Relevance, relatedness and restricted set theory

In Georg Schurz (ed.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. pp. 45--56 (1991)
Relevance logic has become ontologically fertile. No longer is the idea of relevance restricted in its application to purely logical relations among propositions, for as Dunn has shown in his (1987), it is possible to extend the idea in such a way that we can distinguish also between relevant and irrelevant predications, as for example between “Reagan is tall” and “Reagan is such that Socrates is wise”. Dunn shows that we can exploit certain special properties of identity within the context of standard relevance logic in a way which allows us to discriminate further between relevant and irrelevant properties, as also between relevant and irrelevant relations. The idea yields a family of ontologically interesting results concerning the different ways in which attributes and objects may hang together. Because of certain notorious peculiarities of relevance logic, however,1 Dunn’s idea breaks down where the attempt is made to have it bear fruit in application to relations among entities which are of homogeneous type.
Keywords relevance logic  Michael Dunn
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Barry Smith (1999). Truthmaker Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291.

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