The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief

American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124 (1992)
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Richard Foley
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Citations of this work

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.

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References found in this work

``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs".Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247-257.
Rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):129 - 145.

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