Greatness is a prevalent topic within philosophy of which many interpretations are offered, ranging from Aristotle's virtue-driven megalopsychos to Nietzsche’s power-hungry übermensch. Humanity’s persisting interest in the idea of greatness is undeniable– the desire for achievement can become obsessive, overwhelming and, for many, anxiety inducing. While there have been innumerable attempts to explain what greatness is, there is little to no scholarship on why we burden ourselves with the pursuit of greatness, consequently and uncharacteristically placing ourselves in a position of (...) angst and vulnerability. The risk of failure and embarrassment loom menacingly behind displays of ambition, seemingly incompatible with the visceral desire for achievement many of us find so familiar. This paper attempts to primarily fill this absence and explore greatness’ value (why we feel the need to strive) while simultaneously remedying errors in prevalent philosophical concepts of greatness. Ideally, an understanding of greatness and its value will offer solace and encouragement for those facing the anxiety and detriment that is all too often concomitant with the human desire for achievement. A coherent conception of greatness and its value will perhaps create an entry point to easing the variety of stresses and pressures that come with the pursuit of greatness. To accomplish this, the paper introduces multiple perspectives from prominent philosophers both of old (Plato, Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas) and more contemporary (Nietzsche, Amy Allen, Virginia Held) through a critical lens. Using relatable, real-world examples that promote interaction from a wide readership, a logical analysis and structural critique of each philosophy is conducted. Finally, a concept is offered that finds both power and virtue are critical, even intrinsic, characteristics of greatness and its value. (shrink)

The article considers the philosophical potential of Heraclitean ambiguity and implications for how one might engage philosophically with Heraclitus. While works on Heraclitus most commonly offer new interpretations or dispute or add nuance to established interpretations, this work somewhat sidesteps interpretive disputes to consider the philosophical value and relevance of Heraclitus’s fragments themselves. Specifically, a hermeneutical tool proposed by William Desmond called a “companioning approach,” is supported. Desmond’s companioning approach is considered in the context of Pierre Hadot’s account of the (...) history of hermeneutical practices to show that it merely defines and legitimizes a longstanding hermeneutical activity. Further, a recent work by A. V. Halapsis shows that Heraclitus’s ambiguity may have been a consequence of his anthropological commitments and that he may have intended to allow for something like a companioning engagement. (shrink)

This paper aimed to vindicate that Aristotle’s method of reaching the definition of something in Z 12 of Metaphysics is incomplete and suggest the way in which we can reach its true definition. This paper claimed that the definition reached by genus and differentia (say, “a human is a featherless, two-footed animal.”) is not true but merely a taxonomic definition¾“what a definition is like” (1038a35). The combination of essential differentiae of something does not express what it is intrinsically but what (...) other things are not, although the definition is the account of the essence. The combination of the differentiae ‘featherless’ and ‘two-footed’ are not what makes us humans in a positive sense. These differentiae simply set us apart from all other animals. Moreover, his method is arbitrary. The combination of essential differentiae is subject to change insofar as we can swap out one differentia for another. However, the essence of something cannot be changeable. In order to make “a definition like” be “a true definition,” this paper suggests another interpretation of the ultimate differentia. As he presents it, the ultimate differentia is the one that cannot be further divided. However, this paper interprets the ultimate differentia of something as its activity (ἐνέργειά) and its end (τέλος). Hence, it is necessary to combine Aristotle’s method of differentiation with the teleological ultimate differentia of something if we want to reach its true definition. Aristotle at various times refers to human as a rational animal, at other times as a featherless two-footed animal throughout his corpus. This paper suggests that one is taxonomic, an example of what definition is like, and the other one represents the achievement that can be made when we know the true end of a thing¾that is, true definition, if a human is for thinking with our logos. Keywords: definition, essence, taxonomy, differentia, the ultimate differentia, activity, end. (shrink)

In the field of study of Immaneul Kant, it has become apparent that scholars must reassess his seemingly universalist moral theory in the context of his racist and otherwise bigoted thought. In particular, many of these analyses revolve around one particular instance of anti-colonial sentiment found in Kant’s essay “Toward Perpetual Peace”. In this paper, I engage with two attempts by Pauline Kleingeld and Lucy Allais, which argue for a primarily-universalist and primarily-racist Kant respectively. Ultimately, I argue that Kleingeld and (...) Allais’ analyses both fail because they prioritize philosophical motivations for Kant other than his teleology in his conceptions of morality and human nature. I first present an analysis of Kant’s work focused around his essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” that demonstrates the primacy of teleology to Kant’s system of thought, including his moral theory. I then argue that it is the nature of a teleological system such as Kant’s to establish a hierarchy, and I show how this is apparent in Kant’s work, including “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”. Under this lens, it becomes clear that Kant’s exclusionary epistemology of human nature is not inconsistent with his ethics, and is easily recontextualized through his teleological perspective of human life and behavior. (shrink)

Johannes Althusius, a German legal theorist and political thinker in the early 1600s, attempts in his Politica to create a chain of increasingly large communal associations that could constitute a universally applicable political order. He founds this system on a natural law theory of behavioral guidelines. Many elements of his body of work, from its federalist structure to the granting of a right of sovereignty to the people, bear marks of an early connection to modern Western thought meriting further exploration. (...) Upon close inspection, the natural law theory at play in Politica also contains oddities and inconsistencies worthy of note. His Theory of Justice, a work on law and ethics, contains a similar theory with slight yet significant variations at the core level. Ultimately owed to weaknesses in the derivation of duties to self and a lack of evidence for the reasoning of the hierarchy of duties to others in Politica, the Theory of Justice model, though not without its own internal inconsistencies in the moral authority of positive law, is found to present a more philosophically sound model. (shrink)