In the biomedical field, calls for the generation of new regulations or for the amendment of existing regulations often follow the emergence of apparently new research practices (such as embryonic stem cell research), clinical practices (such as facial transplantation) and entities (such as Avian Influenza/’Bird Flu’). Calls for regulatory responses also arise as a result of controversies which bring to light longstanding practices, such as the call for increased regulation of human tissue collections that followed the discovery of unauthorised post-mortem (...) organ retention. Whilst it seems obvious that new regulations should only be generated if existing regulations are inadequate (a practice referred to in this paper as ‘regulatory syncretism’), this does not always occur in practice. This paper examines the conceptual steps involved in generating regulatory responses to emerging phenomena. Two decision points are identified. First, a stance is taken as to whether the emerging phenomenon raises unique ethical or legal issues (exceptionalism versus non-exceptionalism). Second, the decision is made as to whether new regulation should be generated only for truly unique phenomena (syncretism versus asyncretism). It is argued here that it is important to make a careful assessment of novelty, followed by a reflective and deliberate choice of regulatory syncretism or asyncretism, since each type of regulatory response has advantages which need to be harnessed and disadvantages which need to be managed—something that can only occur if regulators are attentive to the choices they are making. (shrink)

We will analyse the representations and conceptualisation of genetics and genetic information in bioethical discourse. Genetics and genetic information is widely believed to be revolutionizing medicine and is sometimes misconceived as having a high predictive value compared to traditional diagnostics. We will attempt to present the inherent limitations of genetic information within its health care context. We␣will also argue against the exceptional treatment of genetic information that seems to govern bioethical reflection and regulatory approaches. And finally, we will make the (...) claim that geneticization should be seen as a more serious threat to our privacy, autonomy and freedom, than genetic discrimination. (shrink)

Is genetic information different from other types of medical information and is therefore a special treatment required because of its special features? This question has been discussed since the mid-1990s under the label of genetic exceptionalism. This article discusses the essential arguments of the genetic exceptionalism discourse and analyzes their ethical reach. The primary question of this paper is whether the arguments of the current debate, with its predominantly scientific focus, are capable of solving the ethical questions raised by genetic (...) exceptionalism in such a way as to do justice to the normative scope and epistemological complexity. The author argues that the current genetic exceptionalism discourse is restrictive and offers little opportunity for exploring viable and ethically justifiable solutions regarding the implementation of genetic information in medical practice. Discourses on genetic exceptionalism should not only adhere to scientifically consistent criteria but also reflect individual perceptions and cultural values, enriched by adequate historical reflection. (shrink)