against Demades and Aristotle. (...) These two early prosecutions are generally accepted to have had a political purpose, being attacks aimed at Macedonian sympathizers by the more staunchly pro-democratic Athenian elements; the later trials, however, are poorly attested in the sources and have received less scholarly attention, particularly for their political aspects. (shrink)

Dotted throughout the records of the turbulent last decades of fourth-century Athens are reports—often frustratingly vague—of prosecutions, many of intellectuals on the charge of . Most belong to the period of Macedonian domination: Theophrastus was one targeted at this time, and we hear also of actions against Demetrius of Phalerum, Theodorus the atheist, and Stilpo of Megara. Even before the Athenian capitulation to Macedon, in the immediate aftermath of the death of Alexander, prosecutions were launched against Demades and Aristotle. (...) These two early prosecutions are generally accepted to have had a political purpose, being attacks aimed at Macedonian sympathizers by the more staunchly pro-democratic Athenian elements; the later trials, however, are poorly attested in the sources and have received less scholarly attention, particularly for their political aspects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien. By Klaus D~ring. (Amsterdam : Verlag B. R. Griiner N.V., 1972. Pp. xii q- 185) D~Sring has assembled the first complete collection of textual fragments concerning the Megarian philosophers of the fourth and third centuries B.c., together with a commentary. The fragments are divided by the author into four groups, each centered around one of the better-known figures of the school: (...) Euclid, Eubulides, Diodorus Cronus, Stilpo. Evidences concerning lesser-known personalities are included under the figure to whose "circle" they belonged. A fifth group of texts appears in an Anhang devoted to the sophist Bryson (often mistakenly associated with the Megarians) and his student Polyxenus. Divisions in the commentary parallel those in the text. The author also adds a stemma summarizing his conclusions about teacher-pupil relationships within the school, and there is a selective bibliography and a SteUenregister. An index, which in view of the work's organization would be helpful, is not included. Simply as a collection of texts, this is a major addition to the scholarship in its field; with the author's commentary, it is the most important work on the Megarians since Kurt von Fritz's Real-Encyclopiidie article.1 D~Sringpresents convincing evidence that some widely disseminated opinions about the school have little or no foundation. Some of his alternative views have important consequences, and not only for the history of the Megarians. DSring rejects the dates customarily assigned to the school's founder Euclid (ca. 450ca. 380), pointing out that there is actually no good evidence for them (pp. 73-74). His own figures (ca. 435-ca. 365) rely on the evidence of Plato's Theaetetus to give the year 369 as a terminus post quem for Euclid's death. The first consequence of this chronology is that the story of Euclid stealing into Athens disguised as a woman in order to avoid the anti-Megarian decree of 432 must be rejected; Dfiring feels that it is probably one of a family of tales elaborated by later writers "urn die Macht der Philosophie zu demonstrieren " (p. 74). A more important consequence is in store when this chronology is combined with a reassessment of the evidence relating to Euclid's philosophical position. D6ring rejects the traditional description of Euclid as a "neo-Eleatic" who attempted to combine a strict Parmenidean monism with Socrates' ethical views by identifying the "One" with the "Good." Following yon Fritz, he sees this as "eine ziemlich gewaltsame antike Doxographenkonstruktion" (p. 83). His own view reverses the importance of Socratic and Eleatic elements in Euclid's thought, making him "[ein] Sokratiker, der die dem Sokratischen Denken inh~ente eleatische Komponente weiterentwickelt hat" (p. 87). Together with the revision of Euclid's dates, this would appear to eliminate decisively Kr~imer's thesis that Euclid originated the "Gleichsetzung ontologischer und axiologischer Momente''e fundamental to Platonic metaphysics. First, Euclid was only a few years older than Plato (not "at least two decades," as KrOner requires); second, there is no evidence whatever that he had studied the Eleatic doctrines before meeting Socrates; and finally, the purported "Gleichsetzung" appears to be rather the work of doxographers (pp. 87-89). When we add DSring's skeptical assessment of the story of Plato's Megarian period (p. 76), there remains little evidence to support the theory that Euclid was the ultimate source of Plato'S metaphysics. The most famous achievements of the M~garians were in the sphere of logic. Here, x Suppl. V (1931), s. v. "Megariker." H. J. Kr~mer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles (Heidelberg, 1959), p. 506. [52H 522 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Dtring's work should provide the impetus for further research; his collection of texts is much more comprehensive than anything previously available, and his commentary, although deliberately limited to an overview, at least provides a good account of the status quaestionis. The material on the paradoxes attributed to the Megarians (pp. 106-114) is particularly valuable; he gives a good conspectus of the extensive literature on the "Liar" and "sorites," and his remarks on the lesser-known paradoxes (the "Man Who Escapes Notice," the "Electra," the "Hooded... (shrink)