Rationality in mental disorders: too little or too much?

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):13-36 (2020)
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Abstract

The idea that mental illnesses are impairments in rationality is very old, and very common (Kasanin 1944; Harvey et al. 2004; Graham 2010). But is it true? In this article two severe mental disorders, schizophrenia and delusional disorder, are investigated in order to find some defects in rationality. Through the analysis of patients’ performances on different tests, and the investigation of their typical reasoning styles, I will show that mental disorders can be deficits in social cognition, or common sense, but not in rationality (Sass 1992; Johnson-Laird et al. 2006; Bergamin 2018). Moreover, my claim is that psychopathological patients can also be, in some circumstances, more logical than normal controls (Kemp et al. 1997; Owen et al. 2007). From a philosophical point of view these data seem to be very relevant, because they help us to reconsider our idea of rationality, and to challenge the common way to look at sanity and mental illness.

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Citations of this work

The societal response to psychopathy in the community.Marko Jurjako, Luca Malatesti & Inti Angelo Brazil - 2022 - International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 66 (15):1523–1549.
Expressivism about delusion attribution.Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):59-77.
Naturalizam i relativnost u pogledu praktičnih razloga (Engl. Naturalism and Relativism about Practical Reasons).Marko Jurjako - 2022 - In Boran Berčić, Aleksandra Golubović & Majda Trobok (eds.), HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović. Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. pp. 113-139.
Certainty and delusion.Rick Bellaar - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (7):1–25.

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