“The question for us,” as Ronald Giere writes in Understanding Scientific Reasoning, “is whether analogies play any role in the JUSTIFICATION of [a] new theory.” Giere’s answer is an emphatic “No.” (Giere 1984, pp. 79-80). Although most philosophers of science would probably qualify Giere’s unmitigated rejection of analogical justification, few attribute much significance to analogical arguments in science. And when philosophers do grudgingly acknowledge an analogical argument, they are hesitant to analyze it.Take, for example, Charles Darwin’s argument for natural selection. (...) It is difficult to deny that the analogy between artificial and natural selection played an important justificatory role. After all, artificial selectibn was the topic of the first chapter of Darwin’s Origin of Species and was referred to in countless arguments throughout the text.2. (shrink)

The analogy between artificial selection of domestic varieties and natural selection in nature was a vital element of Darwin's argument in his Origin of Species. Ever since, the image of breeders creating new varieties by artificial selection has served as a convincing illustration of how the theory works. In this paper I argue that we need to reconsider our understanding of Darwin's analogy. Contrary to what is often assumed, nineteenth-century animal breeding practices constituted a highly controversial field that was fraught (...) with difficulties. It was only with considerable effort that Darwin forged his analogy, and he only succeeded by downplaying the importance of two other breeding techniques - crossing of varieties and inbreeding - that many breeders deemed essential to obtain new varieties. Part of the explanation for Darwin's gloss on breeding practices, I shall argue, was that the methods of his main informants, the breeders of fancy pigeons, were not representative of what went on in the breeding world at large. Darwin seems to have been eager to take the pigeon fanciers at their word, however, as it was only their methods that provided him with the perfect analogy with natural selection. Thus while his studies of domestic varieties were important for the development of the concept of natural selection, the reverse was also true: Darwin's comprehension of breeding practices was moulded by his understanding of the working of natural selection in nature. Historical studies of domestic breeding practices in the eighteenth and nineteenth century confirm that, besides selection, the techniques of inbreeding and crossing were much more important than Darwin's interpretation allowed for. And they still are today. This calls for a reconsideration of the pedagogic use of Darwin's analogy too. (shrink)

Given the amount of literature devoted to the reasoning used in Darwin’s Origin of Species, an interpretation seeking to revise the standard take on Darwin’s methodology is unexpected. Yet,, and challenges the view that Darwin drew an analogy in the Origin on the grounds that such a strategy could not support the possibility of a new species emerging. I suggest, however, that how one interprets causal efficacy is intimately connected with Darwin’s use of analogy. A more robust conception of natural (...) selection, as found in the Origin, supports the standard interpretation, significantly weakening Richards’ charge of a paradox. (shrink)

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The analogy Darwin drew between artificial and natural selection in "On the Origin of Species" has a detailed structure that has not been appreciated. In Darwin’s analogy, the kind of artificial selection called Methodical selection is analogous to the principle of divergence in nature, and the kind of artificial selection called Unconscious selection is analogous to the principle of extinction in nature. This paper argues that it is the analogy between these two different principles familiar from his studies of artificial (...) selection and the two different principles he claims are operative in nature that provides the main structure and force of the analogy he uses to make his case for the power of natural selection to produce new species. Darwin’s statements explicitly distinguishing between these two kinds of principles at work in nature occur prominently in the text of the Origin. The paper also shows that a recent revisionist claim that Darwin did not appeal to the efficacy of artificial selection is mistaken. (shrink)

The paper characterizes Darwin's theory, providing a synthesis of recent historical investigations in this area. Darwin's reading of Malthus led him to appreciate the importance of population pressures, and subsequently of natural selection, with the help of the wedge metaphor. But, in itself, natural selection did not furnish an adequate account of the origin of species, for which a principle of divergence was needed. Initially, Darwin attributed this to geographical isolation, but later, following his work on barnacles which underscored the (...) significance of variation, and arising from his work on botanical arithmetic, he supposed that diversity allowed more places to be occupied in a given region. So isolation was not regarded as essential. Large regions with intense competition, and with ample variation spread by blending, would facilitate speciation. The notion of place was different from niche, and it is questioned whether Darwin's views on ecology were as modern as is commonly supposed. Two notions of struggle are found in Darwin's theory; and three notions of variation. Criticisms of his theory led him to emphasize the importance of variation over a range of forms. Hence the theory was populational rather than typological. The theory required a Lamarckian notion of inheritable changes initiated by the environment as a source of variation. Also, Darwin deployed a use/habit theory; and the notion of sexual selection. Selection normally acted at the level of the individual, though kin selection was possible. Group selection was hinted at for man. Darwin's thinking (and also the exposition of his theory) was generally guided by the domestic-organism analogy, which satisfied his methodological requirement of a vera causa principle. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

Traditional logical empiricist and more recent historicist positions on the logic of discovery are briefly reviewed and both are found wanting. None have examined the historical detail now available from recent research on Darwin, from which there is evidence for gradual transition in descriptive and explanatory concepts. This episode also shows that revolutionary research can be directed by borrowed metascientific objectives and heuristics from other disciplines. Darwin's own revolutionary research took place within an ontological context borrowed from non evolutionary predecessors (...) with methodological objectives borrowed from and justified by their success in Newton's physics. The logic of discovery is not a special form of inference from observation to theory, but rather a theory of the rationality of research, including principles bearing upon the rational choice of problems, or epistemic objectives, and heuristic, or means to solving the problems. Such choices can be justified only locally in the context of a relatively stable background ontology and substantive epistemology, not globally for all science. (shrink)

Recently, the nature of science (NOS) has become recognized as an important element within the K-12 science curriculum. Despite differences in the ultimate lists of recommended aspects, a consensus is emerging on what specific NOS elements should be the focus of science instruction and inform textbook writers and curriculum developers. In this article, we suggest a contextualized, explicit approach addressing one core NOS aspect: the human aspects of science that include the domains of creativity, social influences and subjectivity. To illustrate (...) these ideas, we have focused on Charles Darwin, a scientist whose life, work and thought processes were particularly well recorded at the time and analyzed by scholars in the succeeding years. Historical facts are discussed and linked to core NOS ideas. Creativity is illustrated through the analogies between the struggle for existence in human societies and in nature, between artificial and natural selection, and between the division of labor in human societies and in nature. Social influences are represented by Darwin’s aversion of criticism of various kinds and by his response to the methodological requirements of the science of that time. Finally, subjectivity is discussed through Darwin’s development of a unique but incorrect source for the origin of variations within species. (shrink)

This work takes a stand on whether Wallace should be regarded as co-author of the theory of natural selection alongside Darwin as he is usually considered on behalf of his alleged essential contribution to the conception of the theory. It does so from a perspective unexplored thus far: we will argue for Darwin’s priority based on a rational reconstruction of the theory of natural selection as it appears in the writings of both authors. We show that the theory does not (...) appear in exactly the same manner in the writings of each of its alleged co-discoverers: tough we find the same fundamental elements in both works, even in Darwin’s early texts, we discern a more complex unifying and ramified structure than the one we find in Wallace’s Ternate manuscript. Even when we think the badge of the “Darwin–Wallace” theory is well deserved, the unifying force of Darwin’s version has proved to be one of the keys for the ulterior success of the so-called Darwinian revolution in Biology. (shrink)

Darwin used artificial selection extensively and variedly in his theorizing. Darwin used ASN as an analogy to natural selection; he compared artificial to natural varieties, hereditary variation in nature to that in the breeding farm; and he also compared the overall effectiveness of the two processes. Most historians and philosophers of biology have argued that ASN worked as an analogical field in Darwin’s theorizing. I will argue rather that this provides a limited and somewhat muddled view of Darwinian science. I (...) say “limited” because I will show that Darwin also used ASN as a complex experimental field. And I say “muddled” because, if we concentrate on the analogical role exclusively, we conceive Darwinian science as rather disconnected from contemporary conceptions of “good science”.I will argue that ASN should be conceived as a multifaceted experiment. As a traditional experiment, ASN established the efficacy of Darwin’s preferred cause: natural selection. As a non-traditional experiment, ASN disclosed the nature of a crucial element in Darwin’s evolutionary mechanics: the nature of hereditary variation. Finally, I will argue that the experiment conception should help us make sense of Darwin’s comments regarding the “monstrous” nature of domestic breeds_traditionally considered to be problematic. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain why, while Charles Darwin was well recognized as a scientific leader of his time, Claude Bernard never really regarded Darwinism as a scientific theory. The lukewarm reception of Darwin at the Académie des Sciences of Paris and his nomination to a chair only after 8 years contrasts with his prominence, and Bernard’s attitude towards Darwin’s theory of species evolution belongs to this French context. Yet we argue that Bernard rejects the scientific value (...) of Darwinian principles mainly for epistemological reasons. Like Darwin, Bernard was interested in hereditary processes, and planned to conduct experiments on these processes that could lead to species transformation. But the potential creation of new forms of life would not vindicate Darwinism since biologists can only explain the origin of morphotypes and morphological laws by the means of untestable analogies. Because it can be the object neither of experiments nor of any empirical observation, phylogeny remains out of science’s scope. Around 1878 Bernard foresaw a new general physiology based on the study of protoplasm, which he saw as the agent of all basic living phenomena. We will analyze why Bernard regarded Darwinism as part of metaphysics, yet still referred to Darwinians in his latter works in 1878. Basically, the absence of a scientific reception of Darwinism in Bernard's work should not obscure its philosophical reception, which highlights the main principles of Bernard’s epistemology. (shrink)

This essay traces the interlinked origins of two concepts found in Charles Darwin's writings: "unconscious selection," and sexual selection as applied to humanity's anatomical race distinctions. Unconscious selection constituted a significant elaboration of Darwin's artificial selection analogy. As originally conceived in his theoretical notebooks, that analogy had focused exclusively on what Darwin later would call "methodical selection," the calculated production of desired changes in domestic breeds. By contrast, unconscious selection produced its results unintentionally and at a much slower pace. Inspiration (...) for this concept likely came from Darwin's early reading of works on both animal breeding and physical ethnology. Texts in these fields described the slow and unplanned divergence of anatomical types, whether animal or human, under the guidance of contrasting ideals of physical perfection. These readings, it is argued, also led Darwin to his theory of sexual selection as applied to race, a theme he discussed mainly in his book The Descent of Man (1871). There Darwin described how the racial version of sexual selection operated on the same principle as unconscious selection. He thereby effectively reunited these kindred concepts. (shrink)

This essay traces the interlinked origins of two concepts found in Charles Darwin's writings: "unconscious selection," and sexual selection as applied to humanity's anatomical race distinctions. Unconscious selection constituted a significant elaboration of Darwin's artificial selection analogy. As originally conceived in his theoretical notebooks, that analogy had focused exclusively on what Darwin later would call "methodical selection," the calculated production of desired changes in domestic breeds. By contrast, unconscious selection produced its results unintentionally and at a much slower pace. Inspiration (...) for this concept likely came from Darwin's early reading of works on both animal breeding and physical ethnology. Texts in these fields described the slow and unplanned divergence of anatomical types, whether animal or human, under the guidance of contrasting ideals of physical perfection. These readings, it is argued, also led Darwin to his theory of sexual selection as applied to race, a theme he discussed mainly in his book The Descent of Man. There Darwin described how the racial version of sexual selection operated on the same principle as unconscious selection. He thereby effectively reunited these kindred concepts. (shrink)

In the first chapter of the Origin of species and in two chapters of the Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discusses the origin of domestic pigeons, claiming that all the known breeds were produced from a single species: Columba livia, the rock pigeon. The detailed defense of this point is of high relevance in Darwin’s argumentation strategy, since the differences between the several domestic breeds is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they could (...) be classified as different species or genera. If man was able to produce such large differences, it becomes plausible that nature can produce even larger differences, and therefore the process of natural selection becomes acceptable. Darwin emphasizes the enormous differences between the several domestic breeds (that may have dissimilar cranial structures and a varying number of vertebrae), and at the same time he attempts to show that there are connections and transitions between the extreme types, arguing for their common origin. One of the several interesting parts of his argument is an experiment of crossing between widely different breeds, which led him to obtain pigeons similar to the wild species. The detailed analysis of Darwin’s study of pigeons shows the extreme care he took in his attempt to provide strong arguments for his theory. RESUMO: No primeiro capítulo do Origin of species, e em dois capítulos do Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discute a origem dos pombos domésticos, defendendo que todas as raças conhecidas provêm de uma única espécie: Columba livia, o pombo de rocha. A defesa detalhada desse ponto é de grande importância na estratégia argumentativa de Darwin, pois as diferenças entre as várias raças de pombos são tão grandes que, se fossem encontradas em estado selvagem, poderiam ser classificadas como espécies ou gêneros diferentes. Se o homem foi capaz de produzir mudanças tão grandes como essas, torna-se plausível que a natureza possa produzir diferenças ainda maiores, e assim o processo de seleção natural se torna aceitável. Darwin enfatiza as grandes diferenças entre as raças de pombos (que chegam a possuir, por exemplo, diferentes estruturas cranianas e diferentes números de vértebras), e ao mesmo tempo procura mostrar a existência de nuances e transições entre os tipos extremos, para defender a origem comum. Um dos aspectos interessantes de sua argumentação é um experimento de cruzamento entre raças bem diferentes, através da qual obtém pombos semelhantes à espécie selvagem. A análise detalhada desse estudo de Darwin mostra o extremo cuidado que ele tomava para tentar proporcionar fortes argumentos a favor de sua teoria. (shrink)

The paper comments and elaborates upon five pages of P. F. Strawson’s Individuals , together with his ‘Entity and Identity’ and ‘Universals’. The focus is on Strawson’s understanding of individual non-particulars as types or universals, and on his contention that the most obvious non-particular entities are the broadly conceived artefacts including the works of art. The narrow focus is on the implications of Strawson’s suggestion that ‘an appropriate model for non-particulars of these kinds is that of a model particular - (...) a kind of prototype, or ideal example, itself particular, which serves as a rule or standard for the production of others’ . The paper analyzes the relation between Strawson’s position and the issue of artefacts and their ontology. It also asks about some less obvious affinities between the problem of the non-particulars and Strawson’s concept of a person. (shrink)