How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection
Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):673-692 (2006)
Abstract
The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes , is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. . Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310, 116–119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reportsAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.004
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Citations of this work
Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.
Magic at the marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of tea.Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, Betty Tärning, Sverker Sikström & Thérèse Deutgen - 2010 - Cognition 117 (1):54-61.
References found in this work
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
A solution to Plato's problem: The latent semantic analysis theory of acquisition, induction, and representation of knowledge.Thomas K. Landauer & Susan T. Dumais - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):211-240.
Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task.Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson - 2005 - Science 310 (5745):116-119.