This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

71 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 71
  1. Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.
    Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe Volume Two.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1981 - Blackwell.
  3. Intentions, Personal Agency, and Contemporary Psychological Theory.Frederick Webster Ansoff - 1998 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    Under many theories of motivation found in contemporary psychology there is no room for the concept of personal agency, that is of an individual who formulates and sets about realizing intentions. By intentions we refer to the content of announcements of causes of activity which the agent may or may not perform. Instead humans are typically conceived of as mere organisms which respond, release behaviors triggered by environmental cues or instinctual pressures, or sustain cybernetic regulatory systems which maintain set and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.
    According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X. John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X. Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT – namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try – comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Deliberative Intentions and Willingness to Act: A Reply to Professor Mele.Robert Audi - 1988 - Philosophia 18 (2-3):243-245.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Intention.Bruce Aune - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 4.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Thought and Action.S. F. Barker & Stuart Hampshire - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (3):392.
  8. Intention and Law.Errol Bedford - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):654-656.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Self-Deception and Selectivity: Reply to Jurjako.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):91-95.
    Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. The Motivational Strength of Intentions.Renée Bilodeau - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
    According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a belief desire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. The Motivational Strength of Intentions.Renée Bilodeau - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
    According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a beliefdesire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of them (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Du pouvoir causal des intentions.Renée Bilodeau - 2000 - Actes du XXVIIe Congrès de L’Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française:718-725.
    Je défends l'idée que le seul rôle causal des intentions est d'initier l'action. Elles ont, éventuellement, d’autres fonctions qui se manifestent pendant le déroulement de l’action. Toutefois, ces fonctions sont d’ordre délibératif, non causal.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Review of Kirk Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency, Collective Action: Volume 1. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):626-628.
  14. Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  15. Acting Intentionally and Acting Voluntarily.Jean Beer Blumenfeld - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):228-231.
  16. The Structure of Intentions.Margaret A. Boden - 1973 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 3 (1):23–46.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  17. Intentional Actions and Plans.Myles Brand - 1987 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):213-230.
  18. Intending and Acting.Myles Brand - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):261-264.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   50 citations  
  19. Simple Intention.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (3):245 - 259.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20. Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   42 citations  
  21. Intentions and Intending.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):139 - 149.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. Intentions and the Structure of Intending.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (15):453-466.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  23. The Structure of Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):633-647.
  24. In Re Intention.J. M. B. Crawford & John F. Quinn - 1977 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 51 (1):187 - 219.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Alan Donagan - 2017 - Routledge.
    This book, first published in 1987, investigates what distinguishes the part of human behaviour that is action from the part that is not. The distinction was clearly drawn by Socrates, and developed by Aristotle and the medievals, but key elements of their work became obscured in modern philosophy, and were not fully recovered when, under Wittgenstein’s influence, the theory of action was revived in analytical philosophy. This study aims to recover those elements, and to analyse them in terms of a (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Intending, Acting, and Doing.Luca Ferrero - manuscript
    PLEASE SEE PUBLISHED VERSION -/- I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Acting on Intentions.Claire Finkelstein - 2007 - In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Agency of Belief and Intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.
    In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Bratman on Identity Over Time and Identification at a Time.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):1-14.
    According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper, I discuss Michael Bratman’s well-known identification reductionist theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.
    It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Kulturalistische Handlungstheorie.Dirk Hartmann - 1996 - In Dirk Hartmann & Peter Janich (eds.), Methodischer Kulturalismus. Zwischen Naturalismus und Postmoderne. Suhrkamp. pp. 70-114.
    Die primäre Aufgabe des Artikels ist es, die Eckpfeiler einer methodisch-kulturalistischen Handlungstheorie einzuschlagen. Zunächst soll die kategoriale Unterscheidung von Handeln und Verhalten und die Notwendigkeit einer philosophischen Handlungstheorie motiviert werden. Darüber hinaus liefert der Aufsatz die terminologischen Grundlagen einer entsprechenden Handlungstheorie und es wird aufgezeigt, wie diese in eine Theorie des Sprechhandelns und eine Theorie der Handlungsdeutung erweitert werden kann.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.
    I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33. Trust and Will.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Judith Simon (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. “‘What on Earth Was I Thinking?’ How Anticipating Plan’s End Places an Intention in Time”.Edward Hinchman - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 87-107.
    How must you think about time when you form an intention? Obviously, you must think about the time of action. Must you frame the action in any broader prospect or retrospect? In this essay I argue that you must: you thereby commit yourself to a specific prospect of a future retrospect – a retrospect, indeed, on that very prospect. In forming an intention you project a future from which you will not ask regretfully, referring back to your follow-through on that (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Handling Og den Praktiske Kunnskapens Metafysikk.Heine A. Holmen - 2016 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift:5-19.
  36. Halfhearted Action and Control.Shepherd Joshua - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Christopher G. Framarin's Desire and Motivation in Indian Philosophy, Routledge Hindu Studies. [REVIEW]Malcolm Keating - 2013 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 133 (1):160-62.
  38. Against Representations with Two Directions of Fit.Arto Laitinen - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):179-199.
    The idea that there are representations with a double direction of fit has acquired a pride of place in contemporary debates on the ontology of institutions. This paper will argue against the very idea of anything at all having both directions of fit. There is a simple problem which has thus far gone unnoticed. The suggestion that there are representations with both directions of fit amounts to a suggestion that, in cases of discrepancy between a representation and the world, both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I.Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action. Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention, expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. The Volitive and the Executive Function of Intentions.Christoph Lumer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):511-527.
    Many philosophers of action, including Bratman and Mele, conceive intentions functionally, as executive states: intentions are mental states that represent an action and tend to cause this action. In the philosophical tradition (e.g. for Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant) another function of intentions, which may be called “volitive”, played a much more prominent role: intentions are mental states that represent what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realised and thus, in a possibly rational way, synthesise our motivational, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41. Intentions Are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.
    In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various philosophical theories of intention, among others that of Bratman. The hypothesis that intentions are optimality beliefs is defended on the basis of empirical decision theory. Present empirical decision theory however does not provide an empirically satisfying elaboration of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  43. Life and Action. [REVIEW]Eric Marcus - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):749-751.
  44. Intending Is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marusic & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Intention and Motivational Strength.Hugh McCann - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
    One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  46. The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Hugh J. McCann - 1998 - Cornell University Press.
    In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action ; the foundations of action ; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action ; explores the foundations of action and defends a volitional theory; (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  47. Pragmatism and Intention-in-Action.John McDowell - 2011 - In Rosa M. Calcaterra (ed.), New Perspectives on Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy. Editions Rodopi.
  48. “Some Remarks On Intention In Action”.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Studies in Social Justice:1-18.
    I suggest that intentions for the future become intentions in action when the time for acting comes. The image of intentions as a kind of continuant helpfully accommodates progress in an action; a persisting intention in action changes its shape in respect of how much of what is intended lies behind it and how much is still in prospect. Specific motor intentions in the course of, for instance, crossing a street are shapes successively taken by a persisting intention in action. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  49. What is the Content of an Intention in Action?John McDowell - 2010 - Ratio 23 (4):415-432.
    On the view proposed, the content of an intention in action is given by what one would say in expressing it, and the proper form for expressing such an intention is a statement about what one is doing: e.g. ‘I am doing such-and-such’. By contrast, some think that there are normative or evaluative elements to the content of an intention in action which would be left out of a form that merely stated facts. They think that the appropriate way to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  50. Control of Belief and Intention.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):337-346.
    This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of belief and that of intention. I do not defend this Symmetry View in detail, but rather try to adjudicate between different versions of it: what I call Evaluative, Normative and Teleological versions. I argue that the central motivation for the Symmetry View in fact supports only a specific Teleological version of the view.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 71