Betty Brancher and the Privileged Branch View of Personal Identity in the Many Worlds Framework

Abstract

This is an extension of my earlier work, How in the World Are There Many Worlds and it's a lot more interesting! This paper explores personal identity and persistence through time in the many-worlds framework, governed by the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (QM). First, I will motivate our consideration of the MWI in this context. Second, I will introduce endurantism, which is one answer to the puzzle concerning persistence through time. Third, I will explain the foundational physics underlying the MWI that lends itself to branching worlds. In turn, I will explain what exactly a world amounts to in this picture. Then, I will present three views on personal identity and persistence through time: the bye-bye Betty view, the every-branch view, and the privileged branch view. I will argue that the privileged branch view is the most attractive of the bunch for determining the best candidate among close continuers. Finally, I will discuss knowledge, attitudes, and moral responsibility within the privileged branch view.

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Logan Carter
Florida State University

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References found in this work

Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Theory.Tim Maudlin - 2019 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Quantum Worlds.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2016 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (1):45-60.

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