Esta pesquisa analisa alguns tópicos sobre a metodologia de acordo com a filosofia da ciência de Larry Laudan, além de examinar, na área da educação, esta proposta de interpretação filosófica. Trouxemos como elementos algumas considerações e definições sobre a metodologia em Laudan, isto é, da metodologia como um instrumento para a realização da axiologia (que são as metas e os valores cognitivos), porém, apresentando também interessantes relações para com as teorias específicas, como o de justificar as teorias específicas e de (...) ser restringida por elas. A metodologia é também, dentro do modelo reticulado de Laudan, justificada pela axiologia. Para além desta análise, há também uma defesa da metodologia enquanto o estudo dela própria, o que permite encontrarmos conexões interessantes em teorias da educação, como no caso da investigação-ação, onde vemos que estamos diante de uma tradição de pesquisa nos moldes defendidos pela filosofia da ciência de Laudan, por reconhecermos que temos um modelo reticular composto por teorias específicas, metodologias e axiologia também na área da educação. Veremos também que a metodologia em Laudan possui um caráter dinâmico, tensionando e sendo tensionada pelos componentes da tradição de pesquisa, caracterizando o modelo reticulado de racionalidade proposto pelo filósofo. Este debate em Laudan, juntamente com a tradição de pesquisa da investigação-ação da área da educação serão investigados neste artigo. Como base para a construção deste texto, utilizamos as seguintes obras de Laudan: The Progress and its problems: towards a theory of scientific growth (1977), Science and Values (1984a), Explaining the success of science: beyond epistemic realism and relativism (1984b), Methodology’s prospects (1986), Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism (1987a), Aim-less Epistemology? (1990a) e Normative Naturalism (1990b). (shrink)

When we think of Sartre's proposal for a theory of alterity in Being and Nothingness, our attention often turns to his famous and original analysis of “the look of the other”. The moment when Sartre presents this analysis in his work is characterised by the author's effort to escape from the problem of solipsism, and the development of a “phenomenology of the look” is presented as a decisive response to the problem. However, Sartre's critics have shown how problematic this response (...) is, insofar as it favours the “being-seeing” - a dimension acquired through a metamorphosis that the look of the other is capable of provoking in the subject - as what would guarantee an effective relationship of otherness. In this work, I try to return to these criticisms in order to highlight their limits, and then change the focus, bringing to the fore the "backstage" of the look that directs us towards a way out of solipsism. (shrink)

This article explores how epistemology plays a role within the realm of social ontology. My main claim is that every facet of the the social domain we deal with needs an epistemic framework and background in the construction of an ontology, contingent upon the fact that it has an ontological reality and existence. I think that two fundamentals make an significant contribution to this claim. The first of these is the notion of idea and its requisite foundation in social sphere, (...) and the other is the concept concerning the common sense. Therefore, the initial part of this article centers on the treatment and examination of the the notion of the idea. My primary assertion in this section is to demonstrate that the concept of ide has a linguistic interconnection and that this connection needs a foundation within the social basis or context. In the subsequent fragment, where the concept of common sense is discussed, it is argued that common sense is a shared attribute among all individuals in common in the social field, and that it is emphasized that this shared common sense serves as an essential component making it possible to provide its epistemological foundations in the social context. (shrink)

This article intends to present and compare two moments in which the problem of reflection and its direct antecedents are treated in Sartre's work. This comparison is expected to draw consequences on the problem of reflection as such and on the problems of interpreting Sartre's journey.

This article intends to explore the philosophical potency in the work of the black writer Carolina Maria de Jesus (1914-1977). Carolina de Jesus is best known for her work Quarto de Despejo, diary of a favelada (1960), our approach, however, focuses specifically on her short story “Socrates Africano”, in which she deals with her experience with her grandfather Benedito and the relationship between her wisdom and that of the Greek philosopher Sócrates (5th century BC). Her reflection starts from the attempt (...) to understand the reason why her grandfather was compared to Socrates and called “African Socrates”. In this sense, we intend to expand the idea of an African Socrates and the origins of one of the African philosophical matrices, the Yoruba tradition, dialoguing with the thought of the Nigerian philosopher Sophie Oluwole (1935-2018) and her approximation between Socrates and Orunmilá, as a motto to think about the philosophical potentialities of Carolina's work and the traits of an Afro-Brazilian philosophy. (shrink)

The philosophy developed by Sartre is the philosophy of freedom. This is confirmed by his work, whether in literary or theatrical texts, in political interventions and even in travel reports; but it is in technical works that this concern is even more evident: Sartre sustains that his philosophy must fulfill three tasks, of which the first – and most important – is the metaphysical liberation of men and women. Being and Nothingness fulfills precisely this task; it is against Kant and (...) distancing itself from Husserl and Heidegger that, first, freedom reveals itself as phenomenological truth: I am freedom; second, against all determinism, whether of externality, such as History (situation, class, etc.), or of interiority, such as Ego (transcendental Self, character, etc.), Sartre shows that freedom is also the foundation of History and the beginning of every individual adventure (life story, Psyche), both expressions of the same genesis: the singularity of freedom, self-sustaining process of being-in-the-world, is the only source of what man is and, consequently, of everything that can come to Being. Phenomenological ontology is the foundational work of the philosophy of freedom. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta una interpretación del ser-para-otro en la ontología fenomenológica de Sartre. A partir de un análisis contextual de la fenomenología de la mirada en El ser y la nada, formulamos el problema del ser-para-otro como tercera ek-stasis. Si admitimos que el ser-para-otro surge de una profundización de la segunda ek-stasis (reflexión) y que, por tanto, está siempre condicionado por ella, corremos el riesgo de caer en la ilusión de la primacía del ser-para-sí. En oposición a esta interpretación, presentamos (...) la hipótesis de que el ser para otro tiene una estructura inmediata, y no sólo reflexiva, basada en El ser y la nada y, de manera auxiliar, en el Idiota da familia. (shrink)

The article addresses the psychological experience of the "We" developed in Being and Nothingness (BN), and how it resonates within the social dynamics of Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR). It is problematized about which "We" is spoken in the condition of Being-with. In BN, Sartre demonstrates that the foundation of human relationships is conflict, as being-with-others is rooted in being-for-others. This, therefore, reflects on the impossibility of psychological experiences of the Us-object and We-subject to support alienation and engagement. We start (...) from the conjuncture of serial collectivity to address the experience of the Us-object, and the necessity of individual choice for engagement with others, which may or not occur when the experience of Us-object takes place. In this way, when individuals recognize themselves as part of a structure organized by a third party and aim for a common goal, the community subject happens. We noticed that Sartre, in Being and Nothingness and its developments, helps us to think about being-with-another, even in a virtual world of the 21st century. Sartre, throughout his life and although without success, strove to materialize the Being that he idealized for people: mutually committed to the responsible construction of a socio-material field “desirable for a community”, including conflict resolutions. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to think about a current issue, the discourse of the Brazilian philosophical making, not worked in the content of Being and Nothingness. However, we think it is possible to bring up some of the themes discussed there, as well as Sartre's philosophical writing, to warn us about the pitfalls of this discourse, which is positioned as the opposite and better than the previous one, but which ends up reproducing what he criticizes by remaining in (...) an excluding dualism. Returning to the Sartrean perspective of thinking in terms of ambiguities, avoiding falling into both realism and idealism, balancing presence to oneself with presence to the world, seems us fundamental, even today, for a more complex discussion, which does not fall into false dilemmas. (shrink)

In 2022, the Brazilian Armed Forces reaffirmed an old interventionist ideology that marked the history of the Republic of Brazil. The text seeks to show that such military ideology does not find a pretext in the history of modern political ideas. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), at first, and then Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), two ideologists who shaped today's understanding of the State, understand representative institutions in disagreement with any non-submission of the FFAA to Political Power. In this way, the ideology of military (...) intervention is, according to the history of ideas, incompatible with the modern conception of the State. (shrink)

The theory of modality Buridan develops is linked to different propositions. This paper addresses one of those propositions. The aim is to show that, if the operator of necessity included in it is ignored, the proposition allows deriving, within first-order predicate logic, a reduction sentence with the characteristics required in Carnap’s framework. Besides, the paper tries to argue that the mentioned operator of necessity can be understood not only in a technical sense (as modal logic does), but also in the (...) way a naïve individual (without modal logical training) could interpret it. These latter arguments are given from the theory of mental models. (shrink)

Based on the notion of bad faith, the article seeks to lay the foundations for a diagnosis of contemporaneity, having as an index, on the one hand, the lack of human determination and, on the other, the effectiveness of the world.

The aim of this paper is to exhibit the core of Paul Natorp's criticisms of psychologism. We expose the arguments that lead Natorp to conclude that knowledge cannot have a subjective foundation but must have an objective grounding. We argue that, according to Natorp, the problem of psychologism is fundamentally methodological. Psychologism confuses the study of the laws of knowledge with the study of the legality of psychical life. Thus, the problem of the genesis is confused with the problem of (...) validity. (shrink)

Arendt’s reflections on the reverberations of the bureaucratic way of governing give rise to two distinct and, above all, complementary argumentative trajectories: 1) its investigation as a form of domination originating from imperialism and later used as a model of totalitarian; 2) the role of bureaucrats. Both help to understand why the bureaucracy not only survived the fall of totalitarian regimes, but also remained the organizational model of nations. At the intersection of these readings, the essay “Auschwitz on Trial” presents (...) two types of participants in the Nazi bureaucratic apparatus: bureaucratic assassins (desk murderes) and subordinate men. In common among them was a lack of responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by the regime and thoughtlessness; however, their degree of participation in the hierarchy and their punishability in post-war trials differed greatly. In these terms, this article aims to analyze the similarities and differences between subordinate men and bureaucratic murderers. To do so, it is assumed that understanding them helps to understand bureaucracy as a form of government that makes public freedom and the free exercise of spiritual activities unfeasible. (shrink)

Onde acaba a mente e começa o mundo? A pergunta solicita duas respostas standard. Alguns aceitam as fronteiras da pele e do cérebro e dizem que o que se encontra fora do corpo está fora da mente. Outros ficam impressionados por argumentos sugerindo que o significado das nossas palavras “simplesmente não está na cabeça”, sustentando que este externismo a respeito do significado leva a um externismo sobre a mente. Propomo-nos seguir uma terceira posição. Defendemos um tipo de externismo muito diferente: (...) um externismo ativo baseado no papel ativo do ambiente orientando processos cognitivos. (shrink)

This brief essay unpretentiously seeks to highlight the relevance of some of the central questions in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, thus aiming to contribute to broadening the scope of the French philosopher's ideas. Without fearing controversy, it presents the correlation between the concept of freedom and the responsibility necessarily implied. Such concepts remind us that this work is current, for it demands to assume its political and ethical unfoldings as unavoidable demands. The debate is built, then, through Sartre's encounters (...) with his peers, highlighting the interlocutions and controversial divergences that mark his itinerary. Finally, the timeliness of the work seems to reside in the historical failure of the humanist project, that is, Being and Nothingness continues to be current, because we are still incapable of promoting a historical situation in which the human being is free. (shrink)

The present study analyzes the relations between Mauss and Sartre. It investigates, primarily, the connections between the obligation of reciprocating a gift and the consequences of this symbolic act, to elaborate a morality deemed as a total fact. Freedom stands out, in this context, as a fundamental value.

This article aims to understand the primordial experience of the existence of the Other, presented by Jean-Paul Sartre in the third part of Being and Nothingness. In order for our intention to be effectively understood, we have organized this reading into three duly articulated moments. In the first moment, it is essential to clarify how the French philosopher delimited the problem of solipsism as an obstacle constituted by realist and idealist philosophies that generally deny the conditions of possibility for the (...) existence of the other, as well as the critical description that questions the permanence of solipsistic theories in contemporary times, bequeathed by Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger. From this critique, we will lead our reading to the second moment, which consists of establishing an understanding of the existence of the Other, showing how it appears and affects the subject’s daily life, above all because the Other requires the presence of a body and a consciousness that is distinct from the subject’s. In the last moment, we will emphasize the interesting approach to the gaze and shame, this original feeling that strips the consciousness of any certainty that it is isolated in the world. Thus, the experience of shame comes to be understood as the unveiling of the subject’s consciousness, which perceives itself as “invaded” by the gaze of the Other, thus making the Other’s existence in the concrete relationship effective. (shrink)

I initially characterize what I consider to be a growing consensus regarding the relationship between science and nature. This consensus contradicts the definition of scientific activity as a device for the instrumentalization of the natural world – something that it has been since its birth. Next, I criticize the Hegelian notion that science is endowed with an egalitarian politics vis-à-vis nature. Finally, I outline the broad outlines of what could turn out to be an authentic politics of this kind: only (...) possible within a set of polytheistic beliefs. In this environment, the conditions for the deobjectification of nature and the subjectification of the subject would be established – processes without which relations would remain defined in a hierarchical structure. From this change, more egalitarian relations between human beings and nature could be promoted: the basis for sustaining a truly ecological way of life. This would make it possible to overcome the slave mechanism of modern science whose gears take momentum from the spiritual impoverishment of nature. (shrink)

This paper intends to recover the “phenomenological” basis of Sartre’s trajectory since his very first reception of Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s philosophies until the moment in which the main synthesis of his existentialism is published, entitled Being and Nothingness (1943). In this sense, the paper situates the status of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies for Sartrean thought, as well as the originality of Being and Nothingness, which is also influenced by a very particular interpretation of Hegelian negation.