'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness

Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63 (2007)
Authors
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: e is some way as regards its subject; e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; e is some way in the awareness of its subject; e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-005
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Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Misrepresenting Consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
‘What It is Like’ Talk is Not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.

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