SUMMARYIn recent years, historians have come to question earlier Whig interpretations that there was little science or science teaching done at Cambridge University prior to the appointment of Cambridge University Parliamentary Commissions in the 1850's. However, there has been no comprehensive survey of scientific activity at Cambridge in the first half of the nineteenth century. This essay, based upon research which penetrates beneath pedagogical tracts and Whig criticisms (both nineteenth and twentieth century varieties) reveals that Cambridge science professors researched, lectured, (...) gave experimental demonstrations and provided other educational opportunities. Furthermore, it shows that serious attempts to provide research and teaching facilities met with some success and might have met with more if not for the intervention of specific historical incidents compounded by financial problems and the consequences of the upgrading of the core of the Cambridge curriculum. Before the sciences became alternative routes to a Bachelor of Arts Degree and before the appointment of the first University Parliamentary Commissions, Cambridge dons laid the foundations for science at Cambridge in the second half of the century. (shrink)

A dominant strand of philosophical thought holds that natural kinds are clusters of objects with shared properties. Cluster theories of natural kinds are often taken to be a late twentieth-century development, prompted by dissatisfaction with essentialism in philosophy of biology. I will argue here, however, that a cluster theory of kinds had actually been formulated by William Whewell (1794-1866) more than a century earlier. Cluster theories of kinds can be characterized in terms of three central commitments, all of which are (...) present in Whewell’s work on classification. Like contemporary cluster theorists, Whewell claims that kinds are united by similarity, that many kinds do not have essences, and that there are “gaps” between kinds. Moreover, Whewell advises taxonomists to look for consilience (roughly, convergence) between different classificatory schemes, a recommendation that reinforces the identification of natural classes with property clusters. Thus Whewell was not only an early cluster theorist, but one with important insights into what a cluster theory of kinds means for the practice of classification. (shrink)

The one thing upon which we can all agree is that just over ten years ago a major revolution occurred in the science of geology. Geologists switched from accepting a static earth-picture, to endorsing a vision of an earth with its surface constantly in motion. (Cox [4]; Hallam [12]; Marvin [28]; Wilson [56]). It is true that early in this century the German geologist Alfred Wegener argued that the continents as we today find them have “drifted” to their positions from (...) other positions widely different. However, other than amongst a number of scientists drawn almost exclusively from the Southern Hemisphere, his ideas fell on deaf — or more precisely, contemptuous — ears. Then in the mid 1960’s, almost literally overnight, the geological community swung around and embraced the hypothesis of continental drift, or what we shall see is perhaps more accurately called “plate tectonics”. (shrink)

What are biological species? Aristotelians and Lockeans agree that they are natural kinds; but, evolutionary theory shows that neither traditional philosophical approach is truly adequate. Recently, Michael Ghiselin and David Hull have argued that species are individuals. This claim is shown to be against the spirit of much modern biology. It is concluded that species are natural kinds of a sort, and that any 'objectivity' they possess comes from their being at the focus of a consilience of inductions.

There is a rather striking video currently used in police training. A firearms officer is caught on video shooting an armed suspect. The officer then gives his account of what happened, and there is no suggestion that he is tying to fabricate evidence. He says that he shot the suspect once; his partner says that he fired two shots. On the video we see four shots being deliberately fired. Memory, it seems, is an unreliable witness in situations of stress.

Of articles which are submitted for publication in Philosophy, a surprisingly large proportion are about the views of Richard Rorty. Some, indeed, we have published. They, along with pretty well all the articles we receive on Professor Rorty, are highly critical. On the perverse assumption that there must be something to be said for anyone who attracts widespread hostility, it is only right to see what can be said in favour of Rorty's latest collection of papers, entitled, Truth and Progress,.

Of articles which are submitted for publication in Philosophy, a surprisingly large proportion are about the views of Richard Rorty. Some, indeed, we have published. They, along with pretty well all the articles we receive on Professor Rorty, are highly critical. On the perverse assumption that there must be something to be said for anyone who attracts widespread hostility, it is only right to see what can be said in favour of Rorty's latest collection of papers, entitled, Truth and Progress,.

In recent years two groups of taxonomists have attempted to influence the general goals and methods of biological classification. The first group, which emerged in the late 1950’s, has been called variously neo-Adansonian, numerical, computer and phenetic taxonomy. The founders of this school, Robert R. Sokal and P.H.A. Sneath, termed their unified approach to systematics “neo-Adansonian” because of the affinities which they saw between their views and those of the 18th century botanist, Michel Adanson (1727-1806). Today little mention is made (...) of Adanson. His ideas turned out not to be as prescient as Sokal and Sneath had at first thought. Besides, he had served his purpose as a patron saint ([79], p. 23). Sokal and Sneath also termed their approach “numerical” because they believed that taxonomists should make greater use of available mathematical techniques. Not only should taxonomic characters be coded quantitatively but also estimates of affinity should be made on the basis of explicitly stated clustering procedures. (shrink)

This article presents a little-studied issue of critical analysis of the main provisions of the inductive philosophy of the English thinker William Whewell (1794–1866) within the framework of university philosophy, in particular in the publications of the famous Kharkiv professor Pavlo Emilievych Leuckfeld (1859–1930). In this context, the main stages of Pavlo (Paul) Leuckfeld's creative and scientific path are indicated at the beginning, in particular his studies at the 2nd Kharkiv Gymnasium (1871–1878) and at the Faculty of History and Philology (...) of Kharkiv University (1878–1883). Further, attention is focused on his teaching activities at Kharkiv University (1884–1918), in particular on his fellowship since 1884, teaching the history of philosophy and logic as a private docent (since 1886), extraordinary professor (since 1893) and ordinary professor of philosophy (since 1899). His participation in international philosophical and psychological congresses, in particular in Munich (1896), Geneva (1904), Heidelberg (1908), and the peculiarities of his scientific fellowship at the University of Graz (Austria) with the authoritative professor Alexius Meinong are also indicated. In addition, attention is paid to the main features of Pavlo Leuckfeld's teaching and publications during his “Simferopol (Crimean) period”, when he was a professor of philosophy and psychology there. Pavlo Leuckfeld's publications were devoted to three main areas: 1) logic and the history of logic, 2) psychology and pedagogy, and 3) the history of philosophy. Among the publications of the first direction, two of his monographs were of great importance: “Various Trends in Logic and the Main Tasks of this Science” (1890) and “Logical Doctrine of Induction in the Main Historical Moments of Its Development” (1896). In these works, he analyzed the relevant positions of famous ancient and English philosophers (Aristotle, Francis Bacon, John Herschel, and John Stuart Mill). An important place in his analysis is occupied by the critical interpretation of the inductive philosophy of William Whewell, presented in particular in the third edition of the three-volume work “History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time” (1857). In this sense, the features of this work of the English philosopher were first pointed out, and then the main theses of Paul Leuckfeld in presenting his understanding of the position of William Whewell. (shrink)

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.Keywords: (...) William Whewell; Tidology; History of HPS; Scientific methodology; Whewell papers. (shrink)