Theoria 84 (2):140-156 (2018)

Authors
Avery Archer
George Washington University
Abstract
According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X. John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X. Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT – namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try – comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT from playing the kind of explanatory role the cognitivist requires. This article meets Brunero's challenge to SBT by offering an account of trying and intending to try that not only saves SBT from Brunero's criticism, but does so in a way that preserves the explanatory significance that cognitivists typically take SBT to have.
Keywords cognitivism  intending to try  intention  means‐ends coherence  practical reason
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12144
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert H. Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.
Practical Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Review of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.
Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

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Citations of this work BETA

Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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