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Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen
Abstract
In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Extended emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):1-24.
Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.
The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values.Heersmink Richard & Carter J. Adam - 2020 - Memory Studies 13 (4):416-433.
References found in this work
Achieving knowledge: a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity.John Greco - 2010 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.
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