In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70 (2018)

Authors
Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
In previous work, I defend the following disparity between moral and epistemic facts: whereas moral facts are irreducibly normative, epistemic facts – facts such as that some subject is epistemically justified in believing something – are reducible to facts from some other domain (such as facts about probabilities).  This moral-epistemic disparity is significant because it undercuts an important kind of argument for robust moral realism.  My defense of epistemic reductionism and of the moral-epistemic disparity has been criticized by Richard Rowland (2013) and by Terence Cuneo and Christos Kyriacou (forthcoming). This paper aims to rebut these criticisms and, more generally, to clarify and strengthen the case for epistemic reductionism and the moral-epistemic disparity.
Keywords epistemic normativity  reductionism in metaepistemology  moral non-naturalism  epistemic reasons  naturalized epistemology
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):1-18.

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