Creeped Out

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford studies in philosophy of mind. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2022)
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Abstract

This paper examines both creepiness and the distinctive reaction had to creepiness, being “creeped out.” The paper defends a response-dependent account of creepiness in terms of this distinctive reaction, contrasting our preferred account to others that might be offered. The paper concludes with a discussion of the value of detecting creepiness.

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Author Profiles

Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame
Sara Bernstein
University of Notre Dame

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References found in this work

Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sentiment and value.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (4):722-748.

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