Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 78 (5):991-1009 (2013)
Authors
Gregor Betz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Abstract
We use recently developed approaches in argumentation theory in order to revamp the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, thus alleviating the well-known paradoxes the H-D account faces. More specifically, we introduce the concept of dialectic confirmation on the background of the so-called theory of dialectical structures (Betz 2010, 2012b). Dialectic confirmation generalises hypothetico-deductive confirmation and mitigates the raven paradox, the grue paradox, the tacking paradox, the paradox from conceptual difference, and the problem of surprising evidence
Keywords hypothetico-deductivism  confirmation  degree of justification
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9406-3
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.

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