Rezension zu: Andreas Urs Sommer, Was bleibt von Nietzsches Philosophie?, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin 2018.

This paper tries to interpret Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values as a dialectical structure of Cynicism. Ancient Cynicism is regarded as the thesis, modern cynicism as its antithesis, namely its decadent form. In recent years this decadence has been somewhat overcome by the attempt to underline a new Cynicism, which can be seen as a synthesis. I’m well aware that Nietzsche did not appreciate Hegel. But I find this way of presentation quite convincing in the reading of his revaluation as (...) a dialectical structure. And the dialectical structure is not meant in the Hegelian sense, but in the broader sense of the word. Although Nietzsche strongly criticizes Hegel’s dialectic, one can also find ‘dialectical’ features in his philosophy. The three transformations of the spirit in Thus Spoke Zarathustra can be understood as a dialectical structure: The camel that obediently carries the heavy old values is considered the thesis. The lion, which no longer respects the old values and creates only freedom, is considered the antithesis. But only the child can create new values and so the final transformation of the spirit is considered the synthesis. Moreover, Oliver Dier sees an inner dialectical movement in Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence (Oliver Dier, Die Verwandlung der Wiederkunft, in: Nietzsche-Studien, 30 (2001), 133–174). According to Werner Stegmaier, the word “great” in late Nietzsche also has a dialectical sense (Werner Stegmaier, Nietzsches Befreiung der Philosophie. Kontextuelle Interpretation des V. Buchs der ‘Fröhlichen Wissenschaft’, Berlin a. Boston 2012, 29). Roberto Esposito considers Nietzsche’s biopolitics to be “inscribed in the dialectic of immunity and community” (Quoted from Vanessa Lemm, Nietzsche and biopolitics: Four readings of Nietzsche as a biopolitical thinker, in: Sergei Prozorov a. Simona Rentea [eds.], The Routledge Handbook of Biopolitics, New York 2017, 50–65; here: 51). I then compare Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values with the coin metaphor of Diogenes. The revaluation is close to Cynicism, both in a literary as well as in a philosophical way. The starting point of the revaluation is obviously Cynical. But Nietzsche takes the will to power much further than the Cynics. I subsequently discuss the danger that the revaluation of all values will result in a cynical nihilism and the way Nietzsche overcomes it with his doctrines of the eternal recurrence and the Übermensch. Finally, the paper concludes with the claim that Nietzsche completes his revaluation with his own Cynicism as a synthesis. (shrink)

Rezension zu: Andreas Urs Sommer, Was bleibt von Nietzsches Philosophie?, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin 2018.