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  1.  73
    Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality.Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What would it mean to apply quantum theory, without restriction and without involving any notion of measurement and state reduction, to the whole universe? What would realism about the quantum state then imply? This book brings together an illustrious team of philosophers and physicists to debate these questions. The contributors broadly agree on the need, or aspiration, for a realist theory that unites micro- and macro-worlds. But they disagree on what this implies. Some argue that if unitary quantum evolution has (...)
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  2.  53
    Non-Contextuality, Finite Precision Measurement and the Kochen–Specker Theorem.Jonathan Barrett & Adrian Kent - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (2):151-176.
  3.  8
    Non-Contextuality, Finite Precision Measurement and the Kochen–Specker Theorem.Jonathan Barrett & Adrian Kent - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (2):151-176.
  4. Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism.Jonathan Barrett - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...)
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  5.  74
    Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW]Jonathan Barrett - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. (...)
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  6.  55
    Rationalizing Explanation and Causally Relevant Mental Properties.Jonathan Barrett - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.
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  7. Mental Causation.Jonathan Barrett - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
    This dissertation is concerned with whether mental properties can be causally relevant to behavior, that is, whether a mental event can cause a piece of behavior by virtue of its mental properties. Since it seems that my behavior is not just a causal consequence of my beliefs and desires, but is caused by those beliefs and desires precisely because they are those beliefs and desires, an affirmative answer to this question is commonly taken to be required for a successful philosophical (...)
     
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