Dunn's relevant predication, real properties and identity

Erkenntnis 47 (1):37-65 (1997)
Abstract
We critically investigate and refine Dunn's relevant predication, his formalisation of the notion of a real property. We argue that Dunn's original dialectical moves presuppose some interpretation of relevant identity, though none is given. We then re-motivate the proposal in a broader context, considering the prospects for a classical formalisation of real properties, particularly of Geach's implicit distinction between real and ''Cambridge'' properties. After arguing against these prospects, we turn to relevance logic, re-motivating relevant predication with Geach's distinction in mind. Finally we draw out some consequences of Dunn's proposal for the theory of identity in relevance logic.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005306200547
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Relevant Identity.Philip Kremer - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):199-222.

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