Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 19 (2):151-193 (2014)

Lucas Angioni
University of Campinas
I argue that Topics VI does not contain any serious theory about definitions, but only a collection of advices for formulating definitions in a dialectical context, namely, definitions aiming to catch what the opponent means. Topics VI is full of inconsistencies that can be explained away by this approach: the inconsistencies reflect "acceptable opinions about definitions" that distinct groups of interlocutors accept. I also argue that the "topoi" need not be pieces of serious theory Aristotle is commited to. The "topoi" must also be considered as "endoxa", namely, as accepted opinions about how it is legitimate to draw an inference
Keywords dialectic  endoxa.  essencialism  definition  Aristotle  theory of argumentation  teoria da argumentação  dialética
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5216/phi.v19i2.31609
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Aristotle's First Principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle on Meaning and Essence.David Charles - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
257 ( #39,381 of 65,730 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,010 of 65,730 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes