Year:

  1.  1
    Self-Reported Reasons for Moral Decisions.Tom Farsides, Paul Sparks & Donna Jessop - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):1-20.
    Many investigations of moral decision-making employ hypothetical scenarios in which each participant has to choose between two options. One option is usually deemed “utilitarian” and the other either “non-utilitarian” or “deontological”. Very little has been done to establish the validity of such measures. It is unclear what they measure, let alone how well they do so. In this exploratory study, participants were asked about the reasons for their decisions in six hypothetical scenarios. Various concerns contributed to each decision. Action decisions (...)
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  2.  1
    How Many Laypeople Holding a Popular Opinion Are Needed to Counter an Expert Opinion?Jos Hornikx, Adam J. L. Harris & Jordy Boekema - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):117-128.
    ABSTRACTIn everyday situations, people regularly receive information from large groups of people and from single experts. Although lay opinions and expert opinions have been studied extensively in isolation, the present study examined the relationship between the two by asking how many laypeople are needed to counter an expert opinion. A Bayesian formalisation allowed the prescription of this quantity. Participants were subsequently asked to assess how many laypeople are needed in different situations. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the (...)
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  3.  3
    Do Reasoning Limitations Undermine Discourse?Kuhn Deanna & Modrek Anahid - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):97-116.
    Why does discourse so often seem shallow, with people arguing past one another more than with one another? Might contributing causes be individual and logical rather than only dialogical? We consider here whether there exist errors in reasoning that could be particularly damaging in their effects on argumentive discourse. In particular, we examine implications for discourse of two such errors – explanation as a replacement for evidence and neglecting the likelihood of multiple causes contributing to an outcome. In Studies 1 (...)
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  4. Inferences From Disclosures About the Truth and Falsity of Expert Testimony.Sergio Moreno-Ríos & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):41-78.
    Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an expert's testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the expert's testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no (...)
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  5. Actively Open-Minded Thinking: Development of a Shortened Scale and Disentangling Attitudes Towards Knowledge and People.Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen & Marjaana Lindeman - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):21-40.
    Actively open-minded thinking is often used as a proxy for reflective thinking in research on reasoning and related fields. It is associated with less biased reasoning in many types of tasks. However, few studies have examined its psychometric properties and criterion validity. We developed a shortened, 17-item version of the AOT for quicker administration. AOT17 is highly correlated with the original 41-item scale and has highly similar relationships to other thinking dispositions, social competence and supernatural beliefs. Our analyses revealed that (...)
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  6. Endowment Effect Despite the Odds.Lukasz Walasek, Erica C. Yu & David A. Lagnado - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):79-96.
    Can ownership status influence probability judgements under condition of uncertainty? In three experiments, we presented our participants with a recording of a real horse race. We endowed half of our sample with a wager on a single horse to win the race, and the other half with money to spend to acquire the same wager. Across three large studies, we found the endowment effect – owners demanded significantly more for the wager than buyers were willing to pay to acquire it. (...)
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  7.  2
    Shared and Distinct Cue Utilization for Metacognitive Judgements During Reasoning and Memorisation.Ackerman Rakefet & Beller Yael - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):376-408.
    Metacognitive research is dominated by meta-memory studies; meta-reasoning research is nascent. Accessibility – the number of associations for a stimulus – is a reliable heuristic cue for Feeling of Knowing when answering knowledge questions. We used a similar cue, subjective accessibility, for exposing commonalities and differences between meta-reasoning and meta-memory. In Experiment 1, participants faced solvable Compound Remote Associate problems mixed with unsolvable random word triads. We collected initial Judgement of Solvability, final JOS and confidence. Experiment 2 focused on confidence, (...)
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  8. Comment on Løhre & Teigen . “There is a 60% Probability, but I Am 70% Certain: Communicative Consequences of External and Internal Expressions of Uncertainty”. [REVIEW]R. Fox Craig & Ülkümen Gülden - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):483-491.
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  9. Counterfactual and Semi-Factual Thoughts in Moral Judgements About Failed Attempts to Harm.Parkinson Mary & M. J. Byrne Ruth - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):409-448.
    People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It (...)
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  10.  1
    The Roles of the Temporal Lobe in Creative Insight: An Integrated Review.Wangbing Shen, Yuan Yuan, Chang Liu & Jing Luo - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):321-375.
    Recent studies have revealed that the temporal lobe, a cortical region thought to be in charge of episodic and semantic memory, is involved in creative insight. This work examines the contributions of discrete temporal regions to insight. Activity in the medial temporal regions is indicative of novelty recognition and detection, which is necessary for the formation of novel associations and the “Aha!” experience. The fusiform gyrus mainly affects the formation of gestalt-like representation and perspective taking. The anterior and posterior middle (...)
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  11. Expressing Certainty in No Uncertain Terms: Reply to Fox and Ülkümen.Karl Halvor Teigen & Erik Løhre - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):492-496.
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  12.  4
    The Rationality Quotient: Toward a Test of Rational Thinking, by Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, and Maggie E. Toplak. [REVIEW]Weller Joshua - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):497-502.
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  13.  3
    The Contributions of Convergent Thinking, Divergent Thinking, and Schizotypy to Solving Insight and Non-Insight Problems.E. Webb Margaret, R. Little Daniel, J. Cropper Simon & Roze Kayla - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):235-258.
    The ability to generate diverse ideas is valuable in solving creative problems ; yet, however advantageous, this ability is insufficient to solve the problem alone and requires the ability to logically deduce an assessment of correctness of each solution. Positive schizotypy may help isolate the aspects of divergent thinking prevalent in insight problem solving. Participants were presented with a measure of schizotypy, divergent and convergent thinking tasks, insight problems, and non-insight problems. We found no evidence for a relationship between schizotypy (...)
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  14.  3
    Dual Frames for Causal Induction: The Normative and the Heuristic.Hattori Ikuko, Hattori Masasi, E. Over David, Takahashi Tatsuji & Baratgin Jean - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):292-317.
    Causal induction in the real world often has to be quick and efficient as well as accurate. We propose that people use two different frames to achieve these goals. The A-frame consists of heuristic processes that presuppose rarity and can detect causally relevant factors quickly. The B-frame consists of analytic processes that can be highly accurate in detecting actual causes. Our dual frame theory implies that several factors affect whether people use the A-frame or the B-frame in causal induction: among (...)
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  15.  2
    The Cognitive Reflection Test Revisited: Exploring the Ways Individuals Solve the Test.B. Szaszi, A. Szollosi, B. Palfi & B. Aczel - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):207-234.
    Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test, the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several (...)
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  16.  1
    Risk It? Direct and Collateral Impacts of Peers' Verbal Expressions About Hazard Likelihoods.Paul D. Windschitl, Andrew R. Smith, Aaron M. Scherer & Jerry Suls - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):259-291.
    When people encounter potential hazards, their expectations and behaviours can be shaped by a variety of factors including other people's expressions of verbal likelihood. What is the impact of such expressions when a person also has numeric likelihood estimates from the same source? Two studies used a new task involving an abstract virtual environment in which people learned about and reacted to novel hazards. Verbal expressions attributed to peers influenced participants’ behaviour toward hazards even when numeric estimates were also available. (...)
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  17.  12
    How Semantic Memory Structure and Intelligence Contribute to Creative Thought: A Network Science Approach.Benedek Mathias, N. Kenett Yoed, Umdasch Konstantin, Anaki David, Faust Miriam & C. Neubauer Aljoscha - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2):158-183.
    The associative theory of creativity states that creativity is associated with differences in the structure of semantic memory, whereas the executive theory of creativity emphasises the role of top-down control for creative thought. For a powerful test of these accounts, individual semantic memory structure was modelled with a novel method based on semantic relatedness judgements and different criteria for network filtering were compared. The executive account was supported by a correlation between creative ability and broad retrieval ability. The associative account (...)
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  18.  2
    Are You Sure About That? Eliciting Confidence Ratings May Influence Performance on Raven's Progressive Matrices.Kit S. Double & Damian P. Birney - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2):190-206.
    Confidence ratings have often been integrated into reasoning and intelligence tasks as a means for assessing meta-reasoning processes. Although it is often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks has no effect on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be established empirically. The current study examines whether eliciting CR from participants during a fluid-reasoning task influences their performance and how this effect is moderated by their initial self-confidence in their own reasoning abilities. In a first experiment, we (...)
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  19.  9
    The Effect of Perspective-Taking on Reasoning About Strong and Weak Belief-Relevant Arguments.Matthew T. McCrudden, Ashleigh Barnes, Erin M. McTigue, Casey Welch & Eilidh MacDonald - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2):115-133.
    This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency and strength about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from (...)
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  20.  2
    What Causes Failure to Apply the Pigeonhole Principle in Simple Reasoning Problems?Mercier Hugo, Politzer Guy & Sperber Dan - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2):184-189.
    The Pigeonhole Principle states that if n items are sorted into m categories and if n > m, then at least one category must contain more than one item. For instance, if 22 pigeons are put into 17 pigeonholes, at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one pigeon. This principle seems intuitive, yet when told about a city with 220,000 inhabitants none of whom has more than 170,000 hairs on their head, many people think that it is merely likely (...)
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  21.  2
    Set Size, Assertion Form, Thematic Content and Sampling in the Selection Task.Raymond S. Nickerson, Susan F. Butler & Daniel H. Barch - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2):134-157.
    Participants attempted to solve a modified version of Wason's selection task. Variables were: sizes of the sets referenced by a specified assertion, form of the assertion, thematic content of the assertion, and the need for sampling or not. In Experiment 1, participants were given enough information to determine the truth or falsity of the specified assertion with certainty; in Experiment 2, they had to rely on sampling and could not determine the assertion's truth or falsity with certainty. Performance was better (...)
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  22.  11
    Studying the Role of Cognitive Control in Reasoning: Evidence for the Congruency Sequence Effect in the Ratio-Bias Task.Balazs Aczel & Bence Palfi - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):81-97.
    In this study, we investigated whether control of the conflict between incongruent heuristic and analytical answer options in a reasoning task is modulated by the presence of conflict on previous trials. In two experiments, we found that the incongruency of the previous trial has a significant effect on the control exhibited on the current trial. Our data also showed that this adaptation effect is modulated by the incongruency of the previous series of trials. These results demonstrate the same control adaptation (...)
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  23.  9
    Incidental Emotions Have a Greater Impact on the Logicality of Less Proficient Reasoners.Isabelle Blanchette & François Nougarou - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):98-113.
    Previous research shows differences in reasoning about emotional and neutral stimuli. A common explanation hypothesised for this effect is that emotion incurs an additional cognitive load. If this is the case, incidental emotion should have a greater impact on the reasoning of less proficient reasoners, and when items are more difficult, because a greater proportion of available cognitive resources must be allocated to the task. We manipulated the emotional value of reasoning stimuli using conditioning and with the simultaneous presentation of (...)
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  24.  13
    Challenges for the Sequential Two-System Model of Moral Judgement.Burcu Gürçay & Jonathan Baron - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):49-80.
    Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses (...)
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  25.  12
    Vittorio Girotto.Paolo Legrenzi & Phil Johnson-Laird - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):1-9.
  26.  26
    Illusory Inferences with Quantifiers.Salvador Mascarenhas & Philipp Koralus - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):33-48.
    The psychological study of reasoning with quantifiers has predominantly focused on inference patterns studied by Aristotle about two millennia ago. Modern logic has shown a wealth of inference patterns involving quantifiers that are far beyond the expressive power of Aristotelian syllogisms, and whose psychology should be explored. We bring to light a novel class of fallacious inference patterns, some of which are so attractive that they are tantamount to cognitive illusions. In tandem with recent insights from linguistics that quantifiers like (...)
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  27.  28
    Fast and Frugal Heuristics and Naturalistic Decision Making: A Review of Their Commonalities and Differences. [REVIEW]Yixing Shan & Lili Yang - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (1):10-32.
    Both the fast and frugal heuristics and the naturalistic decision making research programmes have identified important areas of inquiry previously neglected in the traditional study of human judgment and decision making, and have greatly contributed to the understanding of people's real-world decision making under environmental constraints. The two programmes share similar theoretical arguments regarding the rationality, optimality, and role of experience in decision making. Their commonalities have made them appealing to each other, and efforts have been made, by their leading (...)
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  28.  38
    Relevance Differently Affects the Truth, Acceptability, and Probability Evaluations of ‘and’, ‘but’, ‘Therefore’, and ‘If Then’.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Hannes Krahl & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning (4).
    In this study we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and ‘and’/‘but’/‘therefore’ sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege-Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across (...)
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