History of Science, Misc

The goal of this note is to bring into wider attention the often neglected important work by Bertrand Russell on the foundations of physics published in the late 1920s. In particular, we emphasize how the book The Analysis of Matter can be considered the earliest systematic attempt to unify the modern quantum theory, just emerging by that time, with general relativity. More importantly, it is argued that the idea of what I call Russell space, introduced in Part III of that (...) book, is more fundamental than quantum theory, general relativity, and quantum gravity since the topological ordinal space proposed by Russell would naturally incorporate into its very fabric the emergent nature of spacetime by deploying event assemblages, and not spacetime or particles, as the fundamental building blocks of the world. (shrink)

يرى العباقرة العالم بطرقٍ مختلفة عن الآخرين، ولذا كثيرًا ما يواجهون صعوبة في التفاعل مع المُحيطين بهم، بل ويُتهمون بالجنون، وهو ما عبر عنه «أرسطو» بقوله «لا توجد عبقرية عظيمة دون لمسة من الجنون». وسواء قبلنا ذلك أو لم نقبله، فإن طريق العبقرية والإبداع – كما تُظهر السير الذاتية لكبار العلماء والمخترعين – هو طريق طويل ومتعرج، مرصوف بطقوسٍ وعادات غريبة يصعب أن نجد لها تفسيرًا. النماذج التالية مجرد لمحات سريعة لأغرب عادات العلماء الذين ساهموا في بناء حضارتنا الإنسانية وغيروا (...) مجرى التاريخ، وهي تؤكد أن العبقرية كينونة متحررة من الزمن؛ خروجٌ عن الذات، وانغماس في عالمٍ أسمى وأكثر رحابة! (shrink)

This article is devoted to define and characterize ‘Science’ as a discipline by the fundamental principles of scientific investigation. In particular, we propose and argue that ‘Science’ be defined by a set of principles / criteria which underlies scientific- investigation. We argue that this set must include the following principles: (1) Rationality, (2) Objectivity (3) Universality, (4) Internal Consistency, (5) Uniqueness, (6) Reproducibility, (7) The Principle of Falsification, (8) Simplicity and Elegance and (9) Experimental Observation and Verification. We elaborate, through (...) illustrative examples, the justification of the above set of criteria. `Scientific temper’ essentially means the cultivation of these principles, as attitudes / value-system adopted as “ways of life”. We discuss the relevance of the inculcation of scientific temper in the modern context. Finally, the scope and limitations of the scientific method are highlighted and an attempt is made to dispel several misconceptions and myths associated with Science and scientists. (shrink)

David Kinnebrook is remembered as the assistant to the Astronomer Royal dismissed in 1796 for marking stellar transits too slowly. Kinnebrook’s firing is commonly listed as the origin point for the personal equation and empirical psychology. Historians have viewed Kinnebrook as a slightly misused, though mute, party in the affair, drawing their accounts from Nevil Maskelyne’s published account of the dismissal. Kinnebrook’s letters, which resurfaced in 1985, detail a months-long dispute with Maskelyne concerning observational disagreements. The letters provide an account (...) of observational practice and individual differences in marking transits; they also detail Maskelyne’s failure to recognize an epistemic problem. Kinnebrook’s letters show that the problem of individual differences was known to Maskelyne as well as several of his contemporaries. Evidence from the letters shows that Maskelyne passed off six weeks of observations collected by his disgraced assistant as his own. The letters also state that Maskelyne had substantial personal observational differences with previous assistants. While Bessel later conjectured that Kinnebrook was under pressure to speed up his observations, Kinnebrook’s letters confirm that conjecture and reveal that Kinnebrook had a deeper comprehension of the epistemological problems of observation than has been recognized. Kinnebrook’s recognition of personal differences in marking stellar transits is a significant moment in the prehistory of the personal equation. (shrink)

There is, it is claimed, a long-standing link between photography and the realist novel. Nancy Armstrong in particular argues that the pictorial veridicality of literary realism is at least partly premised upon the rapid propagation of photographic images through late 19th century culture. In doing so, Armstrong argues that photography and realist fiction were mutual participants in an epistemological project wherein the horizons of the ‘real world’—at least within the context of literary fiction—were continuously and unconsciously drawn and redrawn. Meanwhile, (...) within the context of science and technology history, it is often taken for granted that late 19th century science photographers assumed that photographs provided direct, untrammelled access to an entirely different notion of the real: a real unviolated by the messy business of human perception and agency. While this notion is a gross misrepresentation of the facts of the matter, this is not to imply that late 19th century science photographs were ‘fictive’, at least in the sense intended by Armstrong, Novak, Helen Groth, and others. Although it might be the case that non-scientific applications of photography in the late 19th century were conducted in a fictive register, science photography proves a rather more challenging case. In the wake of this observation, this chapter first demarcates and define these conflicting notions of realism, in which I will demonstrate that the epistemic commitments of literary and metaphysical realism (specifically Cartesian realism) are categorically incompatible, though they share a common intuition. Subsequently, I then explain the value of photography to scientific practitioners by appealing to the formal properties of photographs. Third, I argue that although photographic processes guarantee that photographs are traces of the world, there is no further guarantee that those traces will be isomorphic to experience; whilst 19th century science photographs were undeniably visions of the world, they are parts of the world hitherto unseen by human eyes. Finally, I contend that science photography in the late 19th century anticipated key developments in philosophical realism—not least the transition from 18th and 19th century Cartesian realism to 20th century scientific realism. By revealing an invisible universe entirely unlike the one of our phenomenological experience, late 19th century science photography helped reintroduce humanity to a world in which we lack ontological rank or priority. (shrink)

There is a tendency to take mounted dinosaur skeletons at face value, as the raw data on which the science of paleontology is founded. But the truth is that mounted dinosaur skeletons are substantially intention-dependent—they are artifacts. More importantly, I argue, they are also substantially imagination-dependent: their production is substantially causally reliant on preparators’ creative imaginations, and their proper reception is predicated on audiences’ recreative imaginations. My main goal here is to show that dinosaur skeletal mounts are plausible candidates for (...) art-status. But, what is more, I think they are artworks—specifically, sculptures. (shrink)

I argue that forays into history of science in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1996) are by and large instances of “Great Man” history of science. “Great Man” history is the idea that history is the biography of great men. The “Great Man” of science model not only excludes women and people of color from science but also suggests that only special, exceptional people can succeed in science. If this is correct, then Kuhn (1962/1996) fails to usher in a (...) “historiographic revolution in the study of science” or a “new historiography” (Kuhn 1962/1996, 3), as the book purports to do. Instead, it merely perpetuates the defunct historiography of the “Great Man” of science. (shrink)

Scientific thinking is one of the most creative expressions of human cognition. This paper discusses my research contributions to the cognitive science of science. I have advanced the position that data on the cognitive practices of scientists drawn from extensive research into archival records of historical science or collected in extended ethnographic studies of contemporary science can provide valuable insight into the nature of scientific cognition and its relation to cognition in ordinary contexts. I focus on contributions of my research (...) on analogy, model-based reasoning, and conceptual change and on how scientists enhance their natural cognitive capacities by creating modeling environments that integrate cognitive, social, material, and cultural resources. I provide an outline of my trajectory from a physicist to a philosopher of science to a hybrid cognitive scientist in my quest to understand the nature of scientific thinking. (shrink)

The striving for a unification of the sciences, which characterises Hermann von Helmholtz's scientific work throughout, was influential for the neokantian movement that followed him. It concentrated on mathematical physics, was oriented towards a mechanistic world view and faced a process of increasing hypothetization. Starting points were his formulation of the law of energy conservation and his speech "Über das Sehen des Menschen" in 1855, which was regarded as a significant impulse for the renewed turn to Kant. In this speech, (...) Helmholtz substantiated his lifelong thesis of free will and the autonomy of thought. End points were his ideas on monocyclic systems and the principle of the least action. The physical efforts towards a formally founded unity were accompanied by manifold of synthetizations in special fields such as optics, acoustics and electrodynamics. The quest for unification was in tension with the specialisation of the sciences, which was already progressing at the time, and found its limit in the difference to the humanities recognised by Helmholtz and still relevant today. (shrink)

The European tradition makes a sharp distinction between animism and science. On the basis of this distinction, either animism is reproved for failing to reach the heights of science, or science is reproved for failing to reach the heights of animism. In this essay, I draw on work in the history and philosophy and science, combined with a method from the sociology of scientific knowledge, to question the sharpness of this distinction. Along the way, I also take guidance from the (...) research of North American Indigenous scholars. As it turns out, there is a rich, if largely overlooked, tradition of Aristotelian animism running through the history of modern European science, and this tradition sometimes resonates with Indigenous perspectives. By challenging the entrenched distinction between animism and science, I aim to help reconcile ongoing tensions between Indigenous and European scientific groups, and so strengthen prospects for their mutually beneficial cooperation. (shrink)

Neste livro reunimos alguns dos trabalhos apresentados no GT Filosofia, História e Sociologia da Ciência e da Tecnologia, durante o XIX Encontro Nacional da ANPOF, realizado em Goiânia, de 10 a 14 de outubro de 2022. Agradecemos aos autores e às autoras que contribuíram com seus textos para a realização deste projeto. Esperamos que os leitores e as leitoras aproveitem o rico material filosófico presente neste livro.

We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the \emph{phenomenological map}, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper's concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has (...) some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding ``abduction'' in the literature and its relation with ``analogy''. (shrink)

The history of the science of the stars (astronomy and astrology) in fourteenth-century Byzantium is significantly intertwined with the implications of theological and philosophical controversies. A less-explored astronomical text authored by the fourteenth-century Byzantine scholar Theorodos Meliteniotes (ca. 1320–1393 CE) provides new historical factors toward a historiography of the differences between scientific and theological discourses, their development in the transition to early modern times, and the different historical developments of science in the worlds of the Eastern and Western Churches.

In general, naturalistic philosophy deals with concepts that relate to the world as expressed in natural language, as it has evolved from a finite stock of root words substantially derived (in European languages) from Latin and Greek. In that sense naturalistic philosophy occupies an intermediate position between natural language and the appropriation of that language for uses in science. Our aim is to show that naturalistic philosophy is neither dead, nor is it to be found residing exclusively in a separate (...) discipline named “philosophy of science”. We maintain that although science and naturalistic philosophy have some methodologically distinct aspects, when properly described, science includes naturalistic philosophy. Naturalistic philosophy is entailed in activities from conceptualisation and theorisation, to interpretation of the products of science. We provide examples of the process of argumentation said to characterise naturalistic philosophy, as an integral part of the work of eminent scientists. This more complete view of what constitutes the doing of science has implications for the teaching of science, suggesting that at least some emphasis is required on the conjectural and creative aspects of science, as well as the purely methodological. (shrink)

Within contemporary science, it is common practice to compare data points to the average, i.e., to the statistical mean. Because this practice is so familiar, it might at first appear not to be the sort of thing that requires explanation. But recent research in cognitive science and in the history of science gives us reason to adopt the opposite perspective. Cognitive science research on the ways people ordinarily make sense of the world suggests that, instead of using a purely statistical (...) notion of the average, people tend to use a value-laden notion of the normal. Similarly, historical research on the scientific practices used in other time periods indicates that, prior to the nineteenth century, scientists tended to make use of a notion of the normal that was overtly value-laden. These findings give us reason to rethink certain familiar facts about scientific practice. In particular, they suggest that the fact that scientists so often make use of the statistical average should be seen as a highly surprising fact, the sort of thing that calls out for explanation. (shrink)

The year 2023 celebrates the 125th anniversary of the birth of Mark Yakovlevich Vygodsky, a famous Soviet mathematician and pedagogue, one of the founders of the Soviet school of the history of mathematics. Not only the scientist's scientific achievements, but also his significant contribution to pedagogical theory and practice, allow us to describe him as a significant scientific figure of the twentieth century. His mathematics textbooks and reference books are reprinted almost annually, so that his ideas continue to influence educational (...) and scientific practice to this day. This article is the second in a series of publications prepared by the author, who is the great-grandson of M.Y. Vygodsky. This research presents previously unpublished scientific results and discoveries concerning the life and work of the scholar. Firstly, based on archival data and family memories, detailed facts about his origins, young years and his development as a scientist are presented. At the same time, a rather complete chronology of M.Y. Vygodsky's scientific activity and personal life is compiled. Secondly, for the first time, a complete list of his main scientific contributions has been prepared, which makes it possible to assess the talent and the scale of his academic achievements. The presented results may be useful for prospective scientific and historical studies. In the modern context, it seems valuable to present a picture of M.Y. Vygodsky's life and work, as he was an interdisciplinary researcher and in this he was ahead of his time. In our changing world, contemporary challenges require the same interdisciplinarity to solve complex problems, and a fresh look at the life and work of a scholar like M.J. Vygodsky can stimulate inspiration in the modern researcher, student, and anyone seeking development and awareness. (shrink)

The article I wrote on the astrology research program (2022) has drawn criticism from G. Dean and I. Kelly (2023) that scarcely touches on my topics of effect sizes in single-factor, multi-factor, and automated whole-chart experimentation. They ignore the meta-analysis of current research and my explanation of emergent effects. Instead they try to impugn all of astrology by arguments that date from the time of Cicero and Augustine.

In this paper I propose a solution to the crucial issue of the number of styles of reasoning. Ever since, in the 1980s, Ian Hacking outlined what he later called the ‘project of styles of scientific reasoning’, for short the ‘styles project’, he has never provided criteria for individuating styles of reasoning. Whether or not certain ways of thinking can be counted as styles of reasoning in the sense of Hacking is a question that has remained unanswered, despite its apparent (...) relevance to various other controversial issues related to the styles project. I shall frame the issue within a view of categorization which begins with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein and culminates with the so-called theory of prototypes in psychological research. My conclusion will be that there is no clear boundary to the category of styles of reasoning and that degrees of category membership for a given way of thinking are determined by its degree of similarity to prototypes such as the statistical style of reasoning. (shrink)

A dominant strand of philosophical thought holds that natural kinds are clusters of objects with shared properties. Cluster theories of natural kinds are often taken to be a late twentieth-century development, prompted by dissatisfaction with essentialism in philosophy of biology. I will argue here, however, that a cluster theory of kinds had actually been formulated by William Whewell (1794-1866) more than a century earlier. Cluster theories of kinds can be characterized in terms of three central commitments, all of which are (...) present in Whewell’s work on classification. Like contemporary cluster theorists, Whewell claims that kinds are united by similarity, that many kinds do not have essences, and that there are “gaps” between kinds. Moreover, Whewell advises taxonomists to look for consilience (roughly, convergence) between different classificatory schemes, a recommendation that reinforces the identification of natural classes with property clusters. Thus Whewell was not only an early cluster theorist, but one with important insights into what a cluster theory of kinds means for the practice of classification. (shrink)

Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science Volume 77Issue 4 01 November 2023 Table of Contents -/- [1] C. T. Wolfe, “The life of matter: early modern vital matter theories,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 673–675, Nov. 2023. -/- [2] G. Giglioni, “Large as life: Francis Bacon on the animate matter of plants,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of (...) Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 677–696, Nov. 2023. -/- [3] L. Georgescu, “Cavendish on life,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 697–715, Nov. 2023. -/- [4] A. Clericuzio, “Thomas Willis’ iatrochemistry and the activity of matter,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 717–732, Nov. 2023. -/- [5] R. Garau, “Gassendi’s second thought. From a materialistic picture of cognition to the defence of dualism: the lasting influence of the polemic with Descartes,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 733–751, Nov. 2023. -/- [6] T. Demeter, “Sympathetic Organizations: body, mind, and society in Robert Whytt and David Hume,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 753–769, Nov. 2023. -/- [7] P. Pecere, “Materialism, Lebenskraft and the limits of science: metaphysical vitalism in post-Kantian scenarios,” Notes and Records: the Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 771–787, Nov. 2023. -/- . (shrink)

It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice (...) ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically. (shrink)

Why do corporations and wealthy philanthropists fund the human sciences? Examining the history of the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), a private research institute founded in the early 1980s, this article shows that funders can find as much value in the social worlds of the sciences they sponsor as in their ideas. SFI became increasingly dependent on funding from corporations and libertarian business leaders in the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, its intellectual work came to focus on the underlying (...) principles of adaptation, innovation, and decentralized coordination supposedly at work in ‘complex systems’ from biological ecosystems to markets and firms. This research cast the ideas of the libertarian economist Friedrich Hayek into a new scientific idiom. SFI also became a space where figures in business, media, academia, and politics could come to learn to see the world in a particular way—to acquire the subjectivity of what I call ‘the Santa Fe Institute libertarian’. At SFI, visitors did not simply learn the principles of neo-Hayekian complex system science. They came to see themselves as agents of social evolution, providing the spark that the free-market system needed to produce new technologies and new solutions to social problems without top-down political direction. For the Institute's corporate and libertarian financiers, SFI was not just a space where intellectuals described the world in favored ideological terms, but a space where elite actors became committed to the project of making a new political-economic order. (shrink)

Between the 1930s and the mid 1970s, it was commonly believed that in 1880 Karl Marx had proposed to dedicate to Charles Darwin a volume or translation of Capital but that Darwin had refused. The detail was often interpreted by scholars as having larger significance for the question of the relationship between Darwinian evolutionary biology and Marxist political economy. In 1973–4, two scholars working independently—Lewis Feuer, professor of sociology at Toronto, and Margaret Fay, a graduate student at Berkeley—determined simultaneously that (...) the traditional story of the proposed dedication was untrue, being based on a long-standing misinterpretation of the relevant correspondence. Between the two, and among several other scholars who became their respective allies, there developed a contest of authority and priority over the discovery. From 1975 to 1982, the controversy generated a considerable volume of spilled ink in both scholarly and popular publications. Drawing on previously unexamined archival resources, this article revisits the ‘case’ of the so-called ‘Darwin–Marx correspondence’ as an instance of the phenomenon of ‘multiple discovery’. A familiar occurrence in the natural sciences, multiple discovery is rarer in the humanities and social sciences. The present case of a priority dispute in the history of ideas followed patterns familiar from such disputes in the natural sciences, while also diverging from them in ways that shed light on the significance of disciplinary norms and research infrastructures. (shrink)

How did “science,” once a term used to refer to universal knowledge, come to be applied to the epistemic practices of particular civilizational and racial groups? This essay approaches this question by examining the life and writings of John Augustus Abayomi Cole, a Sierra Leonean medical practitioner and public intellectual who in the late nineteenth century used the term “science” to describe African knowledge systems. Cole’s writing on science in Africa was explicitly anti-imperial and grounded in a critique of the (...) “materialism” of European society. While reminding Africa’s European conquerors of the folly of their civilizing mission, Cole at the same time urged the “Europized” elite of Sierra Leone’s capital of Freetown to adapt themselves to African spiritual and scientific life. The essay argues that marginal intellectuals like Cole, whose thought was shaped by several interlocking local and intercontinental forces, were instrumental in generating the concept of civilization-specific science. (shrink)

In recent decades, scholarship in the history of science has explored the emergence and development of sciences in which fields serve as privileged sites of knowledge production. Much of this work has focused on the field sciences’ formative period from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, and it is the definitions of the field, fieldwork, and field science emerging from the study of this period that have come to dominate the historical literature. Those definitions cannot, however, account for (...) transformations that have taken place across many field sciences since the mid-twentieth century. Examining a diverse set of disciplines and contexts, the contributions to this Focus section reveal the specific conceptual and material contours of fields, fieldwork, and field sciences during this more recent period and suggest a number of unanswered questions and topics for future research. -/- . (shrink)

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scientific and technological developments made surgery safer, more reliable, and, with the corresponding increase in experimentation permitted, more exploratory and successful than ever before. The age of the heroic surgeon, however, obscured procedures that relied on the patient’s cooperation for a final, positive outcome. This essay focuses on the debates surrounding cleft palate surgery in Britain, Europe, and North America between about 1800 and 1930, where the constancy of failure dogged the surgeon, even (...) with improved operative surroundings. Although an anatomical correction could eventually be secured by surgery, without the patient’s participation in learning “normal” speech, the ultimate result was unsuccessful. Patient responsibility and self-control became, therefore, the key to success. By exploring what this meant for patients, their families, and surgeons, a new way of thinking about surgical outcomes, even during a period of increasing confidence in surgery, can be posited. -/- . (shrink)

Topic modeling—a text‐mining technique often used to uncover thematic structures in large collections of texts—has been increasingly frequently used in the context of the analysis of scholarly output. In this study, we construct a corpus of 19,488 texts published since 1971 in seven leading journals in the field of bioethics and philosophy of medicine, and we use a machine learning algorithm to identify almost 100 topics representing distinct themes of interest in the field. On the basis of intertopic correlations, we (...) group the content‐based topics into eight clusters, thus providing a novel, fine‐grained intellectual map of bioethics and philosophy of medicine. Moreover, we conduct a number of diachronic analyses, examining how the “prominence” of different topics has changed across time. In this way, we are able to observe the distinct patterns in which bioethics and philosophy of medicine have evolved and changed their focus over the past half a century. (shrink)

Language and thought are intimately related: philosophers have long debated how a given language may condition the oral and written expression of thought. The language chosen to communicate scientific discoveries may facilitate or impede international access to such knowledge. Vector and message may become intertwined in ways not yet fully understood: comparing and contrasting dictionary definitions of key terms, such as the Humboldtian Weltansicht, may provide useful insights into this process. Semantic prosody, a linguistic phenomenon brought to light by corpus (...) linguistics through the analysis of ever vaster corpora, may have unsuspected and even unconscious impacts on the perception of a message. A case study of data from WebsTerre, a diachronic corpus of geological English, explores a twentieth-century Kuhnian paradigm shift in Earth Science, from continental drift to plate tectonics, to demonstrate how interactions between semantic prosody and translation have the potential to alter the history of science. (shrink)

Table of Contents 0. Introduction Part I. Life and mechanism 1. Guido Giglioni (Macerata) Scaliger Bacon Harvey: A Trajectory in the Early Modern History of Vegetative Life 2. Andreas Blank (Klagenfurt) Jacob Schegk on Plants, Medicaments, and the Question of Emergence 3. Oana Matei (Arad/Bucharest) Particles, universal spirit, and seeds: John Evelyn's theory of matter in Elysium Britannicum 4. Luca Tonetti (Bologna) Stimulus and fibre theory in Giorgio Baglivi’s medicine: A reassessment 5. Antonio Clericuzio (Roma Tre) ‘Febris non est morbus, (...) sed bellum contra morbum’. A study of seventeenth-century theories of fevers. 6. Riccardo Chiaradonna (Roma Tre) Plotinus and Ficino in Ralph Cudworth’s philosophy of nature 7. Raphaële Andrault (CNRS-ENS Lyon) The chain of motions and the chain of thoughts. The diachronic mechanism of Spinoza's friends. 8. Antonio M. Nunziante (Padova) Both Natural and Supernatural: Leibniz’s Integrated Model of Life 9. Marco Storni (Neuchâtel) Experience, Analogy and Mechanism in Maupertuis’s Theory of Generation 10. Cécilia Bognon-Küss (Louvain-La-Neuve) Intussusception, vital mechanisms and the ontology of life 11. Charles Wolfe (Toulouse) Expanded mechanism or heuristic vitalism? Part II. Mechanisms of the mind 12. Emanuela Scribano (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice) Powers of the Body and Eclipse of the Soul. From Descartes On 13. Ursula Renz (Graz) Shaftesbury’s Conception of Human Thought 14. Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice) Psychology and Mechanism: Christian Wolff on the Soul-Body Analogy 15. Federico Boccaccini (Brasilia) Mental Machinery and active powers from Hartley to Ward 16. Paolo Pecere (Roma Tre) Mechanism, organization, mind: a Kantian legacy in 19th century psychology 17. Lydia Patton (Virginia Tech) Organic Memory and the Perils of Perigenesis: the Helmholtz-Hering Debate. (shrink)

Twentieth-century field research in the human sciences has repeatedly rendered specific communities and people as subjects of study. As scientists layered field upon field in the same spaces, subjects have gained their own forms of expertise. This essay examines the history of research in Terra Indígena Pimentel Barbosa, in what is now Central Brazil, to argue that fields are composed of human relations and that historians of science have the moral responsibility to recognize that fields are almost always someone’s home. (...) As we constitute our own fields, we accrue obligations of reciprocity, both with the scientists we study and with the communities that were their subjects. To study the past, we must attend reflexively to the futures we make possible. -/- . (shrink)

The Medical Research Council National Survey of Health and Development (NSHD) is Britain’s longest-running birth cohort study. From their birth in 1946 until the present day, its research participants, or study members, have filled out questionnaires and completed cognitive or physical examinations every few years. Among other outcomes, the findings of these studies have framed how we understand health inequalities. Throughout the decades and multiple follow-up studies, each year the study members have received a birthday card from the survey staff. (...) Although the birthday cards were originally produced in 1962 as a method to record changes of address at a time when the adolescent study members were potentially leaving school and home, they have become more than that with time. The cards mark, and have helped create, an ongoing evolving relationship between the NSHD and the surveyed study members, eventually coming to represent a relationship between the study members themselves. This article uses the birthday cards alongside archival material from the NSHD and oral history interviews with survey staff to trace the history of the growing awareness of importance of emotion within British social science research communities over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. It documents changing attitudes to science’s dependence on research participants, their well-being, and the collaborative nature of scientific research. The article deploys an intertextual approach to reading these texts alongside an attention to emotional communities drawing on the work of Barbara Rosenwein. (shrink)

With the powerful analyses and resources they enable, digital humanities tools have captivated researchers from many different fields who want to use them to study science. Digital tools, as well as funding agencies, research communities, and academic administrators, require researchers to think carefully about how they conceptualize, manage, and store data, and about what they plan to do with that data once a given project is over. The difficulties of developing strategies to address these problems can prevent new researchers from (...) sticking with digital tools and flummox even experienced researchers. To help overcome the data hurdle, we present five principles to help researchers, novice and experienced alike, conceptualize and plan for their data. We illustrate the use of those principles with two digital projects from the history of science, the Embryo Project and the Marine Biological Laboratory History Project, and their associated HPS Repository for data. The principles apply beyond the digital realm, so those who collect and manage data by more traditional means will also find them useful. (shrink)

In 2011, a 5,000-year-old “male” skeleton buried in a “female” way was discovered by an archaeological team just outside of modern-day Prague. This article queries the impulse to name such a discovery as evidence of transgender identity, and bodies, in an increasingly ancient past. To do so, it takes up the work of Denise Ferreira da Silva, Sylvia Wynter, and Hortense Spillers as a means to push back against the impetus to name such discoveries “transgender” in order to shore up (...) the legitimacy of contemporary trans identity. Each of these three thinkers offers a different vantage point for rethinking such naming practices that push the reader to consider how desires to name and place “transgender” in a distant past papers over the violence of plantation slavery, global imperialism, and the Enlightenment's shift toward scientific reason. This article argues not that such anthropological discoveries should not be considered transgender, but rather that the desire for them to be, or become, transgender does not legitimate contemporary transgender identity, and may instead treat certain iterations of transness as spatially and temporally universal. (shrink)

From 1754 to 1756 Kant wrote on such central, related topics as the axial rotation of the Earth, the theory of heat, and the composition of matter, focusing on space, force, and motion. It has been noted that each of these topics pertains to his 1755 Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, in which he drew on extant cosmogonies and the analogical form of Newtonianism developed by naturalists including Buffon, Haller, and Thomas Wright. How does Kant build on (...) these various sources? This article aims to provide a nuanced account of specific features of the relation between natural history and natural philosophy in Kant’s early developmental theory of the universe and to illuminate the strategy that guides his innovative, selective appropriation of contemporaneous insights. -/- . (shrink)

This article brings together the history of the social sciences and the history of social thought in Socialist Romania. It is concerned with the development of ideas about the social beyond collectivism, especially about the relationship between individual and society under socialism, from the early 1960s to the end of the 1970s. The analysis speaks to three major themes in the current historiography of Cold War social science. First, the article investigates the role of disciplinary specialization in the advancement of (...) new ideas about the social in the postwar period. Specifically, it asks how the debate over the relationship between sociology and Marxism-Leninism has challenged ideas about collectivism from Stalinist social science. Second, the article shows how social practice, individual and collective agency, and people's subjectivities became theoretically relevant in the 1960s, and how they were integrated, via empirical sociological research, into the reworked conceptual apparatus of post-Stalinist Marxism-Leninism. This complicates accounts about the role of quantification and theorization in postwar social science by foregrounding the intense reflection on the role of empirical research in sociology under state socialism. Third, the article shows how the relationship between individual and society became a topic of interest across social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s. The Marxist humanist approach to the social, although it never achieved the institutional status of a distinct discipline, adds an important perspective from East Central Europe to the existing historiography of the ‘thinning’ of the social in social sciences and social thought beginning in the 1950s. (shrink)