En este artículo introductorio al número especial “Desacuerdos Profundos: Precisiones y Exploraciones”, se presentan los artículos que comprenden este número brindando contexto a sus distintas temáticas, las cuales van desde la naturaleza de los desacuerdos profundos y su resolución, hasta sus conexiones con debates filosóficos y fenómenos sociales.

In this paper, we address the connection between deep disagreements and the rise of affective polarization. Many contemporary approaches to deep disagreement conceive it in atomistic terms, and their practical approaches only explore the consequences of their particular theories. In contrast, we offer a re-lational approach to the phenomenon, consistent with the recent political turn in analytic philosophy. Specifically, we argue that the notion of deep disagree-ment must be approached by taking into account the practical goal of detecting and intervening (...) on social injustices related to situations of deep disagreement. In this line, we briefly discuss both an operationalization of the notion and a way to take care of our disagreements. (shrink)

The factual existence of deep disagreements has an unclear status in the lite-rature. On the one hand, some authors claim that deep disagreements exist in practice, arguing that the parties involved will use non-rational persuasion tactics to resolve the disagreement. On the other hand, some argue that deep disagreements are only theoretically possible because practical constraints will push the parties to find rational ways to resolve the disagreement. This article empirically investigates the factual existence of deep disagreements by analyzing parliamentary (...) debates on abortion. The analysis results do not allow us to determine whether the debates examined are cases of deep disagreement but rather question whether the distinction between rational argumentation and non-rational persuasion tactics is explanatorily relevant for investigating deep disagreements. (shrink)

Disagreements about scientific ontology have frequently been reconstructed as the result of a dispute between rival epistemic stances. In this paper, (i) we characterize some of these disagreements as deep disagreements. In addition, we show that deep disagreements about scientific ontology can arise not only from the adoption of different epistemic stances, but also between positions that fall within the same stance. The development of this point allows us, in turn, to establish a distinction between types of deep disagreement and (...) to explore the possibility that there are differences of degree between them. (shrink)

In this article I present an answer to the problem of deep disagreements posed by Robert Fogelin (1985). According to this author, there are disagreements that cannot be resolved rationally because they refer to “framework propositions”. I argue that, making certain distinctions, Fogelin’s conclusion is less serious than initially thought. The first distinction is between resolving and overcoming di-sagreements. From the fact that disagreements cannot be resolved, it does not follow that they cannot be overcome in other ways. Thus, together (...) with resolu-tion, the parties can overcome disagreements through means such as negotia-tion, mediation, arbitration or suspension of judgment. The second distinction is between theoretical and practical disagreements. As I argue, while for theo-retical disagreements the fact that they cannot be resolved implies that the only way to overcome them is by suspending judgment, for practical disagreements it is not possible to suspend judgment, but there are other ways to “manage di-sagreements”. Having made these distinctions, I conclude by pointing out that the fact that certain disagreements are deep does not prevent them from being overcome, which reflects a pluralistic view of the argumentation that should be further explored. (shrink)

This paper studies Wittgenstein’s later observations on moral disagreements. First, it examines the practice of reason-giving and justification in moral disa-greement. It argues that, for Wittgenstein, moral reasons are descriptions which are used to justify a moral evaluation. Second, it explains that the adequacy and conclusiveness of moral reasons and justifications are dependent on their appeal to whomever they are given, not on how the world is. Third, it shows that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the inconclusiveness of moral reasons and jus-tification (...) do not entail a commitment to moral relativism. Lastly, it shows how Wittgenstein’s observations can be used in future investigations to develop a new picture of deep moral disagreements. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of deep disagree-ments in philosophy. I argue that deep philosophical disagreements imply a challenge for philosophy since deep philosophical disagreements hinder ratio-nal decision between philosophical theories. That makes demanding or offe-ring reasons for philosophical theory useless. To overcome this, I argue that philosophical argument is an end in itself and not a means to rational reso-lution of deep philosophical disagreements. I describe two theories that at-tempt to explain deep disagreements in general. Next, (...) I distinguish between intraphilosophical and interphilosophical disagreement. Thus, interphilosophical disagreements are those that are deep philosophical disagreements, while in-traphilosophical disagreements are disagreements between epistemic peers. Subsequently, I explore the consequences of deep philosophical disagreements and conclude that epistemic and practical reasons fail to provide a rational res-ponse to deep philosophical disagreements. Finally, I respond to two objections about argumentative language in philosophical debates and the impossibility of philosophical progress. (shrink)

This paper has three purposes. The first and main one is to show that certain deep disagreements are rationally resolvable. The procedure of rational reso-lution of these disagreements is the same as the one Duncan Pritchard (2011, 2021) thinks that allows to resolve any deep disagreement. Thus, the second purpose of this paper is to give some reasons to think, against Pritchard, that this procedure only allows to resolve a certain kind of deep disagreements. The third purpose, which is treated (...) as subsidiary of the first one, is to defend the characterization of deep disagreement used here against two alternative cha-racterizations. (shrink)

This paper explores disagreements due to active ignorance as a kind of deep di-sagreement. It recovers Fogelin’s notion of “deep disagreement”, which stressed the limits of argumentation to build consensus and to dissipate deep disagree-ments; and it discusses his contention that deep disagreements cannot be sol-ved through rational resolution. The paper examines a disagreement that has practical implications and involves subjects asymmetrically situated in a web of power relations and builds on that case to conclude that disagreements due to ignorance (...) are not impervious to rational resolution. Specifically, it argues that practices of “epistemic activism” (Medina 2019) count as rational and reasona-ble mechanisms of resolution of deep disagreements due to active ignorance. (shrink)

In the deep disagreements characterized by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005) the parties do not share a common framework sufficient for the argumentative exchange to actually occur. Arguments are present as propositional structu-res, but do not develop as activity. Some public debates, particularly those that appeal to a resolution through the knowledge provided by science, can be reconstructed from the perspective of this model. Can scientific evidence be constructed from which to build, at least partially, that necessary common framework? Which notion of (...) objectivity is the most adequate for this purpose? Fogelin’s proposal is a starting point to reflect on the resolution of disagree-ments and scientific knowledge, in particular from the notions of incommen-surability and objectivity. It is argued that objectivity in scientific activity resul-ting from the conditions that allow negotiating meanings can work to resolve some deep disagreements. (shrink)