Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):17-32 (1989)
AbstractIt has been suggested that moods are higher order-dispositions. This proposal is considered, and various shortcomings uncovered. The notion of a higher-order disposition is replaced by the more general notion of a higher-order functional state. An account is given in which moods are higher-order functional states, and the overall system of moods is a higher-order functional description of the mind. This proposal is defended in two ways. First, it is shown to capture some central features of our pre-scientific conception of moods. Secondly, it is argued that the account is more likely to be psychologically realistic (in a sense to be defined) than accounts which are behaviourally equivalent, but which do not employ a hierarchy of functional descriptions. It is suggested that the hierarchical structure of the model mirrors a feature of the physical states that realise moods and emotions
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References found in this work
Toward a General Psychobiological Theory of Emotions.Jaak Panksepp - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):407-422.
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Citations of this work
Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.Alex Madva - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78.
Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion.Paul E. Griffiths - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.
Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion.P. E. Griffiths - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175.
Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
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