Thomas Hobbes

The renowned work by the English political philosopher examines the structure of society and legitimate government, arguing for a social contract and rule by an absolute sovereign.

In recent years, scholars have delved deeper into the intricate connections between Thomas Hobbes’s political and religious doctrines. It is now widely recognized that religion plays a central role...

Hume devised a third way between Hobbes and Locke that bolstered the former’s defense of stability and the latter’s defense of rebellion. This feat remains underappreciated. Hume’s third way rests on the idea of the public conscience, which, like Hobbes’s idea of the public conscience, derives from communication and consensus. The public conscience orients us toward the public interest, which, in Hume’s theory, is the authoritative standard by which individuals and government alike must abide. In this paper, I elaborate on (...) the moral psychological principles that underlie Hume’s concept of the public conscience, which is liable to both conservative liberal and progressive liberal interpretations. And I argue that Hume’s third way provides valuable insight into the logic of public political discourse in liberal societies. (shrink)

In the mid seventeenth century, European scholars on the frontline of philosophical discussions corresponded and exchanged their works in manuscript or in print, as they had always done, but a strong trend towards publishing their work in the vernaculars and towards translating each other’s works between vernaculars was building up. The French mathematician Guillaume du Verdus had become friends with the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, and ambitioned to translated the latter’s English Leviathan into French. In spite of all his endeavours (...) and of Hobbes’s friendly support, he could not become proficient enough in English to safely translate the book, hence his decision to translate the Latin De Cive, an earlier work of political philosophy by Hobbes. What can explain this choice? How were modern languages taught in early modern Europe? Was Du Verdus’s decision to translate Hobbes mainly due to philosophical or ideological reasons? How can we contextualise such choices from internal and external evidence? (shrink)

"Se quisermos saber no que consiste, precisamente, o maior de todos os bens, qual deva ser a finalidade de todos os sistemas de legislação, verificar–se–á que se resume nestes dois objetivos principais: a liberdade e a igualdade. A liberdade, porque qualquer dependência particular corresponde a outro tanto de força tomada ao corpo do Estado, e a igualdade, porque a liberdade não pode subsistir sem ela” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau). Se Hobbes elabora um hipotético estado de natureza que, encerrando uma situação na qual (...) “o homem é um lobo para o outro homem” (homo homini lupus) em um contexto que envolve “a guerra de todos contra todos” (bellum omnium contra omnes), converge para a necessidade acerca do estabelecimento da paz como condição sine qua non para a conservação da vida, o que impõe a fundação do Estado e da sociedade civil por intermédio do contrato que demanda a renúncia dos direitos ilimitados dos indivíduos e instaura a autoridade política, o poder absoluto e a soberania estatal, Locke atribui ao estado de natureza a condição de uma realidade histórica concreta caracterizada pela perfeita igualdade e absoluta liberdade em uma construção que, baseada na lei natural, implica a transição para o estado civil através do contrato que funda a sociedade política como um processo que tende a assegurar os direitos naturais dos indivíduos, à medida que traz como fundamento da instituição do poder a propriedade, ou seja, a vida, a liberdade e os bens dos cidadãos, característica do individualismo moderno e do liberalismo político. Dessa forma, o Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa assinala que, se o contrato burguês não encerra qualquer tipo de “alienação” propriamente dita, caracterizando-se, em suma, pela abdicação de um direito infinito que, contudo, não se impõe senão como teórico, convergindo para assegurar, em compensação, direitos “reais”, à medida que é para si mesmo, para o próprio lucro, que se contrata, o contrato de Rousseau, que se contrapõe à referida perspectiva, consiste em uma troca que implica não menos do que o homem, sobrepondo-se o cidadão ao indivíduo no processo de constituição do social que determina o pacto que, convergindo para a antinomia da relação envolvendo liberdade e autoridade, requer a “alienação verdadeira” dos indivíduos em face da soberania popular e resulta na constituição do povo soberano, única fonte legítima do poder e seu único detentor, e na instituição da Vontade Geral como condição para o seu exercício. (shrink)

Stewart Duncan, Materialism from Hobbes to Locke, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, 248pp., ISBN: 9780197613009.

This paper deals with Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature. Deviating from its interpretation as a logically indispensable hypothesis for the purpose of the individualist-contractualist legitimation of the state, the article directs the discussion away from the question of the state of nature’s status within Hobbes’ anthropological or legal framework and towards the issue of where and what kind of evidence for this narrative is supposed to be found. If one interrogates this narrative in epistemological terms, an interpretative (...) perspective is opened up in which ordinary forms of competitive and exploitative behaviour as well as of unmediated rule are of central importance, and the consideration of the state of nature as both a situational-relational and gradual concept is made possible as well as necessary. This contribution not only shows how such interpretative possibility is substantiated by the primary sources, but also asks how it relates to Hobbes’ own reflections on knowledge and scientific method. It is shown that what is crucial here is not the distinction between empirical and idealist approach, but the one between two kinds of experience, the second of which corresponds to a nominalist view of knowledge about politics. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the linguistic aspect of demonology in «Leviathan» by Thomas Hobbes. Firstly, demonology is considered as a danger to political stability in «Leviathan». Secondly, the main points of the philosophy of language and the place of metaphor in Hobbes’ political philosophy are presented. Thirdly, through Hobbes’ understanding of metaphor, ways of neutralizing demonological prejudice in «Leviathan» and the sovereign’s monopoly right to use metaphors are discussed.

This article examines the subtle nuances of Hobbes’s and Kant’s perspectives on rhetoric and materialism, contextualising them within the broader framework of political philosophy. Despite both philosophers being critics of rhetoric, their approaches exhibit notable divergences. Hobbes, who advocated for monarchy, criticized rhetoric from the perspective of a materialist anthropology influenced by Lucretius. However, he paradoxically employed rhetorical strategies in his new scientia civilis. Despite critiquing both Lucretian materialism and rhetoric, Kant incorporated certain rhetorical elements compatible with his philosophical framework, (...) particularly in relation to Epicureanism. This study analyses their interpretations of paradiastole and the implications for the political thought. The argument is that both thinkers, in seeking a rational foundation for the political order, anchor their notions of rationality in Epicurean materialism, by reconfiguring rhetorical elements to suit their respective philosophies. The article elucidates Kant’s republican proclivities and his aspiration to maximize the citizens’ autonomy, which contrasts with Hobbes’s monarchical orientation. This research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the early modern political thought and its relevance to the contemporary republican and democratic theory. (shrink)

Esse artigo tem como objetivo expor o motivo pelo qual Hobbes defende que o Estado, para manter a paz, deve ter sob seu domínio, necessariamente, o poder temporal e o espiritual. Para o filósofo inglês, enquanto o Estado possui o poder capaz de promover a paz, os discursos religiosos podem levar os homens à condição de guerra de todos contra todos mediante a diversidade de doutrinas que se contrapõem à obediência ao soberano. Para tanto, tomar-se-á como ponto de partida a (...) exposição em Behemoth, ou o Longo Parlamento, daqueles que Hobbes aponta como os causadores da guerra civil, sendo os principais atores da rebelião o clero presbiteriano e papista. (shrink)

Jeffrey Collins’ new book aims to presents Locke’s views on religious toleration in the light of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. At first blush, Hobbes seems an unusual choice as a point of co...

The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes collects twenty-six newly commissioned, original chapters on the philosophy of the English thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Best known today for his important influence on political philosophy, Hobbes was in fact a wide and deep thinker on a diverse range of issues. The chapters included in this Oxford Handbook cover the full range of Hobbes's thought--his philosophy of logic and language; his view of physics and scientific method; his ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law; and (...) his views of religion, history, and literature. Several of the chapters overlap in fruitful ways, so that the reader can see the richness and depth of Hobbes's thought from a variety of perspectives. The contributors are experts on Hobbes from many countries, whose home disciplines include philosophy, political science, history, and literature. A substantial introduction places Hobbes's work, and contemporary scholarship on Hobbes, in a broad context. (shrink)

Von Natur aus ist der Mensch so frei wie wölfisch. Um sich selbst zu bändigen, muß er folglich einen künstlichen Riesen schaffen, den Staat, der als übergeordnete Instanz den permanenten Bürgerkrieg zu unterdrücken und Frieden zu schaffen vermag. Diese Essenz von Thomas Hobbes'"Leviathan" ist bis heute ebenso vehement verworfen wie bekräftigt worden. In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurden vor allem die historischen Bedingungen erschlossen, unter denen Hobbes sein epochales Werk verfaßte; aber seine bestürzende Grundthese, daß es des Schreckens bedarf, um inneren (...) Frieden zu erzeugen, ist eine Herausforderung für jedwede Staats- und Gesellschaftstheorie geblieben. Zu den Mitteln, mit denen der Leviathan die Menschen vom Unfrieden abhält, gehören Bilder, und aus diesem Grund steht dem Leviathan ein Frontispiz voran. Obwohl seit Jahrhunderten selbst entfernteste Aspekte von Hobbes' Werk ausgeleuchtet wurden, ist dieses grundlegende Element seiner Lehre bislang nicht erörtert worden. Eine systematische Untersuchung seiner Wertschätzung des Augensinnes fehlt ebenso wie eine umfassende Analyse seiner Bildmittel. Horst Bredekamp erschließt mit Abraham Bosse den Künstler des Frontispizes, stellt sämtliche Varianten dieses Urbildes des modernen Staates zusammen und versucht, die Vorgeschichte seiner politischen Ikonographie zu klären. Im Zentrum stehen die königlichen Kunstleiber von Westminster Abbey sowie optische Geräte, mit deren Hilfe Hobbes neben dem Körper und dem Raum auch eine künstliche Zeit als Wirkmittel des Leviathan zu etablieren suchte. Gegen Ende seiner prägnanten Analyse erörtert der Autor die Wiederkehr der Hobbesschen Staatsikone im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert sowie die Zukunft des Staates als Bild. (shrink)

Carefully and faithfully edited by "one of our most astute commentators on Hobbes's political theory" (Jeremy Waldron), the Norton Library edition of Leviathan features the complete text of the work, with spelling and punctuation thoughtfully modernized and archaic terms helpfully annotated throughout.

Šiame straipsnyje tiriami subtilūs Hobbes’o ir Kanto požiūrių į retoriką ir materializmą skirtumai, žvelgiant į juos platesniame politinės filosofijos kontekste. Nors abu šie filosofai buvo retorikos kritikai, tarp jų požiūrių išryškėja esminių skirtumų. Hobbes’as, būdamas monarchijos šalininkas, paveiktas Lukrecijaus, kritikavo retoriką iš materialistinės, antropologijos perspektyvos. Paradoksalu, tačiau jis pasitelkė retorines strategijas savo naujajame scientia civilis. Kantas, nors ir kritikuodamas tiek Lukrecijaus materializmą, tiek ir retoriką, į savo filosofijos perspektyvą integravo kai kuriuos suderinamus retorinius elementus, visų pirma susijusius su epikūrizmo tradicija. (...) Šiame straipsnyje tiriama, kaip du aptariamieji filosofai traktuoja paradiastole ir kokias pasekmes jų interpretacija turi jų politinei minčiai. Iškeliamas argumentas, kad abu mąstytojai, ieškodami racionalaus pamato politinei tvarkai, savąjį racionalumo sąvokos interpretavimą įtvirtina epikūrietiškame materializme, perkonfigūruodami retorinius elementus taip, kaip būtų patogu jų filosofijai. Straipsnyje išsiaiškinama, kad Kantas yra linkęs į respublikoniškas politines pažiūras; jis siekia kuo labiau padidinti piliečių autonomiją. Tai kategoriškai skiriasi nuo Hobbes’o orientacijos į monarchinę valdymo struktūrą. Šis tyrimas prisideda prie labiau niuansuoto suvokimo apie ankstyvąją Naujųjų laikų politinę mintį bei jos aktualumą šiuolaikinei respublikoniškai bei demokratinei teorijai. (shrink)

In this symposium response, I suggest that a key to thinking about the implications of Hobbes’s materialism for his arguments about ethics, politics, and law is to trace his efforts to defend complex causation. I suggest that when we read Hobbes as trying to hold onto complex causation as an ontological and epistemological fact, we have to rethink the relationship between freedom, reason, sovereignty, and the law.

This contribution to a symposium on Samantha Frost’s Lessons From a Materialist Thinker discusses its groundbreaking approach to Hobbes’s thought and raises two questions that are still to be answered by future scholars: what does a materialist politics or a materialist ethics look like, and how can we understand juridical relations from a materialist standpoint?

This contribution to a symposium on Samantha Frost’s Lessons from a Materialist Thinker considers Frost’s interpretation of Hobbesian Man and the connection between man and the Commonwealth. Particular attention is paid to Frost’s interpretation of man as an interdependent and intersubjective living creature and the relationship between living embodiment and agency. Through this focused examination, this contribution aims to elucidate the critical questions raised by Lessons and identify promising avenues for future Hobbes scholarship by highlighting the key insights that reshape (...) our understanding of his enduring influence on modern political thought. (shrink)

An attempt to construct a broad, interdisciplinary framework for thinking about ethical issues, and acting on them, from a leading researcher in the field.

A symposium on Samantha Frost’s Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and Politics offers an opportunity to revisit one of the most original contributions to Hobbes scholarship in the last few decades. The book’s originality resides not only in recuperating Hobbes’s materialist metaphysics for contemporary ethics and politics, but in making Hobbes’s take on matter inform novel conceptual approaches to social and non-social reality, such as new materialism – a philosophical school that conceives matter as vibrant and (...) agentic, rather than inert. (shrink)

This contribution to a symposium on Samantha Frost’s Lessons from a Materialist Thinker considers her innovative reinterpretation of Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy, situating him as a precursor of New Materialism. Frost’s reading emphasizes Hobbes’s conception of human beings as ‘thinking bodies’ inextricably intertwined with their environment. This materialist conception leads to a relational, peace-oriented ethic rooted in our interdependence. Frost’s interpretation is contrasted with those of Arash Abizadeh and Stephen Darwall. Abizadeh identifies two normative dimensions in Hobbes’s ethics: the prudential and (...) the juridical. This perspective highlights the role of contractual obligations, which is less prominent in Frost’s interpretation. Darwall’s projectivist interpretation suggests that Hobbes saw ethical judgments as projections of our desires onto the world, which potentially challenges Frost’s materialist reading. While acknowledging the tensions between these interpretations, it is argued that Frost’s reinterpretation offers valuable insights for addressing contemporary ethical and political challenges. (shrink)

Hobbes’s theory of authorisation poses numerous puzzles to scholars. The weightiest of these conundrums is a supposed contradiction between chapter 17 of Leviathan, that calls for unconditional submission to the sovereign, and chapter 21, that defends the liberties of the subject. This article offers a fresh perspective on the theory’s consistency, function and addressees. While existing research doubts the theory’s consistency, focuses on its immunisation function and on the subjects as the theory’s main addresses, the paper argues that Hobbes’s theory (...) of authorisation is consistent with the doctrine of the liberty of subjects, and that it serves the dual purpose of immunising the sovereign against criticism and disciplining the sovereign via a counsel of memento mori: A hitherto underexplored element of authorisation theory is a reminder of the mortality of sovereignty directed at the sovereign to convince him to make restricted use of his absolute right to rule. Hobbes’s theory of authorisation can thus be read as part of a complex argumentative strategy for peace, rooted in a ‘liberal absolutism’ which is not as paradoxical as it sounds, and which is reflected in the frontispiece by the friendly smile of the sovereign. (shrink)

The pirate is a figure that is both marginal to war – since he is excluded from it – and central – since he is regularly called upon to define it. From a few evocations of this figure by Bodin, Grotius and Hobbes, all of which are based on Thucydides, we want to bring to light a normativity that is specific and immanent to the space of warlike violence.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes introduces an imaginary figure, the Fool, who disputes the third law of nature, saying: ‘that man perform their covenants made’. According to the Fool, ‘there is no such thing as justice’. Also, it is not ‘against reason’ to break a covenant if it is to one’s own advantage to do so. Hobbes claims that the Fool is wrong, but where exactly does the latter’s folly lie? Commentators have found Hobbes’s answer to be surprisingly vague. This paper (...) examines Hobbes’s reply and how commentators have tried to assist him. It argues that Hobbes’s vagueness reflects an unresolved tension between - in the words of John Rawls - the ‘rational’ and the ‘reasonable’ in his theory, a tension that has in turn led to contradictory interpretations. (shrink)

Locke bases his moral and political philosophy on his doctrine of the ‘law of nature’. Scholars have debated the content and grounding of this law and its relationship to Christian theology. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law’s content are traceable to an unclear grammatical construction in a crucial passage of the Treatises of Government, which can be resolved by following out a related set of arguments in that work. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law’s grounding can then be (...) resolved by the hypothesis, strongly supported by textual evidence, that Locke relies tacitly on the reasoning of a parallel passage in Hobbes. Lockean natural law rests on neither atheistic nor specifically Christian premises but on a hypothetical natural theology. Locke’s conclusions from that natural theology represent an attempt to follow out Hobbesian logic while also tightening it up on one important point on which Hobbes himself appears to vacillate. (shrink)

Defendo que a linguagem, em Thomas Hobbes, por ser o fundamento de sua filosofia, pode ser entendida, em última instância, como um pacto de entendimento e de vontades. Sendo assim, não apenas os nomes e a verdade decorrem da convenção linguística, mas todos os tipos de regras e princípios são fruto de um contrato linguístico que atende às necessidades, às convenções e às vontades dos humanos. Com o objetivo de provar esta hipótese, foi necessário provar, primeiro, como a linguagem ocupa (...) o lugar de fundamento na filosofia de Hobbes. Sendo assim, partiu-se de uma investigação dos primeiros escritos do filósofo, passando pelos ecos que a tradição e os seiscentos podem ter proporcionado para seus argumentos maduros, bem como pela forma como o filósofo pode ter incorporado a geometria em seu método. Desse percurso (e, no geral, ao longo dele), foi possível apresentar não apenas como a linguagem recebe uma crescente atenção e aprofundamento da parte do filósofo de Malmesbury, como a sua filosofia da linguagem se estabelece, mas, também, extrair que a própria linguagem é um pacto — do que se abre uma nova entrada para investigar os argumentos a respeito da natureza propostos por Hobbes. (shrink)

Hobbes, le « père de l'Etat-nation moderne », suivant l'expression de Hannah Arendt, rompt avec la perspective platonico-aristotélicienne et inaugure une pensée politique qui, renonçant au statut naturel de la cité, installe la sécurité au cœur de la politique.

This article aims to present Thomas Hobbes’s views on freedom. I discuss how the philosopher understands freedom and the realm of human actions within which, according to him, it can manifest. In this context, I reconstruct both the state of nature, in which humans lived in less socialized times, and the state of polity, within which they have functioned since creating that artificial body known as the state. Hobbes’s reference to the Latin terms jus and lege, meaning right and law (...) and their consistent application in the philosopher’s subsequent writings facilitates a more precise definition of the scope of human freedom and explains the differences in this matter between the subject and the sovereign. Ultimately, it is this relationship, subject–sovereign, that proves central to a clear and complete understanding of the issue of freedom. Therefore, I devote relatively the most space in the article to its discussion. (shrink)

This article traces Hobbes’s account of ‘exemplarity’ from his early writings to Leviathan. It argues that, by tracking Hobbes’s changing views on exemplarity, we get a better grasp on how he construed the effective conditions of an enduring peace in 1651. While these conditions are compatible with the formal structure of sovereignty, they remain distinct from it. I start by inserting Hobbes’s early engagement with historiography in the context of the ‘crisis of exemplarity’ of the late Renaissance. Whereas prior engagement (...) with antiquity had relied on a notion of exemplarity as historical particulars embodying general norms to be imitated in a contemporary setting, a dissatisfaction with this model, characteristic of a revived interest in Tacitus, appears in the sixteenth century. Initially adhering to this ‘Tacitean’ scheme of political theory, Hobbes ended up abandoning exemplarity as the foundational model of politics in Elements of Law and De cive. However, Leviathan reintroduced the scheme of exemplarity as a strategy of effective government. This strategy is based on a retrieval of the sovereign’s appearance as a moral exemplum to be imitated by the subjects. Lastly, I suggest that this change stems from the altered conditions of government at the end of the 1640s. (shrink)

En colección pasiva. En colección pasiva.

The paper is a contribution to discussions about prospects of reaffirmation of the ontological-political interpretation of Hobbes’s thought advised in the mid-twentieth century by Leo Strauss and C.B. Macpherson. The paper begins with an outline of the main avenues and lines of contention and division within contemporary Hobbes studies, constituted as examples of the “definitive rejection” of Strauss’s and Macpherson’s interpretations. In the second part, there are discussed some issues in detail that help us to define the meaning of the (...) political ontology in Hobbes’s thought as determined by the pair of oppositions “juridical (negative) power” — “ontological-generative (positive) power”. In the third and fourth parts there are considered two main aspects and implications of the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty, as well as the current debates around it (launched mainly as a result of inspiration by Carl Schmitt’s reading of the theory): firstly, the doctrine of an exception/state of emergency in relation to the idea of citizenship and human rights, and, secondly, metaphysical-political and theological-political, justifications of the “monistic” authority of the absolute power juxtaposed against a pluralist and democratic (republican), and at the same time a-secular and cross-religious-comparative considerations of sovereignty of the “people” (as a “multitude”). As a result of the proposed analyzes and reflections, the religious and theological foundations (considered through comparative studies on the doctrines and traditions of three monotheistic religions) are highlighted for questioning the “essentialist” approach to the “fetishism” of sovereignty in the most influential doctrines from Schmitt to Morgenthau and Hinsley. (shrink)

This article engages the role of temporality in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Rather than focusing on the political individual proposed by his later works, it politicizes the conception of subjectivity advanced in his earlier works. In these, he advances a materialist account of subjectivity that is conceptualized in entirely temporal terms. It is, he argues, the temporal categories of memory and imagination that make humans uniquely capable of selfhood and freedom. This early conception lacks the tendency towards domination described (...) in Leviathan, in which the state of nature is presented as a war of all against all. However, this article argues that what the state of nature reveals is that the temporality of subjectivity is not objective, but rather socially produced. As such, the state of nature depicts behavior resulting from material anxiety, which prevents thinking, and therefore acting, beyond the present. Political institutions therefore emerge in his thought as a mechanism for quelling anxiety such that the future becomes actionable. By projecting a vision of a secure, open future, these institutions create a present in which meaningful, self-directed actions become possible. That is, he is the first to posit the very modern notion that political institutions fundamentally shape our sense of possibility. (shrink)