'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness

Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63 (2007)
Abstract
I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: e is some way as regards its subject; e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; e is some way in the awareness of its subject; e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-005
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Citations of this work BETA
‘What It is Like’ Talk is Not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.
Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Misrepresenting Consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.

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Discussion
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There  is 1 thread in this forum
2009-12-20
This is by a wide margin my most-downloaded paper on PhilPapers. Why is this? I don't think it's my /best/ paper -- 'Multidisjunctive' and 'Externalist's guide' are more interesting, in my view; and 'Noise' is (IMHO!) the final word on its subject-matter (if sort of hard to read).
Theories:
  1. High-profile forum? (But 'Noise', in /Mind/, has way fewer downloads)
  2. Critical? (But this paper has more than twice as many downloads as the paper it criticizes)
  3. On the rarely discussed topic of the language of experience reports? (But see the previous)
  4. Feet in several categories? 
Somewhat inclined to think it's all of these working together: it's the most-downloaded paper in Pronouns and Anaphora, and the fourth most-downloaded paper in What is it Like?; also there's stuff in there for the active HOT community; and there's the imprimatur of /Phil Review/; and it opens a can of, ah, criticism of Lormand's weird view, for fun.


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