Classic invariantism, relevance and warranted assertability manœvres

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336 (2005)
Abstract
Jessica Brown effectively contends that Keith DeRose’s latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism’s chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if her position has not been ruled out, the classic invariantist must offer considerations in favor of her position if she is to convince us that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability maneuver that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this maneuver is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability maneuver—one that utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength—that affords a more successful defense of classic invariantism, and that helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00402.x
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References found in this work BETA
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context&Quot.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Knowledge, Assertion, and Context.K. DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111:167-203.
Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism?Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge and Implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.
WAMs: Why Worry?Peter Baumann - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.
Pragmatic Contextualism.Geoff Pynn - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):26-51.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism.Tim Black - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 8--27.
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