Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes tells us that he wrote Leviathan to “absolve the divine laws” of the charge that they justify rebellion. This article interprets the argumentative strategy of the second half of Leviathan in light of this intention. Over the course of his three major political works, Hobbes develops a convergent argument to absolve God’s laws. This strategy of judicial rhetoric relies on using multiple independent claims in the hope that one’s audience finds at least one of them persuasive. This was (...) a risky strategy for Hobbes that angered his critics. The strategy also reveals something about what sort of philosopher Hobbes was and how we ought to approach his work. (shrink)

The driving question behind Sandra Leonie Field's exciting new book, Potentia, is: what, exactly, constitutes popular power? Field turns to two seventeenth-century political theorists, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, to try to extract an account that might avoid Joseph Schumpeter's dismal conclusion that we should abandon all pretenses to popular power. In the process, she exposes problems with recent populist interpretations of Hobbes and Spinoza, showing that both of these figures appreciated the problems with identifying plebiscites with popular power (...) better than their "radical" interpreters. The result is a rich and stimulating work on a topic—namely, power—that remains somewhat undertheorized, at least... (shrink)

In her paper “Sovereignty and the International Protection of Human rights”, Cristina Lafont argues that “The obligation of respecting human rights in the sense of not contributing to their violation seems to be a universal obligation and thus one that binds states just as much as non-state actors.” In this paper, I argue that one can find support for this claim in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. This requires a different reading of Leviathan than the one that is typically performed by realist (...) thinkers, such as, for instance, Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, who read Hobbes as someone who has no regard for human rights. Contrary to the realists, I suggest a reading of Leviathan that shows that there is in fact a normative underpinning of Hobbes’ view of sovereignty, to the extent that Hobbes can be taken to be one of the forerunners of international law. I do this by showing how Hobbes’ reasons for establishing sovereign power, and not his conclusions on how to organize sovereign power, may give support to Lafont’s claim that an obligation to respect human rights is not confined to the sovereign state, but also to extra-state institutions. (shrink)

There are eleven known manuscripts of Hobbes’s Elements of Law. As they divide on textual grounds into two groups, they are effectively two separate editions, employing two different texts. While two of the manuscripts apparently were Hobbes’s working copies, it also seems clear that he never definitively established the text of the Elements. There are reasons for thinking it unlikely that, as has been suggested, Hobbes intended the work to influence debate in the Short Parliament. More likely, he hoped his (...) patron, Newcastle, would transmit his principles to the monarch and his chief advisors. (shrink)

Hobbes Studies presents a special issue dedicated to the career and work of Professor Johann Sommerville on the occasion of his retirement. This introduction provides a brief overview of Sommerville’s professional achievements and the major themes of his scholarly work over the past forty years. It closes with a very brief summary of the contributions made in his honor.

This paper brings to light an unexplored aspect of Hobbes’s argument that political authority rests upon subjects’ consent. Consent enacts a transfer of subjects’ right of nature to the sovereign, yet she already possesses a natural right to everything. What moral difference, then, does this make to her possession of power, and how? In my reading, the difference lies in the rise of new obligations befalling the sovereign by means of an indirect mechanism: That many individuals, hoping for safety, transfer (...) their right of nature to the sovereign triggers an obligation for her to accept the role of a ruler and perform the duties attached to it, for the sake of the peace enjoined by the laws of nature. This reading should also confirm the possibility of a consensual foundation for the Hobbesian right to punish and shed new light on Hobbes’s notion of tacit consent. (shrink)

Just as some types of philosophical analysis are more useful than others to historians or political scientists, so, I find, are some sorts of historical research more useful to philosophers than are other sorts. Sommerville makes history useful to non-historians by clarifying the large-scale historical background against which his investigative questions are posed, and then separating out crucial figures, ideas, and events from arcana of interest primarily to specialist historians. His interpretations are relatively neutral, striking a welcome balance between mere (...) reporting of events or textual ideas on the one hand, and on the other, accounts so theoretically laden that they prejudge or foreclose promising interpretive possibilities. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine Hobbes’s interpretation of Scriptural passages that figure prominently in contemporaneous political debates. Hobbes’s interpretative practices affirm his major systematic aims but also contribute to his inventive reenvisioning of Hebraic and Christian political history. The privileged position Hobbes gives Hebraic forms of rule together with his treatment of I Samuel 8 are motivated, in part, by a need to counter Aristotle’s influence on an exegetical tradition that opposes monarchy-as-tyranny in connection with this central, much-debated text. Hobbes (...) conjoins his counter-revolutionary interpretation of 1 Samuel 8 with specific passages in the Christian New Testament that permit him to insert Jesus as “king of the Jews” into a startlingly unique conception of Hebraic and Christian history. This revisionary history and eschatology support Hobbes’s theorization of absolute sovereignty and undercut fantastical beliefs in an immaterial world. (shrink)

Well-known for his work on absolutism, divine right theory, and his contextual reading of Hobbes’ ideas, Sommerville also published successful critical editions of Sir Robert Filmer and King James vi and I’s political writing. Sommerville’s engagement in key historiographical debates on early- modern British history, involving “opposing camps” of revisionists and post-revisionists, is less explored. Here, I focus on the question whether pre-Civil War England was immune to ideological conflict or, instead, featured a confrontation between King and Parliament based on (...) ideas of power, liberty and obedience. I also highlight the continued relevance of Sommerville’s innovative account of English political thought as deeply shaped by European theories. His work reminds us of the role of the history of political thought in rectifying false claims and unchecked opinions, so commonly expounded in our divided world. In conclusion, I advance my own critical interpretation of Sommerville’s views on absolutism and patriarchalism. (shrink)

The unauthorized 1650 publication of The Elements of Law broke Hobbes’s treatise into two parts that were inconsistent with his own division of the work. This obscured what is arguably the most important insight into Hobbes’s method: his account of how human beings use language to instigate and appease others. I review the evidence of how the publication history of the Elements resulted in a break between I.13 and I.14 that Hobbes did not intend. I then argue that as the (...) description of the very method that Hobbes was using to counteract dangerous dogmatists and appease his fellow citizens, the discussion in question made sense in a work intended for private circulation but not in treatises to be read by those on whom the method was to be applied. I show how reading I.13 and I.14 together, as Hobbes had intended, shows that Hobbes never changed his mind about rhetoric. (shrink)

This paper recounts my encounter with the ideological context of Hobbes’s system as a graduate student in political theory through the teaching and scholarship of Professor Johann Sommerville. This encounter made me recognize that political theorists should study not only systems of political philosophy but also their ideological contexts, whose primary components are not “languages” but ideas and arguments deployed in debates concerning issues of political legitimacy of a particular time. Specifically, I realized that incorporating ideological contexts into the study (...) of political theory could render the quest for legitimate political orders in different ages and cultures accessible to modern readers of diverse backgrounds, enable a more accurate grasp of the originality of a philosophical system, and uncover new resources for political theorizing. (shrink)

This book looks at how the ideas of freedom, property, and order are expressed in modern social contract theories. Drawing on the theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls, it studies how notions of freedom promulgated by these SCTs invariably legitimise and defend the private ownership of the means of production. It argues that capitalism's impact on individual dependence and economic inequality still stems from this model, ultimately working in favour of proprietors. The author highlights the problematic nature of SCTs, (...) which work as ideological mechanisms put forward under the guise of formal equality and formal freedom, by focusing on the historical and social context behind them. From a methodological point of view, the author presents a de-ideologization of the contractarian issue and provides insight into the political 'layers' within the discourse of individualism, human nature and morality shaping the outer corners of contractarian theory. An important intervention in the study of SCTs, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of political and social theory, sociology, political history, and political philosophy. (shrink)

Facing censorship and being confined to the fringes of the political debate of his time, Thomas Hobbes turned his attention to translating Homer's Iliad and the Odyssey from Greek into English. Many have not considered enough the usefulness of these translations. In this book, Andrea Catanzaro analyses the political value of Hobbes' translations of Homer's works and exposes the existence of a link between the translations and the previous works of the Malmesbury philosopher. In doing so, he asks: * What (...) new information concerning Hobbes' political and philosophical thought can be rendered from mere translation? * What new offerings can a man in his eighties at the time offer, having widely explained his political ideas in numerous famous essays and treatises? * What new elements can be deduced in a text that was well-known in England and where there were better versions than the ones produced by Hobbes? Andrea Catanzaro's commentary and theoretical interpretation offers an incentive to study Hobbes lesser known works in the wider development of Western political philosophy and the history of political thought. s commentary and theoretical interpretation offers an incentive to study Hobbes lesser known works in the wider development of Western political philosophy and the history of political thought. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reach of ecclesiastical power in Hobbes' Leviathan, examining how the State acquires some of the roles traditionally played by the Church. I will first contextualize historically the ecclesiological debates on which Leviathan draws. Then, I will examine the essential role Hobbes assigns to the king in the governance of the church. Although Hobbes' political theology is often deemed atheist, in Leviathan the king becomes the institutional head of the Church. Moreover, he should establish a minimal Christian (...) creed to be shared by his subjects, in order to preserve religious peace among the different churches of his kingdom. (shrink)

This collection brings together the most significant and influential articles on Hobbes that have been published in the twentieth century. It aims at capturing the trend of fragmentation of Hobbes studies.

In this new study the authors examine a range of theories about the state of nature in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, considering the contribution they made to the period's discourse on sovereignty and their impact on literary activity. Texts examined include Leviathan, Oceana, Paradise Lost, Discourses Concerning Government, Two Treatises on Government, Don Sebastian, Oronooko, The New Atalantis, Robinson Crusoe, Dissertation upon Parties, David Simple, and Tom Jones. The state of nature is identified as an important organizing principle for narratives (...) in the century running from the Civil War through to the second Jacobite Rebellion, and as a way of situating the author within either a reactionary or a radical political tradition. The Discourse of Sovereignty provides an exciting new perspective on the intellectual history of this fascinating period. (shrink)

Authority and the Liberal Tradition critically describes the historical foundations of modern liberalism, implicitly analyzing the status and effectiveness of American democracy. Heineman examines contemporary liberal ideology, which he argues undermines the normative basis of social stability that was an important element in the classical liberal tradition. He shows how American government has become hostage to ideology, to the advocacy of interest-group politics.

This book is a timely interpretation of the moral and political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Staying close to Hobbes's text and working from a careful examination of the actual substance of the account of natural law, R. E. Ewin argues that Hobbes well understood the importance of moral behavior to civilized society. This interpretation stands as a much-needed corrective to readings of Hobbes that emphasize the rationally calculated, self-interested nature of human behavior. It poses a significant challenge to currently fashionable (...) game theoretic reconstructions of Hobbesian logic. It is generally agreed that Hobbes applied what he took to be a geometrical method to political theory. But, as Ewin forcefully argues, modem readers have misconstrued Hobbes's geometric method, and this has led to a series of misunderstandings of Hobbes's view of the relationship between politics and morality. Important implications of Ewin's reading are that Hobbes never thought that "the war of each against all" was an empirical possibility for citizens; that his political theory actually presupposes moral agency; and that Hobbes's account of natural law forces us to the conclusion that Hobbes was a virtue theorist. This major contribution to Hobbes studies will be praised and criticized, welcomed and challenged, but it cannot be ignored. All philosophers, political theorists, and historians of ideas dealing with Hobbes will need to take account of it. (shrink)

Hobbes and Rousseau relied heavily upon the time-worn metaphor of the body politic to describe and explain their respective political visions. But while Rousseau’s use of the metaphor is largely ac...

Few of the recent treatments exploring Leviathan's dramatic expansion of ecclesiological considerations have delved into the political circumstances that furnished Hobbes's immediate Parisian surroundings, as he penned the work during the 1640s. This paper examines French ecclesial debates that were triggered by the publication of a polemical collection of texts narrating the “rights and liberties of the Gallican church.” Many of the tracts included had been written during the accession crisis of the late sixteenth century, and advocated a sacralized view (...) of kingship in order to exclude papal jurisdictional claims in France. This paper argues that innovations in Leviathan's sacred history mirror tropes employed by Gallican writers, so that Hobbes can be seen as adopting a parallel strategy in establishing Leviathan's Supreme Pastor. This explication suggests that Hobbes composed Leviathan to appropriate, rather than eliminate, claims associated with “spiritual” power for the civil sovereign, as critical to the exercise of sovereignty. (shrink)

Divisão do trabalho e apologia da ordem em Thomas Hobbes e Norbert Elias Resumo: O artigo expõe os juízos afirmativos granjeados por Thomas Hobbes e Norbert Elias a respeito da divisão do trabalho e de suas relações com a ordem social, a despeito das diferenças de métodos e de métricas dos autores em pauta. De Thomas Hobbes, recolhe-se a demonstração, com subjacência no raciocínio hipotético-dedutivo do filósofo inglês, de que, do indivíduo, palmilha-se à sociedade, do contrato que edifica o Estado, (...) envereda-se à divisão do trabalho como uma das maneiras de estatuir o conforto necessário à manutenção da sociedade civil. De Norbert Elias, apanha-se a relação processual entre sociogênese e psicogênese que, sem opor indivíduo e sociedade, trata da formação da divisão do trabalho e da individualidade como fenômenos inseparáveis e peculiares ao processo civilizador. Palavras-chave: Divisão do trabalho. Ordem social. Thomas Hobbes. Norbert Elias. Division of work and apology of the order in thomas hobbes and norbert elias: The article exposes the assertive judgments made by Thomas Hobbes and Norbert Elias concerning the division of labor and its relations with the social order, despite the differences of methods and metrics of the authors in question. From Thomas Hobbes, the demonstration, based on the hypothetical-deductive reasoning of the English philosopher, is gathered from the demonstration that, from the individual, ingrained in society, from the contract that builds the State, the division of labor is divided as one of the ways of establishing the comfort necessary for the maintenance of civil society. From Norbert Elias, one picks up the procedural relation between sociogenesis and psychogenesis that, without opposing individual and society, deals with the formation of the division of labor and individuality as inseparable phenomena peculiar to the civilizing process. Key-words: Division of labor. Social order. Thomas Hobbes. Norbert Elias. División del trabajo y apología del orden en thomas hobbes y norbert elias Resumen: El artículo expone los juicios afirmativos desmenuzados por Thomas Hobbes y Norbert Elias acerca de la división del trabajo y de sus relaciones con el orden social, a pesar de las diferencias de métodos y de métricas de los autores en pauta. De Thomas Hobbes, se recoge la demostración, con subyacencia en el razonamiento hipotético-deductivo del filósofo inglés, de que, del individuo, se adapta a la sociedad, del contrato que edifica el Estado, se entra en la división del trabajo como una de las formas de estatuir el confort necesario para el mantenimiento de la sociedad civil. De Norbert Elias, se recoge la relación procesal entre sociogénesis y psicogénesis que, sin oponer individuo y sociedad, trata de la formación de la división del trabajo y de la individualidad como fenómenos inseparables y peculiares al proceso civilizador. Palabras clave: División del trabajo. Orden social. Thomas Hobbes. Norbert Elias. (shrink)

The article presents a basic perception regarding social contract theory which is considered to be one of the most well-known and influential theories in western political philosophy. By exploring the concepts of social contract theory suggested by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, an attempt is made to reveal various features and characteristics of the natural state. The article discusses the general description of the state of nature as well as the process of establishing a social contract as a means of (...) formation of civil society. (shrink)

A Hobbesian utopia might sound paradoxical. Hobbes never prescribed a utopia per se, and he is well-known for his practical and pragmatic approach to human nature and to politics. Yet, this article identifies several utopian elements in Hobbes, starting with the ways in which his contemporaries thought of his work as utopian. Following Galileo and others, Hobbes might have been part of a utopian moment, or at least believed that he was, especially due to his novel and historic philosophy. Behind (...) his dystopian description of the state of nature there is a utopian vision of a civilized, peaceful, and industrious society, the result of true moral philosophy. Finally, the differences between Hobbes and Plato notwithstanding, there might be one overlooked similarity: if Plato designed a republic where Socrates would not have been persecuted, Hobbes might have designed a commonwealth that would produce and allow future Galileos to work without hindrance. (shrink)

The importance of Thomas Hobbes?s account of personation and representation can hardly be overstated. And his intellectual debt to one of his classical foes, Marcus Tullius Cicero, can hardly be ignored. This paper compares Hobbes?s ideas on personhood of the state with Cicero?s notion of persona civitatis, and attempts to describe how Hobbes reshaped Cicero?s guidelines for presenting legitimate authority into a prop for defending any effective authority. Hobbes absorbs Cicero?s influential argument and builds on the idea of civic representation (...) as guardianship done by role-playing, while tearing down Cicero?s account?s ethical foundations. In contrast to Cicero?s magistrate, the social role of Hobbes?s sovereign is not scripted by ethical constrains: its purpose is not to restrict license, but to present it. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes posited a social contract which legitimates sovereign authority. But what grounds, or could ground, such a contract? Through reflection on Oakeshott, and on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, the paper argues for a so far unrecognised mode of human association: philic association. It briefly considers a possible expression of philic association in the history of English law, before making the case for programmes of mentoring as a policy both reflective and supportive of this mode. It ends by suggesting that the (...) existence of such a mode shows why Hobbes's social contract theory, however ingenious and influential it has proven to be, is neither sufficient nor necessary for its stated purpose. (shrink)

Most comparisons of Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza focus on the difference in understanding of natural right. We argue that Hobbes also places more weight on a rudimentary and exclusive education of the public by the state. We show that the difference is related to deeper disagreements over the prospect of Enlightenment. Hobbes is more sanguine than Spinoza about using the state to make people rational. Spinoza considers misguided an overemphasis on publicly educating everyone out of superstition—public education is important, (...) but modes of superstition may remain and must be offset by institutions and a civil religion. The differences are confirmed by Spinoza’s interest in the philosopher who stands apart and whose flourishing may be protected, but not simply brought about, by rudimentary public education. Spinoza’s openness to a wisdom-loving elite in a democracy also sets up an interesting parallel with Thomas Jefferson’s own commitment to the natural aristocracy needed to sustain republicanism. In demonstrating the 17th century philosopher’s skepticism toward using the state exclusively to promote rationality, even as he recognizes the importance of a sovereign pedagogical role and the protection of philosophy, we move to suggest that Spinoza is relevant to contemporary debates about public education and may reinvigorate moral and political discourse in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

The classic theory of Common Law is based on the idea of a law derived from immemorial customs that guide judges’ decisions and contribute to the continuity and stability of the legal order. Hobbes, in his criticism of Edward Coke, questions the legal principles that characterize the “spirit of Common Law”. In his view, it is authority and not use that makes the law. This Hobbesian criticism, which can be considered as one of the ­sources of positivist interpretation of customary (...) law, first raises the question of the legal validity of custom but also leads to an original analysis of the court decisions and precedents. Two forms of rationality of law are opposed: one based on custom and knowledge of which is an “artificial reason”, the other based on natural law and the prescriptions of the judges’ individual reason. (shrink)

Contrary to John Bramhall and critics like him, Thomas Hobbes takes the view that no account of liberty or freedom can serve as the relevant basis on which to distinguish moral from nonmoral agents or explains the basis on which an agent becomes subject to law and liable to punishment. The correct compatibilist strategy rests, on Hobbes’s account, with a proper appreciation and description of the contractualist features that shape and structure the moral community. From this perspective human agents may (...) indeed use their liberty to make themselves moral agents. In doing this, however, they are not employing a distinct kind of liberty but rather using a liberty that they share with animals and other nonmoral agents to perform a distinct kind of act (i.e., consent) whereby they become moral agents subject to law and any punishments that are required to enforce it. ____ -/- Originally published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe - eds. D. Clarke & C. Wilson, OUP 2011 -/- Republished in Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays - OUP 2021: Paul Russell]. (shrink)

Auch wenn man davon ausgehen kann, dass Tocqueville von Hobbes gehört hatte und dass er auch zumindest die vom englischen Philosophen vertretenen Hauptthesen kannte – etwa über Arthur de Gobineau –, so ist nicht ganz klar, ob er ein Werk von Hobbes gelesen hatte. In der ersten Démocratie erwähnt er zwar ausdrücklich den homo puer robustus, der im De Cive von Hobbes auftaucht, aber es scheint eher so zu sein, dass Tocqueville diese Hobbessche Charakterisierung des Menschen nur indirekt über Rousseaus (...) zweiten Discours kannte – er selbst hat keine Quelle angegeben. In einem Brief an Sedgwick aus dem Jahr 1856 schreibt er allerdings ausdrücklich, dass, aus der Sicht der Europäer, die Amerikaner »den puer robustus von Hobbes« darstellen. (shrink)

While most scholars who have discussed the letters of Elisabeth and Descartes exchanged in 1646 on the subject of the Prince focused on Descartes, whether he was Machiavellian or not, I shall deal here more in depth with the position of Elisabeth. I shall address then four main points: the so-called “methodological” question raised by Descartes about the Prince and quickly dismissed by Elisabeth; the issue of political realism, that is one of the great themes of Machiavelli’s thought; the problem (...) of the “good man,” namely whether and how the natural law can bind in a “wicked” world; Elisabeth’s focus on the passions against Descartes’s political and providential mereology. Finally, I shall try to draw some more general conclusions as regards the place of Elisabeth in the broader context of seventeenth century political philosophy, especially in regard to Hobbes. (shrink)

The chapter analyses the Hobbesian conception of glory. This passion embodies the tendency for empowerment and social competition of the modern self whose motive will be defined as the “desire for recognition”. Hobbes places at the core of his analysis of the human passions the need for recognition, conceived as a never-satisfied desire, as it depends on an endless escalation in the quest for power: the glorious self asks the other self to be recognized as superior, but is unwilling to (...) meet the equivalent request from his partners. Increasingly dependent on the confirmations of others, the individual consciousness is condemned to a condition of distressing anxiety and insecurity about its own value. A conflict of “social unsociability” arises and drags all human beings in a restless competition for honours, which produces an endemic state of mental war. My investigation is guided by the relation that links the question of glory and war. Particularly, I try to show how Hobbes exemplarily captured the “dark side” of the struggle for recognition. At the same time, my reading highlights the ambivalences of the Hobbesian argument that seem to open up glimpses towards a more positive reconsideration of the passion which will become the leitmotif of Kojève’s rehabilitation of the Hobbesian glory. (shrink)

According to Hume, the question of the “dignity” or “meanness” of human nature comes down to a comparison of its “different motives or actuating principles”: that is, whether “our selfish and vicious principles” are “predominant above our social and virtuous” (Hume 1987, 84). Hume was responding in part to Hobbes, and comparison between the two philosophers on this question is common, with Hobbes placed on the “selfish” side, and Hume on the other. But, as Hume immediately goes on to say, (...) “There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy.” The implication is that the distinction at the heart of the dispute contains fairly little of substance. I shall argue that this is indeed an appropriate description of the difference between Hobbes and Hume on the subject of human selfishness when we consider the former’s psychological writings in Leviathan. Nevertheless, words matter when writing about human motivation because, by carrying connotations of praise or blame, they influence human actions. Accordingly, I shall suggest that the emphasis on self-regarding motives in Hobbes’s political writings results from a judgement about which image of human nature it is most useful to present. (shrink)

O artigo analisa a leitura crítica de Hans Kelsen acerca da concepção jurídico-política de Thomas Hobbes, considerando críticas posteriores à própria interpretação de Kelsen. Para tanto, investigou-se primeiramente a posição de Kelsen sobre o jusnaturalismo buscando esclarecer conceitos centrais como os do ser e dever-ser e como o autor os associa a Hobbes. Nesse sentido, observouse a limitação da leitura de Kelsen em relação à filosofia jurídica do autor – uma doutrina jusnaturalista metafísica, tendo na regra de ouro o fundamento (...) natural para o direito positivo. Em contraposição, procurou-se apresentar uma postura crítica, que contesta a posição jusnaturalista atribuída a Hobbes e sustenta a tese de que o autor inglês é um precursor do positivismo jurídico. (shrink)

La scolastique tardive, au début du XVIIe siècle, est le théâtre d’un débat sur la définition du signe, qui se traduit par la division entre signum formale et signum instrumentale. Le premier est l’écho de la tendance médiévale à comprendre les concepts comme des signes. Le second correspond à une définition qui remonte à Augustin, selon laquelle le signe est une chose sensible qui doit être connue pour porter à la connaissance de quelque chose d’autre. Se démarquant de la voie (...) qui avait fait de la seule Logique de Port-Royal le paradigme de la pensée sémiotique de l’Âge classique, cet ouvrage montre, à partir de ce débat scolastique, que le XVIIe siècle se caractérise globalement par une translatio, visible notamment chez Bayle, Gassendi et Hobbes, d’un modèle linguistico-psychologique à une sémiotique emblématique d’une mutation de la logique désormais ordonnée vers l’épistémologie. (shrink)

Resumen En el Leviatán Hobbes implementa la ley de naturaleza como la condición de posibilidad del desarrollo epistemológico que convierte al animal en humano, en el estado de naturaleza. De acuerdo con esta fórmula, la moral se desarrolla cuando los hombres empiezan a comportarse de acuerdo con el contenido no explícito de las leyes de naturaleza, comportamiento posibilitado por su sujeción a un hombre fuerte, quien tiene la función moral de administrar justicia. Esta doble función moral de las leyes de (...) naturaleza entre quien manda y quien obedece implica una experiencia de la justicia como comunicación de postulados racionales compartidos que condicionan el libre accionar de los hombres, manteniéndolos unidos en el tiempo.In the Leviathan, Hobbes employs the law of nature as the condition of possibility of the epistemological development that transforms the animal into a human in the state of nature. According to this formula, morality develops when men behave according to the non-explicit content of the laws of nature, behavior enabled by their subjection to a strong man who has the moral function of administrating justice. The moral function of the laws of nature is double, those who rule and those who obey, and implies an experience of justice as communication of shared rational postulates that conditions the free actions of men, keeping them united in time. (shrink)

In the following article we will discuss the methodology and presentation of arguments to prescribe a theory of better governance exposed by two eminent thinkers of politics as they were James Harrington and Thomas Hobbes. Then, we contrast the theoretical development of both authors under the conceptions of political philosophy and political science exposed by Giovanni Sartori and Norberto Bobbio. We conclude with a critique of a seated prejudice in some academic circles of political science.

In this essay, I contend that the usually neglected Fundamental Law of the Commonwealth, which commands that the essential rights of the sovereign be retained by the sovereign, imposes substantial...

This chapter examines the connections between Hobbes’s and Cavendish’s accounts of causation. Eileen O’Neill and Marcus Adams have argued that Hobbes and Cavendish share the same notion of entire causes as necessary and sufficient for producing their effects. While this account is well-suited to Hobbes’s mechanical account of causation, O’Neill worries that this claim collapses Cavendish’s account of occasional causation into full on occasionalism. I argue that a close analysis of Cavendish’s views on the role of external objects in perception (...) shows that it does make a causal contribution that is not merely moral. Karen Detlefsen has argued that Cavendish’s account causation requires libertarian freedom and the denial of nature as a principal cause. This would put Cavendish at odds with both Hobbes’s account of causes and his account of freedom. I argue that Cavendish’s occasional causation only requires self-motion, that self-motion does not require libertarian freedom, and that matter is the principal or entire cause of all the effects in nature. This not only goes a long way in reconciling Cavendish’s views with those of Hobbes, but also provides a more natural reading of her texts. (shrink)