Analysis 57 (3):179–186 (
1997)
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Abstract
There are two curious features about the backward induction argument
(BIA) to the effect that repeated non-cooperation is the rational solution to
the finite iterated prisoner’s dilemma (FIPD). First, however compelling the
argument may seem, one remains hesitant either to recommend this solu-
tion to players who are about to engage in cooperation or to explain
cooperation as a deviation from rational play in real-life FIPD’s. Second,
there seems to be a similarity between the BIA for the FIPD and the surprise exam paradox (SEP) and one cannot help but wonder whether the former is indeed no more than an instance of the latter. I argue that there is an important difference between the BIA for the FIPD and the SEP, but that a comparison to the SEP can help us understand why the conclusion of the BIA for the FIPD strikes us as a counterintuitive solution to real-life FIPD’s.