In African philosophical literature, and especially in Afro-communitarianism, there are discussions about the value of the relationship an individual has with her respective community. By community, reference is made to the metaphysical holistic view of community which includes all beings in nature. But since the article deals with gender, which is a social construction, most of the arguments appeal to a narrower version of community, that of human beings. Therefore, discussions about “value” refer to the value that is given to (...) the relationship that surpasses any individual value, and it applies or appeals to human beings. One implication of this understanding and the prioritisation of the relationship is that identity is something that is conferred by this sort of relationship. In this article, we argue that this way of understanding “identity” from an Afro-communitarian world view has something to offer in understanding or conceptualising gender(ed) identity(ies). The assumption is that gender identity will be understood as socially conferred and most importantly, one that takes community as essential. (shrink)

Thaddeus Metz, “African conceptions of human dignity” (2012), presents an African conception of dignity that he relates to human rights. In this paper, while ignoring Metz’s discussion on human rights, I specifically look at how this conception can be applied to one of the problematic moral issues, killing of persons with albinism. That is, how Metz’s view would account for exclusion and wrongness of killing of persons with albinism. I argue that the killing of persons with albinism is acting in (...) violation of their dignity. This comes from the view that persons with Albinism are human beings with a dignity, and therefore ought not to be killed. I offer a discussion on how dignity as capacity for community based on shared identity and good-will is not reflected in the way persons with albinism are treated in Malawi. (shrink)

Dennis Masaka argues that individuals have rights outside those conferred by the community. The argument is a critique to Ifeanyi Menkiti’s view of personhood. He argues that Menkiti uses the word person and personhood as synonymous. Masaka makes a distinction between the two, where person is an ontological concept, and personhood is a normative concept. For Masaka, individuals have rights by virtue of being persons and not personhood. My approach to the paper is therapeutic. I argue that Masaka misinterprets Menkiti’s (...) views. I argue that Menkiti does not allocate rights in his idea of personhood and as something conferred by the community as proposed by Masaka. This implies that Masaka’s view is not radically different from Menkiti’s. (shrink)