Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366 (2003)

Authors
John Greco
Georgetown University
Abstract
This essay defends virtue reliabilism against a line of argument put forward by Duncan Pritchard. In the process, it discusses (1) the motivations for virtue reliabilism, (2) some analogies between epistemic virtue and moral virtue, and (3) the relation between virtue (epistemic and otherwise) and luck (epistemic and otherwise). It argues that considerations about virtue and luck suggest a solution to Gettier problems from the perspective of a virtue theory.
Keywords virtue  luck  credit  epistemology  reliabilism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9973.00278
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Westview Press.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.

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Citations of this work BETA

Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):229 – 243.

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