This paper has two aims. The first is to present and defend a new argument for rights contributionism – the view that the notion of a moral claim-right is a contributory (or pro tanto) rather than overall normative notion. The argument is an inference to the best explanation: it is argued that (i) there are contributory moral factors that contrast with standard moral reasons by way of having a number of formal properties that are characteristic of rights, even though they (...) can be overridden, and (ii) that this is best explained by a view that takes these factors to correlate with rights. The second aim is to show that the truth of rights contributionism matters for normative ethics. More specifically, it is argued that rights contributionism clears the way for deontologists to justify the pre-theoretically plausible verdict that we have a duty to save the greater number in so-called Taurek scenarios – scenarios in which we have to choose between saving either a greater or a smaller number of different people. The chapter offers a novel and distinctively deontological explanation of this verdict that is based on the assumption that everyone has a pro tanto right to be saved in a Taurek scenario. (shrink)

Political actions by Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, and other climate activists often involve violations of legal regulations – such as compulsory education requirements or traffic laws – and have been criticized for this in the public sphere. In this essay, I defend the view that these violations of the law constitute a form of morally justified civil disobedience against climate policies. I first show that these actions satisfy the criteria of civil disobedience even on relatively strict conceptions of civil (...) disobedience. I then argue that they meet plausible justification conditions for civil disobedience because they are directed against serious and clear injustices, which legal means of influence have failed to remedy for decades. Finally, I reject the objection that civil disobedience against climate policy violates basic democratic principles because it claims authority to override democratically enacted agreements. When addressed to Fridays for Future activists, the objection misfires for the reason alone that these activists are largely minors that are excluded from democratic participation. Moreover, disobedience even by adult activists is justified by the existence of serious democratic deficits in our climate policies, especially since it can help to correct them. Such deficits include the lack of representation of the interests of people affected by climate change in the future and globally. (shrink)

In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often called the right kind of reasons (henceforth: RKR) and the wrong kind of reasons (henceforth: WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-called buck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face the wrong kind of reasons problem. But nowadays it also gets applied in (...) other philosophical contexts and to reasons for other responses than pro-attitudes, for example in recent debates about evidentialism and pragmatism about reasons for belief. While there seems to be wide agreement that there is a general and uniform distinction that applies to reasons for different responses, there is little agreement about the scope, relevance and nature of this distinction. Our aim in this article is to shed some light on this issue by surveying the RKR/WKR distinction as it has been drawn with respect to different responses, and by examining how it can be understood as a uniform distinction across different contexts. We start by considering reasons for pro-attitudes and emotions in the context of the buck-passing account of value (§1). Subsequently we address the distinction that philosophers have drawn with respect to reasons for other attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions (§2), as well as with respect to reasons for action (§3). We discuss the similarities and differences between the ways in which philosophers have drawn the RKR/WKR distinction in these areas and offer different interpretations of the idea of a general, uniform distinction. The major upshot is that there is at least one interesting way of substantiating a general RKR/WKR distinction with respect to a broad range of attitudes as well as actions. We argue that this has important implications for the proper scope of buck-passing accounts and the status of the wrong kind of reasons problem (§4). (shrink)

Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. He provides a defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, an evidence-relative account of reason, and an explanation of structural irrationality in relation to these accounts.

Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. This dissertation is concerned with the question of whether we ought (or have at least good reason) to avoid such irrationality. The thesis defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content (...) of rational standards or requirements, the preconditions of criti¬cism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Over and above an exten¬sive assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, the thesis provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts. (shrink)

In Fortführung einer postmodernen Geschichtsschreibung haben sich in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten deutsche und angelsächsische Historiker verstärkt darum bemüht, eine virtuelle oder konjekturale Geschichtsforschung als den Königsweg zur Überwindung der Krise der Geschichtswissenschaft zu etablieren. Die Was wäre geschehen, wenn...?-Geschichtsschreibung wird vor allem von dem Althistoriker Alexander Demandt als eine erkenntnistheoretische Wunderwaffe, als ein Novum Organon der Geschichtswissenschaft, angepriesen. In diesem Buch wird gezeigt, daß die irreale oder virtuelle Geschichte sich nicht nur in logische und methodologische Widersprüche verstrickt, sondern geschichtstheoretisch (...) einen erheblichen Rückschritt darstellt. Neben der Kritik an dieser erkenntnisvermindernden Strategie in der Geschichtsforschung wird anhand von unterschiedlichen Interpretationen historischer Ereignisse und Entwicklungen gezeigt, daß von der Antike bis heute alternative Geschichtsinterpretationen das eigentliche Bemühen um größere Erklärungskraft der historischen Forschung darstellten. Auf dieser Grundlage werden Ansätze zu einer Methodologie der Geschichtswissenschaft erarbeitet, die die Erkenntnisse der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie dazu nutzen, um ein größeres Erklärungspotential für historische Interpretationen zu ermöglichen. Geschichtsforschung wird in diesem Sinne zu einer Sozialwissenschaft menschlichen Handelns und muß sich deshalb darum bemühen, die theoretischen Fortschritte anderer sozialwissenschaftlicher Fächer zu integrieren und zu verarbeiten. Dieses Buch ist deshalb ein Plädoyer für interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit, damit die Geschichtswissenschaft Anschluß findet an die methodisch fortgeschrittenen Wissenschaften. Deshalb müssen sich Historiker, Soziologen, Philosophen oder Politikwissenschaftler gleichermaßen mit diesen Problemen befassen. (shrink)

English summary: The authors of this conference volume describe and discuss various aspects of Popper's ethics, such as for example his contributions to freedom and responsibility, to objectivity and truth, to humanism and to metaphysics, from a critical-rational point of view. This is the first time that Popper's ethics have been brought face to face with the Christian faith. The lectures and the ensuing discussions between Protestant and Catholic theologians and advocates of critical rationalism deal with the question of whether (...) Popper's critiques of religion can be compatible with modern social ethics based on Christianity or whether theology can be a critical-rational science. One of the special attractions of this volume is the fact that it contains not only the revised talks but also the very animated discussions on the various subjects. German description: Karl Popper war nicht nur ein Mensch und Wissenschaftler mit klaren ethischen Grundsatzen, auch seiner Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie lagen ethische Pramissen zugrunde. Dieser Sachverhalt ist lange nicht erkannt worden, weil Popper selbst nicht daruber gesprochen hat und weil er diese ethischen Voraussetzungen in seinen Werken nicht systematisch dargelegt hat. Wenn es aber zutrifft, dass dem wissenschaftlichen Lebenswerk Poppers ein ethisches Forschungsprogramm zugrunde lag, dann wird es Zeit, sich damit zu befassen.Die Autoren dieses Bandes stellen verschiedene Aspekte von Poppers Ethik, wie z.B. seine Beitrage zur Freiheit und Verantwortung, zur Objektivitat und Wahrheit, zum Humanismus und zur Metaphysik, von einem kritisch-rationalen Standpunkt aus zur Diskussion. Erstmalig wird die Ethik Poppers mit dem christlichen Glauben konfrontiert. In den Beitragen sowie den anschliessenden Diskussionen zwischen evangelischen und katholischen Theologen mit Vertretern des kritischen Rationalismus geht es darum, ob Poppers religionskritische Darlegungen mit einer modernen Sozialethik auf christlicher Basis vereinbar sind, bzw. ob es eine Theologie als kritisch-rationale Wissenschaft geben kann.Ein besonderer Reiz dieses Bandes liegt darin, dass nicht nur die uberarbeiteten Referate, sondern auch die sehr lebhaften Diskussionen zu den verschiedenen Themen enthalten sind. Hier wird noch deutlicher, dass Poppers Philosophie von starken ethischen Voraussetzungen durchdrungen ist. (shrink)

According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief – much like prudential or moral reasons are normative reasons for action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the assumption that epistemic reasons are normative. In this article, I discuss an important challenge for anti-normativism about epistemic reasons and present a number of arguments in support of normativism. The challenge for anti-normativism is to say what kind of reasons epistemic reasons are if (...) they are not normative reasons. I discuss various answers to this challenge and find them all wanting. The arguments for normativism each stress a certain analogy between epistemic reasons and normative reasons for action. Just like normative reasons for action, epistemic reasons provide partial justification; they provide premises for correct reasoning; they constitute good bases for the responses they are reasons for; and they are reasons for which agents can show these responses without committing a mistake. In each case, I argue that the relevant condition is plausibly sufficient for the normativity of a reason, and that normativism is in any case in a much better position to explain the analogy than anti-normativism. (shrink)

According to an attractive and widely held view, all practical reasons are explained in terms of the (instrumental or final) value of the action supported by the reason. I argue that this theory is incompatible with plausible assumptions about the practical reasons that correspond to certain moral rights, including the right to a promised action and the right to an exclusive use of one’s property. The argument is an explanatory rather than extensional one: while the actions supported by the relevant (...) reasons (e.g. keeping a valid promise or respecting property) can be argued to have a certain kind of value, I argue that this value presupposes a moral right, and therefore cannot explain the reason. Reflection on such cases suggest the conclusion that reasons that are subject to normative powers are generally not value-based. This also has important implications for the dialectic between ‘value-first’ and ‘reasons-first’ approaches to normativity. (shrink)

If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action as well – or so it seems plausible to say. This transmission principle is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this paper is to defend this principle against a number of recent objections, which (as I show) are all based on core assumptions of the view called actualism. (...) I reject actualism, provide an alternative explanation of its plausible features, and present an independent argument for the transmission principle. (shrink)

In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...) correctly to her reasons. In conclusion, I discuss some implications of this argument (given that some other standard assumptions about reasons hold). One such implication is that we are always in a position to be justified in believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (or ought) to do. (shrink)

Actualists hold that contrary-to-duty scenarios give rise to deontic dilemmas and provide counterexamples to the transmission principle, according to which we ought to take the necessary means to actions we ought to perform. In an earlier article, I have argued, contrary to actualism, that the notion of ‘ought’ that figures in conclusions of practical deliberation does not allow for deontic dilemmas and validates the transmission principle. Here I defend these claims, together with my possibilist account of contrary-to-duty scenarios, against Stephen (...) White’s recent criticism. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a theory of how claims about an agent’s normative reasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the plausible ideas that reasons are facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice. I argue that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons for acting immediately and reasons for acting at some later point in time. I (...) provide a general account of the relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons, demonstrate its implications for the evidence-sensitivity of reasons and finally present and defend an argument for my view. (shrink)

Some of our reasons for action are grounded in the fact that the action in question is a means to something else we have reason to do. This raises the question as to which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of a liberal transmission principle, which plays a prominent role in the current literature. The principle states that an agent has an instrumental reason to whenever -ing is (...) a means for him to do what he has intrinsic reason to do. We start by discussing the objection that this principle implies counterintuitive reason statements. We argue that attempts to solve this “too many reasons problem” by appealing to pragmatic strategies for debunking intuitions about so-called negative reason existentials are questionable. Subsequently, we discuss three important arguments in favor of Liberal Transmission, and argue that they fail to make a convincing case for this principle. In the course of the discussion, we also provide alternative, less liberal transmission principles. We argue that these alternative principles allow us to accommodate those phenomena that seem to support Liberal Transmission while avoiding its problems. (shrink)

John Broome argues that rationality cannot consist in reasons-responsiveness since rationality supervenes on the mind, while reasons-responsiveness does not supervene on the mind. I here defend this conception of rationality by way of defending the assumption that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind. Given the many advantages of an analysis of rationality in terms of reasons-responsiveness, and in light of independent considerations in favour of the view that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind, we should take seriously the backup view, a hypothesis (...) that explains why reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind even though paradigmatic reasons are external facts. I argue that Broome’s objections to the backup view, as well as his more general objection to the thesis that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind, do not succeed. (shrink)

Which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means? Some philosophers have suggested a liberal transmission principle, according to which agents have an instrumental reason for an action whenever this action is a means for them to do what they have non-instrumental reason to do. In this paper, we (i) discuss the merits and demerits of the liberal transmission principle, (ii) argue that there are good reasons to reject it, and (iii) present an alternative, less liberal transmission principle, (...) which allows us to accommodate those phenomena that seem to support the liberal transmission principle while avoiding its problems. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the objections that have been raised against the view that equality is intrinsically valuable also provide objections to the view that all practical reasons can be explained in terms of value. Plausible egalitarian principles entail that under certain conditions people have claims to an equal share. These claims entail reasons to distribute goods equally that cannot be explained by value if equality has no intrinsic value.

This entry is composed of three sections. In §1, we survey debates about what structural rationality is, including the emergence of the concept in the contemporary literature, its key characteristics, its relationship to substantive rationality, its paradigm instances, and the questions of whether these instances are unified and, if so, how. In §2, we turn to the debate about structural requirements of rationality – including controversies about whether they are “wide-scope” or “narrow-scope”, synchronic or diachronic, and whether they govern processes (...) or states; as well as examining various forms of skepticism about structural requirements of rationality. In §3, we turn to the debate about the normative significance of structural rationality, surveying central challenges for the view that structural rationality is normatively significant and the theoretical options that arise in light of these challenges. (shrink)

This article is concerned with a puzzle that arises from three initially plausible assumptions that form an inconsistent triad: (1) Epistemic reasons are normative reasons (normativism); (2) reasons are normative only if conformity with them is good (the reasons/value-link); (3) conformity with epistemic reasons need not be good (the nihilist assumption). I start by defending the reasons/value-link, arguing that normativists need to reject the nihilist assumption. I then argue that the most familiar view that denies the nihilist assumption – epistemic (...) teleology – is untenable. Finally, I consider two alternative ways of accounting for the goodness of conformity with epistemic reasons: it may be good because it accords with the virtue of reasons-responsiveness, and it may be good because it is good to conform with normative reasons as such. I argue that both of these conceptions avoid the problems of epistemic teleology and merit serious consideration as potential solutions to the puzzle. (shrink)

According to perspectivism about moral obligation, our obligations are affected by our epistemic circumstances. But how exactly should this claim be understood? On Zimmerman’s “Prospective View”, perspectivism is spelled out as the thesis that an option is obligatory if and only if it maximizes what Zimmerman calls “prospective value”, which is in turn determined by the agent’s present evidence. In this article, I raise two objections to this approach. Firstly, I argue that spelling out the difference between perspectivism and anti-perspectivism (...) in terms of value creates a number of problems that can be avoided by an account that proceeds in terms of reasons. Secondly, I argue that Zimmerman focuses on the wrong body of evidence, and that this commits him to an implausible solution to the problem that perspectivists face with regard to advice from better-informed sources. (shrink)

Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present two (...) objections to this solution. First, even if justification itself amounts to no more than epistemic permissibility, the lottery paradox recurs at the level of doxastic obligations unless one adopts an extremely permissive view about suspension of belief that is in tension with our practice of doxastic criticism. Second, even if there are no obligations to believe lottery propositions, the permissibility solution fails because epistemic permissions typically agglomerate, and the lottery case provides no exception to this rule. (shrink)

In his discussion of normative concepts in the first part of On What Matters (2011), Parfit holds that apart from the ‘ought’ of decisive reason, there are other senses of ‘ought’ which do not imply any reasons. This claim poses a dilemma for his ‘reason-involving conception’ of normativity: either Parfit has to conclude that non-reason-implying ‘oughts’ are not normative. Or else he is forced to accept that normativity needs only to involve ‘apparent reasons’ – a certain kind of hypothetical truths (...) about reasons. I argue that both of these options are inacceptable. In the course of the discussion, I present a general objection to ‘apparent reason accounts’ of the normativity of rationality as advocated not only by Parfit, but also by Schroeder (2009) and Way (2009). (shrink)

According to epistemic reductionism about practical reasons, facts about practical reasons can be reduced to facts about evidence for ought-judgements. We argue that this view misconstrues practical conflicts. At least some conflicts between practical reasons put us in a position to know that an action ϕ is optional, i.e. that we neither ought to perform nor ought to refrain from performing the action. By understanding conflicts of practical reasons as conflicts of evidence about what one ought to do, epistemic reductionism (...) fails to account for this. In conflict cases in which ϕ-ing is optional, epistemic reductionism suggests that we have equally strong evidence for and against assuming that we ought to ϕ, and thus cannot be in a position to know that it is not the case that we ought to ϕ. This is a serious flaw. (shrink)

This is a Japanese translation of my article "Dürfen wir Kindern das Wahlrecht vorenthalten" ("Are We Justified to Deny Children the Right to Vote?"), which presents a basic moral argument against any age limit with respect to voting rights.

Up to a certain age, young people are denied the right to vote. In this paper, it is argued that this general exclusion from democratic participation is unjustified and should be abandoned. After a short survey of some of the pedagogic, legal, and political arguments that have been brought forward to support a liberalisation of electoral law in favour of children, the essay presents a basic moral argument against any age limit with respect to voting rights. First of all, it (...) is argued that the right to vote is grounded in a fundamental claim of human beings to equal participation and, therefore, can be denied only for severe and cogent reasons. Subsequently, the essay purports to establish – and defends against objections – that there are no such reasons that sufficiently justify an age limit. The paper concludes with some remarks on practical consequences of the argument. (shrink)

One of the central aims of Susanne Mantel’s book "Determined by Reasons" (2018) is to reject the idea that normative and motivating reasons can be identical. In her own words, Mantel denies the “Identity Thesis”, according to which “when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N” (Mantel 2018, 93). In this comment, I offer a simple argument for the Identity Thesis: (1) When an (...) agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a reason M for which that agent acts such that M is identical with N. (2) A reason for which someone acts is a motivating reason. (3) Therefore, when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N. Premise (1) is trivial, and premise (2) is true by a common definition of the term ‘motivating reason’, according to which a motivating reason is just a reason that is acted upon. I call this the operative notion of a motivating reason. Mantel does not address this operative notion, even though it is widely used in the literature, especially among proponents of the Identity Thesis. I argue that Mantel does not succeed in rejecting the Identity Thesis as long as she does not show that the operative notion of a motivating reason is flawed. (shrink)

This is a summary of the main ideas of my book 'The Normativity of Rationality'.

If an economist or an economic historian speaks about ethical or moral problems, one should be suspicious. Karl Popper continually repeated that he did not want to preach, and I believe that his deep-rooted distrust of modern philosophical moralists, who usually preach water and drink cognac, led to his not writing a greater work on ethics. Nevertheless he was a moral person, and perhaps we can learn more about his cosmology, his methodology, and about his philosophy in general if we (...) probe into some of the ethical foundations of his life and his thinking. It may become apparent to you that I do not refer primarily to Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies or other works of his political writings alone. In choosing not to do so, it is my intention to demonstrate that all his thinking is deeply rooted in ethics. (shrink)

This a review of Alex Worsnip's book 'Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality'.

This a a reply to Gerhard Ernst's and Erasmus Mayr's critical comments on my book 'The Normativity of Rationality'.

Akrasia bezeichnet bei Aristoteles die tadelnswerte charakterliche Disposition, trotz einer richtigen Auffassung des Guten aufgrund körperlicher Begierden das Schlechte zu tun. Den Typus des Unbeherrschten greift Aristoteles in seinen Schriften wiederholt auf. Kleinere Abhandlungen finden sich in Magna moralia II 4–6 und Problemata XXVIII, wobei die ausführlichste Erörterung in der Nikomachischen Ethik VII 1–11 stets im Zentrum der Rezeption stand.

1. T. Reine allgemeine Logik 4., rechmässige, völlig umbearb. und sehr verm. Aufl.--T. 2. Angewandte allgemeine Logik 3., verb Aufl.

Während meines Studiums an der London School of Economics and Political Science 1967/68 traf ich im Seminar von Karl Popper u. a. Imre Lakatos, John W. N. Watkins und gelegentlich Paul K. Feyerabend, mit denen ich mich bald anfreundete. Nach den teilweise temperamentvollen und langandauernden Diskussionen der Seminarteilnehmer wurde üblicherweise in dem Pub der LSE bei einem oder mehreren Bieren weiterdiskutiert, wo mir Imre und Paul von ihren gelegentlichen Treffen und der Korrespondenz mit Hans Albert in Mannheim erzählten, den ich (...) damals persönlich noch nicht kannte. Die spartanische Lebens- und Arbeitsweise eines damaligen Antialkoholikers wie Karl Popper führte wohl dazu, daß er sich nicht den Pubbesuchen anschloß und mich stattdessen dreimal auf seinen ‚Landsitz‘ nach Penn in Buckinghamshire einlud; meistens bei Tee oder Schokolade. Ich hatte Popper über den Verlag Mohr & Siebeck angeboten, seine wundervolle Aufsatzsammlung Conjectures and Refutations ins Deutsche zu übersetzen und erfuhr erst viele Jahre später, daß auch Gretl Albert und die Tochter von Ernst H. Gombrich sich ebenfalls mit dieser Übersetzung abgemüht hatten. (shrink)

Excerpt from Grundriss Einer Reinen Allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundstzen zum Gebrauch fr Vorlesungen, Begleitet mit Einer Weitern Auseinandersetzung fr Diejenigen, die Keine Vorlesungen Darber Hren Knnen Eben fo bat 1'i1a11 fr Die 91egeln 6ei' Den Geblitfi'en in de'n__drei iibrigen. $iguren' gew11fit 801111eln Die Da an1eigen unter weleben %ed111. Gungen und wei fr (c)ebli1fie in'ibn_en mglieb f1nd' und wie Die (R)eblfi'ederfelen m 6cwf Der erfien $igu1_bermanbelt tee %11 wol: _ len nbe1, um niebt w'eitluftig fe1n Da D1_efe @oebe Docb nur (...) follogi1ii1'ebe' (R)pifinbtgnb 111, auf unfern @ommentar 1u Dic1'en1 9. Und un bier begngm, einige allgeme1'nefltegeln 311 geben. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Dieses Buch analysiert die vielfältigen Verstrickungen deutscher Wissenschaftler mit dem Nationalsozialismus. Diese währten von Hitlers Aufstieg in der DAP/NSDAP nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg bis zu dessen Selbstmord am 30. April 1945. Ohne massive Unterstützung durch die Wissenschaften und die Intellektuellen wäre das Dritte Reich bald zusammengebrochen. Hegels politischer Einfluß auf die allmähliche Verwirklichung eines militärischen Machtstaates in Deutschland von Bismarck über Wilhelm II. bis zu Hitler wird verdrängt und verschwiegen. Die zentrale These des Buches besteht darin, daß nicht Rassismus, Antisemitismus (...) und Weltwirtschaftskrise die Machtergreifung der Nationalsozialisten ermöglicht haben, sondern Hitlers Propaganda für den totalitären Zentralstaat. Hegel hatte in seiner Rechtsphilosophie die modernste und entwickelteste totalitäre Staatslehre entworfen, auf die sich Wissenschaftler und Politiker seit 1821 in ihrem Kampf gegen Individualismus, Liberalismus und Parlamentarismus über 120 Jahre lang stützen konnten. Die Etablierung eines totalitären Machtstaates war die wichtigste Ursache der deutschen Katastrophe. Sein Aufstieg und Untergang werden hier dargestellt und erklärt. (shrink)

This is a review of Tim Henning's 'From a Rational Point of View' (Oxford 2019).