Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):713-732 (2000)
Abstract |
Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions andomissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturallyselected for. Many have thought that from this premise we canjustify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse's view that the moreplausible implication is an error theory – the idea thatmorality is an illusion foisted upon us by evolution. Thenaturalistic fallacy is a red herring in this debate,since there is really nothing that counts as a ‘fallacy’ at all. If morality is an illusion, it appears to followthat we should, upon discovering this, abolish moraldiscourse on pain of irrationality. I argue that thisconclusion is too hasty, and that we may be able usefullyto employ a moral discourse, warts and all, withoutbelieving in it.
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Keywords | Darwin error theory ethics evolution evolutionary ethics Mackie naturalistic fallacy Ruse |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2004 |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1023/A:1006742813396 |
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References found in this work BETA
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.Philippa Foot - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
View all 23 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Do Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rest on a Mistake About Evolutionary Explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.
Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach.Robert Carry Osborne - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.
The Nature of Moral Judgements and the Extent of the Moral Domain.Ben Fraser - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):1-16.
The Argument From Disagreement and the Role of Cross-Cultural Empirical Data.Ben Fraser & Marc Hauser - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):541-560.
View all 18 citations / Add more citations
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