Victoria has seen an increase in Community of Inquiry-styled competitions, where students and participant schools are pitted against one another, assessed and ranked according to professed philosophical Communities of Inquiry (CoI) criteria. This has occurred in the context of the introduction of the ‘Capability’ Curriculum in Victorian schools by State and Federal Education Departments. Assessment indicators common to both performance in CoIs and Capabilities have led many to consider CoI as one of the more promising pedagogies of choice. Various competitions (...) model their events on the CoI format, but can they accord with the key characteristics that have historically defined this pedagogical practice? This paper seeks to examine the incompatibility between competitions that encourage contestants to gain superiority over others and the spirit of philosophical inquiry as conceived by the originators of CoI. Ultimately, we argue that competitions are largely incommensurate with philosophical CoI and suggest an admonitory approach if philosophy is to be associated with such competitions. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of the place for competition in philosophy by considering the example of the Philosothon, a popular school-based philosophy competition originating in Western Australia. Criticisms of this competition typically focus either on specific procedural problems, or else on the claim that the competitive spirit is inimical to collaborative philosophical inquiry. The former type of criticism is extrinsic to competitive philosophy per se, while the latter is intrinsic to it. Defenders of the Philosothon dismiss both types of (...) criticism by pointing to an allegedly ancient precedent, Socratic dialogue, as evidence that competition is not inimical to philosophy. If true, then procedural problems, where they can’t be eliminated or mitigated, can be accepted, on the basis that the Philosothon serves the greater good of promoting the practice of philosophy. My purpose in this paper is twofold. First, to explain both types of criticism based on a detailed description of the Philosothon’s rationale and procedures. Second, to challenge the promotional assertion used to dismiss the criticisms. Drawing on Plato scholarship, as well as research from social science, I suggest an alternative interpretation of the Philosothon, contrasting it with ancient philosophy and describing it instead in terms of ‘signalling’. (shrink)

The role of competition in philosophy is not just a pedagogical concern, but also a feminist concern. Competitive philosophy in schools is intrinsically linked to Janice Moulton’s feminist critique of academic philosophy referred to as ‘The Adversary Method’. She argues that dialogue that emphasises adversarial methods of argumentation promote dominant notions of masculinity. Many philosophers and educators argue that this traditional ideal of masculinity and the adversarial mode of communicating are problematic for a variety of reasons. There has also been (...) a broad array of empirical research demonstrating gender differences in classroom dialogue, including girls feeling targeted by teachers and boys due to the culture established with competitive-type dialogues. There is a direct link between this research and the espousal of masculine Reason in education. More, this kind of Reason is one that is overemphasised in competitive dialogues, such as debates or competitive philosophy. There are three primary concerns for competitive philosophy. Firstly, that it disadvantages girls in particular by over-emphasising masculine attributes. Secondly, that it disadvantages all students, regardless of sex, by over-emphasising masculine attributes. And thirdly, that it undermines the values of the Philosophy for/with Children and the Community of Inquiry approach by, again, over-emphasising masculine attributes. Therefore, the concern for competition in philosophy is not just about pedagogy, it is about justice. (shrink)

Philosophy contests proliferate today. The Philosophy Olympiads are the most common. In the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) community there is some concern about a possible contradiction between the cooperative and community-centred approach to the practice of philosophy in education and the intrinsic rivalry of competitions. The arguments against these contests focus on their main risks. It is thought that they potentially reinforce the particularly harmful meritocratic educational system while simultaneously increasing inequality and reinforcing private education. Furthermore, (...) the belief is that they promote destructive controversy where the goal is winning the debate. In Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI), however, notions exist that could potentially be favoured in these competitions. CoPI focuses on demanding and cooperative argumentative dialogue and encourage 'parresia', the assertive and reasoned defence of one’s ideas in adversarial contexts. Likewise, the Olympic principles promote fair play; the search for excellence and the ideals of 'isonomy', 'isegory' and 'isokratia', fostering participant skills and values which are desirable from an educational, philosophical and democratic perspective. We consider that, from an educational perspective as well as from the Philosophy for Children educational approach, participation in competition is possible and even desirable if the negative aspects it might have are addressed. (shrink)

Evoking the old saying that ‘children should be seen and not heard’, Jana Mohr Lone’s new book presents a powerful case for not merely hearing—but more, for 'listening' 'to' - children. Lone is the Executive Director of PLATO—the Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization affiliated with the University of Washington, Seattle (one of the leading forces for philosophy in schools in the USA)—and has been involved in bringing philosophical discussion into schools for over 25 years. She brings all this experience to (...) bear in this book. Before taking a good look at the book, I note that the publisher, Rowman & Littlefield, seems to have produced quite a few books in the philosophy in schools field recently, including Lone’s previous book 'The Philosophical Child', and a series edited by Tom Wartenberg. That a major publisher is interested in producing such books is a welcome sign indeed. (shrink)

Philosothons are events in which students practise Community of Philosophical Inquiry, usually with awards being made using three criteria: critical thinking, creative thinking and collaboration. This seems to generate a tension. On the one hand it recognises collaboration as a valued trait; on the other hand, the element of competition may seem antithetical to collaboration. There are various possible considerations relevant to this apparent problem. We can pose them as seven questions. One, do the awards really recognise the best performers? (...) Two, do the students and teachers see the awards as fair and reasonable? Three, do the awards recognise cooperation as a valuable contribution? Four, do Philosothons generate enthusiasm and goodwill? Five, might awards motivate students to try harder to do well? Six, if competition is normal in society, does it follow that it is justified as part of the Philosothon? Seven, do awards have a role in bringing the event to a climax? In this article, we will develop and evaluate the arguments suggested by these questions. Our conclusion is that the competitive element in the Philosothon is not antithetical to the collaborative ideal of philosophy. (shrink)

In the latest publication from their series on the founders of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement, Maughn Rollins Gregory and Megan Jane Laverty (2022) have offered us an exceptional gateway into the life and work of Gareth B Matthews. Matthews’ work can be divided into three distinct areas of research—philosophy and children’s literature, philosophy for children, and philosophy of childhood—which Gregory and Laverty distribute across the volume’s five parts. Each part includes representative publications by Matthews preceded by commentary and (...) critique from experts in the field. In this review, I will evaluate this work primarily from the perspective of a practitioner in the P4C movement and explain why it is a valuable resource for anyone with such a relationship to the field. (shrink)

Competition, and its effect on educational environments, has been widely debated. On the one hand, it is argued that competition raises attainment and, on the other, it is said that whilst it may raise attainment for some, it exists at the expense of a supportive school environment. Should philosophy undertaken as a subject in schools, such as P4C, involve any level of competition if there is a chance of it raising performance? Scholars have argued that communities of inquiry within P4C (...) conflict with the notion of competition, using competition as a contrast to cooperation, as competition implies that only certain voices will be heard and, without it, participation is more welcome and inclusive. Perhaps there is already too much competition in schools, in which case philosophy should be the one place students need not worry about competing with their peers and instead focus purely on collaboration. But what if the very skills that competition undermines are rewarded in a competition? While it stands that competition can silence particular voices and conflict with cooperation, I will argue that competition can avoid these outcomes and improve philosophical performance if such competition rewards collaboration and inquiry, therefore encouraging it. (shrink)

Competition plays a substantial and structural role in philosophy today. It is therefore remarkable that it has received little systematic ethical scrutiny in the literature until now. This paper aims to contribute to establishing a discussion about competition in the discipline of philosophy by arguing that philosophy is not inherently competitive and that competition tends to corrupt the practice of philosophy. Regarding, I argue that philosophy can best be understood as a cooperative endeavour. The idea that philosophy is a matter (...) of competitive adversarial argumentation impedes philosophers from achieving what philosophy is all about, that is, realising what Alasdair MacIntyre calls ‘internal goods’: acquiring greater wisdom and knowledge and getting closer to the truth. I then show that a lot of the competition that characterises today’s practice of philosophy revolves around obtaining external goods, such as money, status, prizes and academic positions. While external goods are needed to sustain and regulate the practice of philosophy, competition for such goods also tends to 'corrupt' the practice, by which I mean that internal goods are seriously compromised. This, in turn, excludes prospective philosophers who are not ‘competitive’ enough, which is also a loss for philosophy generally. (shrink)

Women are currently under-represented in academic philosophy. This paper first considers ways in which the competitive atmosphere of philosophy might help explain this lack of diversity. For example, women are stereotyped as less competitive and as less capable of exhibiting what are considered ‘winning behaviours’ in philosophy, leading to a more stressful, less rewarding experience; lower assessments of merit by themselves and others; and potential under-performance. Second, this paper draws out the implications of this discussion for high school philosophy competitions. (...) Are these competitions likely to further exacerbate existing trends of representation, by associating philosophy with competition and winning? I argue that the way that these philosophy competitions are set up, as friendly, low-stakes team events, rewarding attributes that are ‘stereotypically female’, mean that these events are likely to support, rather than damage, diversity in the discipline. Indeed, there are reasons to think that these events form an important part of an image-change that is required for philosophy if it is to become a more diverse discipline at university-level and beyond. I finish by offering a series of practical recommendations for high school philosophy competitions, in light of the aim of increasing diversity in academic philosophy, but also with the more immediate aim of making these competitions inclusive, enjoyable events for everyone. (shrink)

While trying to preserve the autonomy of their playful activity consisting in a game of ‘questioning and answering’, the Gymnosophists defy Alexander the Great and, more importantly, go against their own chances of survival. Thankfully, we do not need to face such dilemmas when philosophising with children. Nevertheless, the Gymnosophists’ example helps construct a notion of philosophy for/with children as an autonomous playful activity that albeit purposive it is, however, without purpose. Alluding to an Aristotelian sense of ‘'telos'’ in its (...) connection with Platonic ‘'paideia'’ I understand philosophy for/with children as an activity that we carry out for its own sake. This does not mean that we are to abolish elements such as antagonism, competition, excellence, etc.―there is no question: the competitive element is there. But what does it mean? We could fix its meaning according to a purpose or we might entertain the idea of keeping its meaning rather vague or undetermined, implicit. (shrink)

In his latest offering on the teaching of philosophy, a two-volume book titled 'Corrupting Youth', community of inquiry practitioner, educational researcher, award winning author and co-founder of the 'Philosophy Foundation ' Peter Worley, provides us with a comprehensive overview of his dialectical method of 'Philosophical Enquiry'. PhiE is a deliberately ‘informal’ but highly effective method of philosophising aimed at children of all ages. It is one whose underlying principles and techniques, Worley points out, can be traced to the ancient Greeks, (...) from pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides, to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. As the originator and leading exponent of contemporary PhiE, much of what Worley details here, though on the surface familiar and commonsensical, is the product of years of experience and careful consideration. The result, coupled with Worley’s knack for masterful storytelling, is a highly engaging and accessible introduction to a dialectic-based pedagogy that has gained increasing traction in recent years. (shrink)

Many competitions call themselves philosophical but the question what makes them philosophical has received little attention so far. The reason might be that it seems to have a simple answer according to which a philosophical competition is a rivalry about the best philosophical performance. In the paper, I argue that this answer is too simple. I suggest a richer analysis that defines philosophical competition as a striving play. I apply the richer notion to examples of contemporary competitions for high school (...) students, the International Philosophy Olympiad and debate competitions, in particular the Ethics Bowl. The richer analysis also serves to counter an argument against philosophical competitions. (shrink)

This paper explores an important yet overlooked aspect of Philosophy for Children : how children experience competitiveness in the Community of Philosophical Inquiry. It describes a qualitative case study conducted with 76 young people involved in CPI dialogues in formal and informal educational settings in Canada and New Zealand. Interviews and video observation revealed that participants often experienced dialogues as competitive exchanges in which ‘winning’ consisted of convincing others, while giving in to others’ opinions was associated with defeat and disappointment. (...) Participants recognised the potential dangers of competitiveness, notably the epistemic risk of excluding alternative perspectives and the social risk of damaging their relationships. Participants often successfully managed competitive dynamics by remaining engaged and open-minded. The last part of the paper discusses these findings in relation to theoretical work in P4C, notably Kennedy’s notion of the CPI as a ‘place of agon.’ Further, it argues that we should rethink the role of competitiveness in the CPI while remaining mindful of its risks, notably by considering its potential as a motivational drive and its place within a larger process of inquiry. (shrink)

Competition plays a substantial and structural role in philosophy today. It is therefore remarkable that it has received little systematic ethical scrutiny in the literature until now. This paper aims to contribute to establishing a discussion about competition in the discipline of philosophy by arguing (i) that philosophy is not inherently competitive and (ii) that competition tends to corrupt the practice of philosophy. Regarding (i), I argue that philosophy can best be understood as a cooperative endeavour. The idea that philosophy (...) is a matter of competitive adversarial argumentation impedes philosophers from achieving what philosophy is all about, that is, realising what Alasdair MacIntyre calls ‘internal goods’: acquiring greater wisdom and knowledge and getting closer to the truth. I then show that a lot of the competition that characterises today’s practice of philosophy revolves around obtaining external goods, such as money, status, prizes and academic positions. While external goods are needed to sustain and regulate the practice of philosophy, competition for such goods also tends to corrupt the practice (ii), by which I mean that internal goods are seriously compromised. This, in turn, excludes prospective philosophers who are not ‘competitive’ enough, which is also a loss for philosophy generally. (shrink)

While trying to preserve the autonomy of their playful activity consisting in a game of ‘questioning and answering’, the Gymnosophists defy Alexander the Great and, more importantly, go against their own chances of survival (since giving a wrong answer to the king’s question amounts to losing their life). Thankfully, we do not need to face such dilemmas when philosophising with children. Nevertheless, the Gymnosophists’ example helps construct a notion of philosophy for/with children as an autonomous playful activity that albeit (implicitly) (...) purposive it is, however, without (explicit) purpose (something akin to Kant’s aesthetic judgement). Alluding to an Aristotelian sense of ‘telos’ in its connection with Platonic ‘paideia’ I understand philosophy for/with children as an activity that we carry out for its own sake. This does not mean that we are to abolish elements such as antagonism, competition, excellence, etc.―there is no question: the competitive element is there. But what does it mean? We could fix its meaning according to a purpose (we compete to excel or persuade and win) or we might entertain the idea of keeping its meaning rather vague or undetermined, implicit. (shrink)