Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608 (2001)
Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism
|Keywords||dialetheism deflationism Liar paradox truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary.W. V. Quine - 1987 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Deflationism (About Theories of Truth).Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.
Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T.Douglas Eden Patterson - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):1-32.
Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.
Similar books and articles
On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox.Keith Simmons - 1987 - History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
Deflationary Truth and the Liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #96,531 of 2,178,178 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #166,021 of 2,178,178 )
How can I increase my downloads?