Assertion, knowledge, and context

Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.

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original DeRose, Keith (2002) "``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context"". Philosophical Review 111(2):167-203
original DeRose, Keith (2002) "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Review 111(2):167-203

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Keith DeRose
Yale University

References found in this work

Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Other Minds.J. L. Austin - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The myth of conventional implicature.Kent Bach - 1999 - Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366.
Contextualism: An explanation and defense.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 187--205.

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