Abstract

This book is mainly a review of those areas of philosophy most closely associated with science. The author generally describes the positions held by representative philosophers in the analytic tradition, quoting liberally, and indicating his approval or disapproval. The review begins with philosophy of science. The scientific method is described as the process of collecting facts by observation and then using induction and deduction to set up theories with explanatory and predictive power. An exposition of the Hempel and Oppenheim theory of explanation follows. George holds that the meaning of theoretical terms may or may not change when a new theory is formulated. The next subject, epistemology, begins with a discussion of the concepts of imagination, memory, knowledge, and perception. George holds that "know" means "believe with conviction." Nevertheless, he maintains that we can never know empirical propositions; only a degree of confirmation is possible. George assumes Realism, and believes that scientific knowledge can be used to solve some problems of perception. The laws of perspective, for example, explain why a penny looks elliptical. George subscribes to the correspondence criterion of truth; coherence and pragmatic utility are only tests. Davidson's views on truth and meaning usher in the philosophy of language. Various sorts of meaning are distinguished, and the work of Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine, Dummett, Carnap, Pearce, Price, Austin, Grice, Searle, Bennett, Korzybski, Morris, Osgood, and Rozeboom is reviewed. Chomsky's influence on the study of grammar is described in some detail. The book concludes with a brief survey of logic. The topics include reference and predication, the propositional and predicate calculi, many-valued logics and "fuzzy" reasoning, formalization and axiomatization, and Turing machines and neural nets.