Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28 (1998)
In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different cognitive models of concept representation. We provide new support for Kuhn 's mature views that incommensurability can be caused by changes in only a few concepts, that even incommensurable conceptual systems can be rationally compared, and that scientific change of the most radical sort—the type labeled revolutionary in earlier studies—does not have to occur holistically and abruptly, but can be achieved by a historically more plausible accumulation of smaller changes. We go on to suggest that the parallel accounts of concepts found in Kuhn and in cognitive science lead to a new understanding of the nature of normal science, of the transition from normal science to crisis, and of scientific revolutions. The same account enables us to understand how scientific communities split to create groups supporting new paradigms, and to resolve various outstanding problems. In particular, we can identify the kind of change needed to create a revolution rather precisely. This new analysis also suggests reasons for the unidirectionality of scientific change.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate.Larry Laudan - 1984 - University of California Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kuhn on Essentialism and the Causal Theory of Reference.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):544-564.
Kuhn, Incommensurability, and Cognitive Science.Peter Barker - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (4):433-462.
Rereading Kuhn.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):217 – 224.
Similar books and articles
Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 1993 - University of Chicago Press.
Thomas Kuhn's Latest Notion of Incommensurability.Xiang Chen - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (2):257-273.
Thomas Kuhn and the Chemical Revolution.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2008 - Foundations of Chemistry 10 (2):101-115.
Thomas Kuhn's Cottage Fred d'Agostino ,Naturalizing Epistemology: Thomas Kuhn and the Essential Tension(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) Edwin H.-C. Hung ,Beyond Kuhn: Scientific Explanation, Theory Structure, Incommensurability and Physical Necessity(Hants: Ashgate, 2006) Hanne Andersen , Peter Barker , and Xiang Chen ,The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). [REVIEW]Alex Levine - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (3):369-377.
Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions.Xiang Chen & Peter Barker - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology.Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.
Added to index2009-03-08
Total downloads208 ( #18,960 of 2,164,591 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #33,332 of 2,164,591 )
How can I increase my downloads?